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 In 1972, Branzburg v. Hayes required the Supreme Court to consider whether the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution conferred on journalists a right to quash grand jury 
subpoenas issued by the government.  The Court held in a five-to-four opinion that it did not.  
Yet, in 2011, a federal district judge found that James Risen, a New York Times reporter, had a 
First Amendment reporter’s privilege that protected him from having to reveal his source for a 
book chapter about a secretive CIA operation.  This judge is not alone in finding such a privilege 
in spite of Branzburg; indeed, many judges have come to the same conclusion.   
This thesis, through an analysis of post-Branzburg cases at the federal courts of appeals 
level, attempts to map the current landscape.  It finds that Branzburg jurisprudence is in tatters, 
with some courts of appeals finding a reporter’s privilege and others not.  It further finds that the 
courts that do find a privilege fail to weigh the First Amendment interests in each case, opting 
instead for sweeping but vacuous pronouncements of the benefits of the First Amendment.   
Taking this landscape under consideration, this thesis suggests that Branzburg is the 
problem – not the solution and offers a way for courts to escape from under Branzburg’s thumb 
by recognizing that subsequent case law has implicitly dismissed the presumption on which 
Branzburg is based.  It further extrapolates from this subsequent case law the principle that the 
First Amendment is implicated when the government or a private party acts adversely to a 
speaker because of his speech.  Having recognized that the First Amendment is implicated by 
subpoenas against journalists, it then argues that the only way to account for all of the interests 
involved is to identify and appraise the value of the First Amendment interests in light of First 
Amendment theory and weigh those interests against the countervailing interests.  Finally, it 




CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
James Risen, Operation Merlin, and the Source 
 
“If you are in jail, how do we help you?” 
“Send cards.”1 
 
“I am going to fight this subpoena,” James Risen, a New York Times (“Times”) reporter, 
said after being served with a subpoena approved by Attorney General Eric Holder, demanding 
that he reveal the identity of a confidential source.2  “I will always protect my sources, and I 
think this is a fight about the First Amendment and the freedom of the press.”3 
Risen is a 57 year-old veteran Times investigative reporter who specializes in national 
security matters4 and is well known in reporting circles.5  In 2002, he and a team of Times 
reporters won a Pulitzer Prize for 9/11 reporting.6  Four years later, Risen and Eric Lichtblau, 
also of the Times, won a Pulitzer for their work in uncovering the George W. Bush 
                                                
1 An exchange between, respectively, Lowell Bergman and James Risen on a pending subpoena and looming 
 The title of this thesis “Speak, and Speak Immediately” comes from Henry Anatole Grunwald, the former 
managing editor of Time magazine, who said, “Journalism can never be silent: that is its greatest virtue and its 
greatest fault.  It must speak, and speak immediately, while the echoes of wonder, the claims of triumph and the 
signs of horror are still in the air.”  BOB KELLY, WORTH REPEATING: MORE THAN 5000 CLASSIC AND 
CONTEMPORARY QUOTES 192 (2008). 
2 United States attorneys must seek permission under a Department of Justice guideline to subpoena 
reporters.  See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10.  The guideline requires that the government first exhaust all reasonable 
alternatives to obtain the information sought in the subpoena, and that the information sought is “essential” to the 
government’s case.  See generally id.  Even if the Department of Justice violates this guideline, however, the 
guideline does not confer any individual rights and therefore, a violation of the rule is of no moment to a court.  See 
In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The regulations are not themselves binding on the 
special prosecutor[.]”); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings No. 92-4, 42 F.3d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he 
guideline ‘is of the kind to be enforced internally by a governmental department, and not by courts.’” (citing In re 
Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 854 (4th Cir. 1992)); U.S. v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 2011). 
3 Charlie Savage, Subpoena Issued to Writer in C.I.A.-Iran Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011, at A18.  
4 See Notice and Motion of James Risen to Quash Subpoena and/or for a Protective Order at 1, U.S. v. 
Sterling, No. 10-cr-00485-LMB, (E.D. Va. June 21, 2011) [hereinafter Mot. to Quash]. 
5 He has twice won a Pulitzer Prize.  See generally Mot. to Quash at 1.  





administration’s use of secret eavesdropping in the wake of 9/11.7  He is also the author of 
several books.8  
Risen’s success has come with a price.  He is currently fighting a wave of subpoenas9 that 
the United States has issued against him.10  The most recent series of subpoenas stems from 
Risen’s recent book: State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration.11  
In researching the book, Risen relied on a confidential source who gave him information about a 
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) operation; the government’s subpoenas demand that Risen 
identify his source for the book.12 
The classified information allegedly disclosed related to Operation Merlin – an operation 
where the CIA “recruited a former Russian scientist . . . to provide Iranian officials with faulty 
nuclear blueprints.”13  In late 1998, the CIA assigned Jeffery Sterling, a CIA operations officer, 
to handle the Russian scientist involved in Operation Merlin.14  The operation was botched from 
the outset.15  Indeed, the blueprints the CIA gave the Russian scientist contained “flaws” too 
obvious to be subtle, as was intended.16  Despite these flaws, the CIA instructed the scientist to 
                                                
7 2006 Pulitzer Prize Winners, THE PULITZER PRIZES, http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2006-National-
Reporting.   
8 See, e.g., MATT BEARDEN & JAMES RISEN, THE MAIN ENEMY: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE CIA’S FINAL 
SHOWDOWN WITH THE KGB (2003); JAMES RISEN & JUDY THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN 
ABORTION WAR (1999). 
9 Charlie Savage, Ex-C.I.A. Officer Named in Disclosure Indictment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, at A15 (“He 
was twice subpoenaed to divulge his source; once by the Bush administration, and, after the first grand jury 
investigating the case expired, again last year by the Obama administration.”).  
10  Id; see also Charlie Savage, U.S. Gathered Personal Data on Times Reporter in Case Against Ex-C.I.A. 
Agent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at A14 (noting that “Mr. Risen has refused to talk about his sources”). 
11 See, e.g., Gov’t’s Mot. in Limine to Admit Testimony of James Risen, Sterling, No. 10-cr-00485-LMB, 
(E.D. Va. May 23, 2011) [hereinafter Mot. to Admit]; see also JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY 
OF THE C.I.A. AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006). 
12 Mot. to Admit, supra note 11. 
13  Mem. Op. at 1, In re Grand Jury Subpoena to James Risen, No. 08-dm-61-LMB (E.D. Va. June 28, 2011). 
14  Brief for Petitioner at 5, U.S. v. Sterling, No. 11-5028 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 2012). 
15  Risen Declaration at 7, Sterling, No. 10-cr-485 (E.D. Va. June 21, 2011) (stating that “Merlin was deeply 
flawed and mismanaged from the start”). 




deliver the plans to the Iranians in hopes that officials would rely on them to create useless 
weapons.17 
 After the operation concluded unsuccessfully, a CIA operative, alleged to be Sterling, 
who was familiar with the operation, explained the mismanagement to Risen.18  Shortly after 
Risen and the source exchanged phone calls and emails in 2003, Risen called the CIA Office of 
Public Affairs and asked if it wished to comment on the operation.19  On April 30, 2003, four 
weeks after Risen made the call to the CIA, he met with the then-Times Washington Bureau 
Chief Jill Abramson, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and CIA Director George 
Tenet.20  Rice and Tenet convinced the Times not to publish the story under the auspices that 
doing so would “compromise national security.”21 
Although the story remained off the front page of the Times, Risen continued to research 
Operation Merlin.22  That research led to Chapter Nine of his 2006 State of War book, “A Rogue 
Operation.”23  In Chapter Nine, Risen described Operation Merlin’s problems – problems, of 
course, that were supposed to be classified and most definitely not in the hands of a journalist.24  
In March 2006, with the ink on Risen’s book still wet, the government convened a grand jury to 
determine whether sufficient evidence existed to indict the source who supplied Risen with 
classified information.25  On January 28, 2008,26 the government subpoenaed Risen for the 
                                                
17  Mot. to Quash, supra note 4, at 5. 
18  Mot. to Admit, supra note 11, at 1. 
19  June 28 Mem. Op., supra note 13, at 3-4. 
20  Id. at 5-6. 
21  Id. at 6. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  Mot. to Admit, supra note 11, Ex. A. 
25  June 28 Mem. Op., supra note 13, at 9. 
26 Id.  The government believed that Sterling was the operative who spoke with Risen, because Sterling was 
familiar with the operation and upset with the CIA after being fired in early 2002.  Id. at 3-4.  Moreover, the 
government knew that Sterling had a relationship with Risen, as Risen published an article about Sterling’s 




identity of the source.27  Initially, the district court disallowed several lines of government 
questioning, because the government’s case was already so strong.28  Nonetheless, the court did 
find that Risen must reveal the identity of the source because some evidence suggested that 
Risen had told another person the name of the source, destroying any confidentiality.29  In many 
respects, then, the government and Risen won some and lost some. 
Both parties asked the court to reconsider its split ruling.30  While the court was 
considering the parties’ motions to reconsider, the government again subpoenaed Risen, 
demanding that he testify in front of the grand jury within forty-eight hours.31  Risen protested to 
the court, which ordered that Risen need not appear before the grand jury.32  Eventually, these 
tactical gerrymanders cost the government time, and its 2008 grand jury expired without any 
indictment against Risen’s alleged source.33 
While the Obama administration had the discretion not to pursue the action after it came 
into power, it decided to continue the action. 34  As a result, Risen was subpoenaed yet again on 
January 19, 2010.35  Essentially, the government – while not demanding the name of Risen’s 
source – asked for “the where, the what, the how, and the when” Risen learned about Operation 
Merlin.36  Despite the government’s insistence, the court, in sum and substance, quashed that 
                                                
27  Id. 
28 Id. at 9.  
29 Id.   
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 10.  
32 Id.  
33  Id.   
34  As the court would later summarize, “On August 5, 2009, the Court issued an order staying argument of the 
motions for reconsideration, to allow the new Attorney General an opportunity to evaluate the wisdom of 
reauthorizing the subpoena, given its significant First Amendment implications.”  Id.  The government decided to 
convene a new grand jury in mid-2009.  Id.   
35 Id.   
36  June 28 Mem. Op., supra note 13, at 12.  The subpoena did, however, ask for “all Rolodex and contact 
information [that Risen had] for Sterling, all notes related to Risen’s reporting on Chapter [Nine], and drafts of book 




subpoena also.37  The court found that a general inquiry into how Risen acquired the information 
would “violate his confidentiality agreement [and] would essentially destroy the reporter’s 
privilege.” 38 
 On December 22, 2010, without Risen’s testimony, the grand jury brought an indictment 
against the man it believed to be Risen’s source – the CIA operative, Jeffrey Sterling.  The grand 
jury based its decision on electronic communications between Sterling and Risen, as well as 
Risen’s past articles relating to Sterling’s employment lawsuit against the CIA.39  The indictment 
charged Sterling under the Espionage Act40 with two-counts of Unauthorized Disclosure of 
National Defense Information, Unlawful Retention of Classified Information, Mail Fraud, 
Unauthorized Conveyance of Government Property, and Obstruction of Justice.41   
 Soon after the grand jury indicted Sterling, Risen received a third subpoena – this time 
ordering him to appear at Sterling’s trial.42  This subpoena asked, in part, that Risen identify his 
source at Sterling’s trial.43  As he did with the previous two subpoenas, Risen moved to quash 
the trial subpoena, arguing that he was protected by a constitutional reporter’s privilege found in 
                                                
37  Id. at 11. 
38  Id. at 34. 
39 Mem. Op. at 4-8, U.S. v. Sterling, No. 10-cr-485 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2011) (discussing the government’s 
evidence against Sterling, including his employment history at the CIA, a March 2, 2002 New York Times article 
about Sterling’s racial discrimination lawsuit against the CIA written by Risen, Sterling’s past attempts to publicize 
U.S. action in Iran, and telephone conversations). 
40 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 et seq. 
41  Id. at 10.   
42  July 29 Mem. Op., supra note 39, at 10. 




the First Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses.44  The trial court granted that motion,45 and 
the government appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which has yet to issue an opinion in the case.46 
One Rule in Athens and Another in Rome 
Forty years ago in Branzburg v. Hayes,47 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that 
the constitutional reporter’s privilege invoked by Risen in the district court did not exist.48  At 
the time the decision was handed down, the Times recognized the intractable truth of its holding: 
“[Branzburg] contained a firm rejection of the theory that the First Amendment shields newsmen 
. . . from having to testify.”49 
It is well understood that “lower courts are bound to follow [the Supreme] Court’s 
decision[s] until they are withdrawn or modified.”50  This is true even of those decisions that 
lower court judges may find nonsensical51 or vehemently disagree with.52  Thus, conventional 
wisdom would suggest that after Branzburg courts would not recognize a reporter’s 
constitutional right not to respond to a subpoena.53   
                                                
44  Id. at 10-14.  
45 U.S. v. Sterling, 818 F. Supp. 2d 945, 960 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“Rather than explaining why the government’s 
need for Risen’s testimony outweighs the qualified reporter’s privilege, the government devotes most of its energy 
to arguing that the reporter’s privilege does not exist in criminal proceedings that are brought in good faith.  Fourth 
Circuit precedent does not support that position.”). 
46 Notice of Appeal at 1, U.S. v. Sterling, No. 10-cr-485 (E.D. Va. October 19, 2011); see also U.S. v. 
Sterling, No. 10-cr-485 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-5028 (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 2011). 
47  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also U.S. v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Any 
discussion of the newsreporters’ privilege must start with an examination of Branzburg . . . .”). 
48  Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 665. 
49  Press Loses Pleas to Keep Data from Grand Juries, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1972, at A1 (emphasis added). 
50  Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307 (2012) (statement of Ginsburg, J.). 
51 C. A. Durr Packing Co., Inc. v. Shaugnessy, 189 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1951) (Learned, J., dissenting) (stating 
in a different context, “Frankly, I have never felt sure that I understood the reasoning of the Supreme Court; but we 
are bound to treat the decision as authoritative . . . .”). 
52 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of Montana, 271 P.3d 1, 34 (Mont. 2011) (McGrath, C.J., 
dissenting) (“While, as a member of this Court, I am bound to follow Citizens United, I do not have to agree with the 
Supreme Court’s decision.  And, to be absolutely clear, I do not agree with it.” (internal footnote omitted)), cert. 
granted, judgment rev’d sub nom., Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). 
53  Johnson v. DeSoto Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 72 F.3d 1556, 1559 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The binding 




Judge Leona Brinkema, the Southern District of New York judge assigned to Risen’s 
case, has challenged this conventional wisdom.  In Risen’s case, she unambiguously held, “The 
Fourth Circuit recognizes a qualified [constitutional] reporter’s privilege.”54  Surprisingly, Judge 
Brinkema’s conclusion is not an aberration; multiple circuits have arrived at similar 
conclusions.55  This has left those judges who decline to recognize a reporter’s privilege in light 
of Branzburg to accuse judges who find the privilege as being “less faithful in adhering to the 
explicit decision in Branzburg”56 and “skating on thin ice.”57  Quite simply, Branzburg 
jurisprudence is a mess.58  
Perhaps confusion below can be excused, however, as even the Supreme Court seems 
unsure of Branzburg’s meaning.  In some instances, justices have indicated that Branzburg 
requires that a court “balanc[e the] interest in effective grand jury proceedings against [the] 
burden on reporters’ news gathering from requiring disclosure of sources.”59  In others, justices 
have found that Branzburg foreclosed the applicability of such a balancing test: “[T]he First 
                                                
54  Id. 
55  See, e.g., U.S. v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recognizing a constitutional reporter’s privilege 
that required a balancing test); U.S. v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181 (1st Cir. 1988) (balancing First 
Amendment interests in the criminal context); U.S. v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) (adopting, in 
the criminal context, the Fifth Circuit’s approach to balancing First Amendment interests in the civil context); U.S. 
v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983) (adopting for criminal cases its language from civil cases that recognize a 
reporter’s privilege); U.S. v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.1980) (noting that Branzburg’s assertion that 
newsgathering is protected by the First Amendment supports a reporter’s privilege in criminal trials); U.S. v. 
Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1977) (adopting language from the lower court’s dissent that used Justice 
Powell’s concurrence to find a reporter’s privilege); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975) (recognizing 
a First Amendment privilege in criminal trials); see also In re Williams, 963 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming a 
lower court’s finding that a reporter had a constitutional privilege not to testify at a grand jury). 
56  U.S. v. King, 194 F.R.D. 569, 580 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
57  McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.); see also U.S. v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 
966 (5th Cir. 1998). 
58  As one commentator wrote, “Branzburg . . . [has] caused great confusion in the lower federal courts . . . .”  
Scott J. Street, Poor Richard’s Forgotten Press Clause: How Journalists Can Use Original Intent to Protect Their 
Confidential Sources, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 463, 477 (2007).   
59  Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 631 (1990); see also Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 859-60 
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that “a fair reading of . . . Branzburg makes plain that the result hinged on an 




Amendment does not provide newsmen with [a] testimonial privilege to be free of relevant 
questioning about sources by a grand jury.”60 
 This confused state of the law has resulted in “‘one rule in Athens, and another rule in 
Rome,’” where the resolution of a case turns largely on where the case is brought.61  This split is 
especially “awkward” as it requires “persons present in several circuits [to] conduct themselves 
in accordance with varying rules.”62  Moreover, with efforts to pass a federal shield law failing in 
the wake of the WikiLeaks saga, the existence of a reporter’s privilege is more important than 
ever as journalists are defenseless to subpoenas at the federal level.63  The recent “uptick” of 
subpoenas against journalists further elevated the importance of this issue.64 
It is this motley state of affairs that propels this look back at the jurisprudence following 
Branzburg in hopes of looking forward to a more cohesive reporter’s privilege doctrine.  In order 
to define a more workable rule than Branzburg, it is necessary to explore the various nuances of 
past cases, including their procedural posture and factual circumstances.  To that end, this thesis 
first explains Branzburg, the only Supreme Court case to discuss comprehensively a 
constitutional reporter’s privilege.  It then frames this discussion with a description of First 
Amendment theory.  Broadening the discussion, it describes literature and case law regarding 
journalists’ newsgathering right.  Next, it explains its method for gathering and analyzing post-
Branzburg cases concerning subpoenas against journalists.  Finally, it surveys controlling courts 
                                                
60  In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1314-15 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers). 
61  Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 838 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers). 
62  U.S. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 179 (1984). 
63 J.C. Derrick, Federal Shield Law Introduced in House Once More, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR THE 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Sept. 19, 2011, http://www.rcfp.org/node/98369 (describing the seventeen-year effort to 
pass a federal shield law). 
64 “One lawyer for a national media company said he has noticed a ‘significant uptick’ in the number of 
confidential-source subpoenas in the past five years, especially in federal cases, and Associated Press General 
Counsel Dave Tomlin reported a ‘slight uptick’ in all subpoena activity, but particularly in federal cases.”  Erik 
Ugland, The New Abridged Reporter’s Privilege: Policies, Principles, and Pathological Perspectives, 71 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1, 60 (2010) (describing the number of subpoenas issued in the five years preceding 2010); see also Letter from 
Carmen L. Mallon, Chief of Staff of the Office of Information Policy, Dep’t of Justice, to author (Sept. 27, 2012) 




of appeals’ decisions regarding a reporter’s privilege and concludes that the current, 
contradictory status quo is unmanageable and ignores basic First Amendment tenants and offers 





CHAPTER 2.  BACKGROUND 
Branzburg v. Hayes, The Fountainhead 
Branzburg placed the Court in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between 
two conflicting constitutional values: the freedom of the press secured by the First Amendment 
and the requirement of grand jury proceedings secured by the Fifth Amendment.65  This collision 
of constitutional values created an internal conflict that is palpable in the Court’s opinion, and 
especially, in Justice Powell’s concurring opinion.66  In an attempt to reconcile these two values 
by giving precedent to the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause,67 the Court penned an opinion 
that was at once unambiguous and ambiguous.68 
The Facts 
 
On November 15, 1969, the Louisville Courier-Journal printed Paul Branzburg’s article 
titled “The Hash They Make Isn’t to Eat.”69  The article described a meeting between Branzburg 
and hashish manufacturers and included a photograph of a drug manufacturer’s hands working 
                                                
65  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-84 (1972). 
66  Id. at 707 (finding that although the journalists in the cases before it had no privilege, in some cases 
journalists may have a privilege as “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections”); see also id. at 
710 (Powell, J., concurring) (concurring that there is no First Amendment reporter’s privilege but nonetheless noting 
that “the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests 
require protection”). 
67 “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).  The basic purpose of the 
grand jury “is to limit [a man’s] jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently 
of either prosecuting attorney or judge.”  Stirone v. U.S., 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960).  
68  Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists’ 
Confidentiality, 1795-2005, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425, 454 (2006) (noting that the majority’s otherwise clear ruling 
that there is no reporter’s privilege under the First Amendment is subject to the limiting language in the majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinion). 
69  Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 345 (Ky. 1970).  Branzburg also wrote another article about 
narcotics use in Frankfurt, Kentucky.  Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669.  For that story, Branzburg “had ‘spent two weeks 




with hashish.70  In order to report on drug manufacturing in the area, Branzburg promised the 
drug manufacturers that he would keep all identities confidential.71 
Just ten days after the story ran, a grand jury subpoenaed Branzburg, demanding that he 
identify his sources.72  Branzburg appeared before the grand jury but refused to name names.73  
With contempt charges looming, the trial court stayed the grand jury proceedings due to the 
“intrinsically important [First Amendment] issues” presented.74  After reviewing the case though, 
the court concluded that Branzburg had waived any First Amendment argument when his 
counsel conceded that “the general weight of authority seems to hold that there is no 
constitutional guarantee to such a privilege.”75  The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed.76 
The “Plurality” Opinion77 
 
 In the Supreme Court’s view, the “sole issue” before it78 was “whether requiring 
newsmen to appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech 
and press guaranteed by the First Amendment.”79  The Court concluded curtly: “[I]t does not.”80 
                                                
70  Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667. 
71  Id. at 667-68.  Obviously, the drug manufacturers were nervous and did not want to be arrested; the article 
quoted one manufacturer as saying, “I don’t know why I’m letting you do this story[.]  To make the narcs [sic] mad, 
I guess.  That’s the main reason.”  Id. at 668 n.1. 
72  Id. n.2; see also Branzburg, 461 S.W.2d at 346. 
73  Branzburg, 461 S.W.2d at 346. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 346 n.1.  The court also found that Branzburg was not protected by Kentucky’s shield law.  Id. at 348. 
76  Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971) (“The speculation that the mere appearance of a news 
reporter before a grand jury might jeopardize his rapport with . . . the drug culture, causing its loss of confidence in 
him and . . . inhibiting his ability to obtain information, is so tenuous that it does not . . . present an issue of 
abridgement of the freedom of the press . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665. 
77  As will be explained, Justice Powell joined the Chief Justice and Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist.  
See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.  Justice Powell also wrote a concurring opinion that, at first blush, does not 
appear to be in line with the majority opinion that he joined.  Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).  This has caused 
some courts to describe what would normally be considered the majority opinion as a plurality instead.  See, e.g., 
U.S. v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Although the opinion of the Branzburg Court was joined by 
five justices, one of those five, Justice Powell, added a brief concurrence.  For this reason, we have previously 
construed Branzburg as a plurality opinion.”); see also Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearing on H.R. 837, H.R. 1084, 
H.R.15891, H.R. 15972, H.R. 16527, H.R. 16716, and H.R. 16542 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 2 (1972) (statement of Irwin Karp, Authors League of America) (“Actually it is four-and-a-
half to four-and-a-half under the Powell opinion, because when you read Justice Powell’s opinion you find him 




 Justice White, writing for the Court, began by summarizing in broad strokes Branzburg’s 
arguments.81  First, Branzburg asserted that confidential sources were necessary for him to gather 
and disseminate news.82  And second, he claimed that requiring him to name his sources would 
result in sources refusing to speak to journalists about sensitive matters, which would impede the 
gathering and disseminating of news.83   
                                                                                                                                                       
78  There were also companion cases.  The companion cases to Branzburg, In re Pappas and Caldwell, arose 
under similar circumstances.  Both reporters in those cases were in the process of investigating the inner workings of 
the Black Panther Party.  See In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 298 (Mass. 1971); Caldwell v. U.S., 434 F.2d 1081, 
1083 (9th Cir. 1970).  In Caldwell, the Times hired Caldwell, a black reporter, to write stories about the Black 
Panther Party’s activities.  BILL TURNER, WILLIAM BENNETT TURNER, & ANTHONY LEWIS, FIGURES OF SPEECH: 
FIRST AMENDMENT HEROES AND VILLAINS 83 (2010).  According to some legal historians, Caldwell was the Times’ 
“emissary to the black radical movement.”  Id. at 84.  Using his position, Caldwell covered the Black Panther 
movement, eventually writing sixteen articles about the movement.  Id. at 83.  One of Caldwell’s articles quoted a 
Black Panther as saying that whites who agreed with the Panthers’ stance should “[g]ive [the Panthers] some money 
and some guns.”  Id. at 84. After the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted several failed interviews with 
Caldwell, the government subpoenaed him on February 2, 1970.  Id. at 85. 
 Caldwell, like Branzburg, moved to quash the subpoena.  Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 362 
(N.D. Cal. 1970), vacated sub nom. Caldwell, 434 F.2d 1081, rev’d sub nom. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.  While the 
lower court did not quash the subpoena, it did, among other things, state that Caldwell could “not be required to 
reveal confidential associations, sources or information received, developed or maintained by him as a professional 
journalist.”  Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1083.  Despite this limitation on the subpoena, Caldwell appealed.  Id. at 1086.  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that there was a constitutional reporter’s privilege.  Id. at 
1083-86.  Having found a privilege, the court went on to balance the interests of Caldwell, the public, and the Black 
Panthers against the government’s interest.  It held that if a journalist can show “that the public’s First Amendment 
right to be informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist to submit to secret Grand Jury interrogation, the 
Government must respond by demonstrating a compelling need for the witness’s presence before judicial process 
properly can issue to require attendance.”  Id. at 1089.   
In In re Pappas, Pappas, a television newsman, went to cover a Black Panther meeting that police were 
intending to raid.  In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 298.  Unfortunately, when Pappas arrived in the early afternoon, he 
was met by a barricade in front of the store where the meeting was to be held.  Id.  Pappas waited outside the 
barricaded store until he gained access in the mid-afternoon, after which he covered the reading of a statement 
prepared by the Black Panthers.  Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672.  Pappas would later return to the location to cover the 
impending police raid and was admitted entrance on the condition that he would keep certain information 
confidential.  Id.  While the raid never occurred, that same night “there was gunfire in certain streets” as a result of 
civil disorder.  Id. at 674.   
Like Branzburg, Pappas was later subpoenaed to appear in front of a grand jury.  Id.  He refused to testify 
as to the identities of the people in the store.  Id.  Pappas moved to quash the subpoena insofar as it required him to 
divulge information he gained as a result of his confidentiality agreement.  Id.  The trial judge found that Pappas did 
not enjoy a reporter’s privilege.  Id.  More specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court found that “it is the duty of all 
citizens having relevant knowledge to assist in such inquiries when called upon to do so.”  Id. at 614. 
79  Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667. 
80  Id.  Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. 
81 Id. at 679-80.  In fact, the court was summarizing Branzburg’s arguments, as well as the arguments of the 
reporters in the two companion cases.  For readability, this thesis discusses the disposition of the case by referring 
principally to Branzburg. 
82 Id. at 679.  




In order to protect these concerns, Branzburg argued that the forced disclosure of 
confidential sources was prohibited by a constitutional reporter’s privilege unless “sufficient 
grounds are shown for believing that the reporter possesses information relevant to a crime . . . , 
that the information the reporter has is unavailable from other sources, and that the need for the 
information is sufficiently compelling to overide [sic] the claimed invasion of First Amendment 
interests occasioned by the disclosure.”84  To buttress this argument, Branzburg relied on First 
Amendment theory that held dear self-realization and self-governance values: 
Principally relied upon are prior cases emphasizing the importance of the First 
Amendment guarantees to individual development and to our system of 
representative government, decisions requiring that official action with adverse 
impact on First Amendment rights be justified by a public interest that is 
‘compelling’ or ‘paramount,’ and those precedents establishing the principle that 
justifiable governmental goals may not be achieved by unduly broad means 
having an unnecessary impact on protected rights of speech, press, or 
association.85  
 
In short, the basis of Branzburg’s privilege claim rested on the newsgathering interests at stake 
outweighing the public’s interest in effective law enforcement.86 
 Even though Justice White accepted Branzburg’s assertion that “news gathering does . . . 
qualify for First Amendment protection,”87 he nonetheless found against him.  He did so by 
relying on two related categories of cases in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  The 
first category rested on the conclusion that “valid laws serving substantial public interests may be 
enforced against the press as against others, despite the possible burden that may be imposed [on 
                                                
84 Id. at 680.  
85 Id. at 680-81 (internal footnotes omitted).  This approach amounted to Branzburg citing, somewhat 
indiscriminately, fifteen of the Court’s First Amendment decisions.  Id. at 680-81 nn.17-19.  For example, 
Branzburg cited Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), a case striking down as unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment, a Los Angeles ordinance that required handbill distributors to, among other things, list their names on 
the handbill.  Id.  Branzburg also cited Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), a case where the Court struck 
down as unconstitutional under the First Amendment a statute that required union organizers to apply for an 
“organizer’s card” from the Secretary of State before making a speech.  Id.  
86 Id. at 681.  




the press’s ability to gather news].”88  The other class of cases rejected the idea that the press has 
a special right of access greater than the public.89  Bringing these two categories of cases 
together, Justice White saw no support for the argument that the press should have a special – an 
unequal – right in relation to the public:  “It is . . . not surprising that the great weight of 
authority is that newsmen are not exempt from the normal duty of appearing before a grand jury 
and answering questions relevant to a criminal investigation.”90 
 Justice White also found support for this conclusion in history.91  Few courts had ever 
found that reporter’s had an exclusive special right not to testify92: “Although the powers of the 
grand jury are not unlimited and are subject to the supervision of a judge, the longstanding 
principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence,’ . . . is particularly applicable 
to grand jury proceedings.”93  Even in modern U.S. law, the reporter’s privilege was “uniformly 
rejected.”94  Justice White concluded in an often-repeated passage: 
[W]e cannot seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a 
newsman’s agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence 
thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime than to do something 
about it.  Insofar as any reporter in these cases undertook not to reveal or testify 
about the crime he witnessed, his claim of privilege under the First Amendment 
presents no substantial question.95 
 
Justice White next cast aside several of the arguments Branzburg put forward to support 
the proposition that within the First Amendment a reporter’s privilege exists.96  First, he noted 
                                                
88 Id. at 682-83.   
89  Id. at 684.   
90 Id. at 685.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 688.  The Justice was reaffirmed of his conclusion, because, even at that time, the majority of states 
had declined to pass shield laws protecting journalists from having to divulge confidential sources.  Id. at 689.  For 
an extensive discussion of modern day shield laws see Sandra Davidson & David Herrera, Needed: More Than A 
Paper Shield, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1277, 1329 (2012). 
94 Id. at 685-86 (citing Garland v. Torres, 259 F.2d 545 (2nd Cir. 1958)).  
95 Id. at 692. 




that while a belief in the potential chilling effect alleged by Branzburg was “not irrational,” “the 
evidence fail[ed] to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the flow of 
news to the public.”97  Moreover, even if sources did not come forward for fear of being 
identified, the Court thought that the government’s interest in ferreting out crime outweighed the 
public interest in the unrestricted flow of news.98  Indeed, “it [was] obvious that agreements to 
conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from 
the standpoint of public policy.”99   
In one last salvo, Justice White rejected Branzburg’s remaining argument that the 
“refusal to provide a First Amendment reporter’s privilege will undermine the freedom of the 
press to collect and disseminate news.”100  The Court was unconvinced for numerous reasons.  
First, journalists historically never benefitted from a constitutional privilege, and, nonetheless 
had been able to disseminate news.101  Second, the mere changing culture of journalism – the 
increasing use of subpoenas, new styles of reporting, and a greater need for confidential sources 
inside the administrative state – alone could not justify a new constitutional privilege created 
from whole cloth.102  Creating such a privilege would, according to the Court, place it on 
“treacherous ground.”103   
 From a pragmatic perspective, the Court also expressed its concern over the practicality 
of enforcing a reporter’s privilege that would require courts to engage in an ad hoc balancing of 
interests.104  According to the Court, recognition of a reporter’s privilege would enmesh courts in 
trials within trials: first, a court would have to decide whether a crime had been committed, then 
                                                
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 695. 
99 Id. at 696.  
100 Id. at 698.  
101 Id. at 698-99.  
102 Id. at 699.  
103 Id. at 700.  




whether the government had shown a compelling interest for a reporter’s testimony, and finally 
whether the government could discover the information via alternate avenues.105  In addition, the 
Court was unwilling to try its pen at the “questionable procedure” of defining who would qualify 
as a “reporter” for the purposes of this “reporter’s” privilege.106 
                                                
105  Id. at 705. 
106  Id. at 703 (“Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for 
the privilege.”).  In many ways, Justice White’s concern as to who qualifies as a reporter was quite prescient.  With 
the rise of the Internet and blogs, answering this question has become especially pressing.  Anne M. Macrander, 
Bloggers As Newsmen: Expanding the Testimonial Privilege, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1075, 1108 (2008) (arguing that as 
new media chips away at the market share of traditional media, “there is less and less reason to omit [bloggers] from 
the protections that newsmen in the traditional mediums enjoy”); see also Matthew L. Schafer, Are Bloggers 
Journalists?  Judge Says Don’t Confuse ‘New Media’ with ‘News Media,’ LIPPMANN WOULD ROLL (July 16, 2010), 
http://www.lippmannwouldroll.com/2010/07/16/dont-confuse-new-media-with-news-media-judge-says/ (discussing 
the controversy as it pertains to shield laws). 
In the most recent attempt to pass a federal shield law to protect journalists from having to divulge certain 
information, one of the most controversial aspects of the law was who exactly it would protect.  See Matthew L. 
Schafer, Subpoenas Against Media Recently Top 3,000, It’s Time to Pass the Shield Bill SPJ Says, LIPPMANN 
WOULD ROLL (July 21, 2010), http://www.lippmannwouldroll.com/2010/07/21/subpoenas-against-media-topped-
3000-its-time-to-pass-the-shield-bill-spj-says/.  Under an almost successful, recent version of the bill, the law would 
have protected “anyone ‘who regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs, records, writes, edits, reports, or 
publishes news or information.’”  Id.  At first blush then, because the law takes a functional approach to protection 
by giving it to people who are actually engaged in newsmaking – whether or not they are affiliated with a traditional 
news organization – it would have arguably covered bloggers.  Id. 
For better or worse as a matter of constitutional law, however, the Court has never held that the press as an 
institution has a stronger claim of protection under the First Amendment than any single citizen.  See, e.g., Nixon v. 
Warner Commnc’s, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (“The First Amendment generally grants the press no right to 
information about a trial superior to that of the general public.”); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) 
(“The issue is a claimed special privilege of access which the Court rejected in Pell and Saxbe, a right which is not 
essential to guarantee the freedom to communicate or publish.”); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 
(1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (“[N]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or 
their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“It has 
generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to 
information not available to the public generally.”), 703 (“[L]iberty of the press is the right of the lonely 
pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who 
utilizes the latest photocomposition methods . . . .”); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“[A] reporter’s constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public.”); 
Associated Press v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (“The publisher of a newspaper has no 
special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties 
of others.”).  But see Randall Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977) (arguing that 
the Supreme Court actually treats the Free Speech and Press Clauses differently).  In light of this, it would seem that 
anyone who is engaged in newsmaking would be entitled to a reporter’s privilege if one were to be adopted by the 
Supreme Court or lower courts; essentially, if lower courts were attempting to stay true to Supreme Court precedent 
while also finding a privilege, they would have to adopt a functional approach to deciding who would be able to 
claim the privilege. 
 Setting this aside for the moment, even though the Supreme Court has never held as much, some Justices 
have argued that the press does have a special right over the “lonely pamphleteer,” because it acts essentially as the 
public’s intelligence gathering agent.  See, e.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397 (1979) (Powell, 
J., concurring).  In Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, Justice Powell in a concurring opinion explained that the press should 




 The Court concluded its opinion by once again asserting that “news gathering is not 
without its First Amendment protections.”107  As such, there was a distinction between grand 
jury investigations conducted in good faith and those conducted in bad faith, which “would pose 
wholly different issues for resolution under the First Amendment.”108  Justice White wrote, 
“Official harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a 
reporter’s relationship with his news sources would have no justification.”109  And, similarly 
certain: “[C]ourts will forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First 
Amendment as well as the Fifth.”110 
The Concurring Opinion 
 
 Justice Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion that attempted to rein in the broad 
language of the majority: “I add this brief statement to emphasize what seems to me to be the 
limited nature of the Court’s holding.”111  Quixotically, he read the Court’s opinion as “not 
hold[ing] that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional 
rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources.”112   
Justice Powell’s conception of bad faith was broader than the majority’s; indeed, he 
would have recognized a privilege that would kick in when reporters were asked to testify as to 
“information bearing only a remote . . . relationship [to an] investigation, or if [they have] some 
                                                                                                                                                       
individual member of which cannot obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his 
political responsibilities.”  Id. at 397 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Justice Stewart famously made the case for special protections of the press as an institution in a speech 
before Yale Law School.  See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 631 (1975).  In that speech, Stewart 
explained his enduring belief that “[t]he primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was a similar 
one: to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official branches.”  Id. 
at 634. 
107 Id. at 707.  
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 707-08.  
110 Id. at 708.  
111  Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). 
112  Id.  This came despite the Court rejecting any weighing of interests that would “embroil[ the courts] in 




other reason to believe that [their] testimony implicates confidential source relationships without 
a legitimate need of law enforcement, [they] will have access to the court on a motion to 
quash.”113  Each case, he concluded, “should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper 
balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony 
with respect to criminal conduct.”114 
The Dissenting Opinions 
 
 Justice Stewart wrote a dissent, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, where he 
lambasted the Court’s “crabbed view of the First Amendment.”115  While the majority maily 
focused on a reporter’s right to a special privilege, Justice Stewart concentrated on the right of 
society to the privilege so that it may be informed.116  This communal right, he argued, existed to 
fulfill the important mission of the press in informing the electorate: 
Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an 
open society is premised, and a free press is thus indispensable to a free society. 
Not only does the press enhance personal self-fulfillment by providing the people 
with the widest possible range of fact and opinion, but it also is an incontestable 
precondition of self-government. 117   
 
 In order to achieve this “basic ideal” of an educated choice, the Court had previously 
recognized a right of the press to publish information, he said.118  Corollary to this right, Justice 
Stewart believed, was the right to gather news for publication.119  The Court had implicitly 
recognized this corollary right in the past, he argued, when the Court found a right to be free to 
                                                
113  Id. at 710.  The Harvard Law Review aptly noted that Justice Powell’s good faith test was different from 
the majority’s.  Newsmen’s Privilege to Withhold Information from Grand Jury, 86 HARV. L. REV. 137, 143-44 
(1972).  “This discrepancy,” the Law Review argued presciently, “may have important consequences for the test’s 
application in the federal courts.”  Id. 
114  Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710. 
115 Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
116  Id. at 725-26. 
117 Id. at 726-27 (internal footnote omitted).  
118 Id. at 727.  
119 Indeed, “[t]he full flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee would be severely 




publish without prior government approval, the right to distribute news, and the right to receive 
news.120  Relying on these precedents, Justice Stewart thought the First Amendment must 
necessarily protect the right to be free from having news “unnecessarily cut off at its source.”121 
 Justice Stewart’s main concern was that the Court’s failure to recognize a privilege would 
prevent sources from confiding in journalists and, as such, deprive the public of potentially 
important information.122  As he put it, “The deterrence may not occur in every confidential 
relationship between a reporter and his source[, b]ut it will certainly occur in certain types of 
relationships involving sensitive and controversial matters.”123  Accepting the potential 
constriction of First Amendment rights as a result of the subpoenas, the Court, according to 
Justice Stewart, should do what it had always done when First Amendment rights are impinged: 
examine competing interests with a special sensitivity to the First Amendment.124 
 In this case, Justice Stewart believed that the interest in effective grand juries could not 
overcome the potential damage to First Amendment freedoms.125  For Justice Stewart, he saw no 
irreparable damage by recognizing the privilege where other privileges had already been 
recognized.126  As the Court had previously noted, “[S]ome confidential matters are shielded 
                                                
120 Id. (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971); 
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S., 444 (1938); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 
U.S. 141 (1943); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 
(1965)).  
121 Id. at 728 (“This proposition follows as a matter of simple logic once three factual predicates are 
recognized: (1) newsmen require informants to gather news; (2) confidentiality – the promise or understanding that 
names or certain aspects of communications will be kept off the record – is essential to the creation and maintenance 
of a news-gathering relationship with informants; and (3) an unbridled subpoena power – the absence of a 
constitutional right protecting, in any way, a confidential relationship from compulsory process – will either deter 
sources from divulging information or deter reporters from gathering and publishing information.”).  
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 735-36.  Justice Stewart also noted that even the Justice Department had recognized the potential 
chilling effect resulting from subpoenaing sources.  Id. at 733.   
124 Id. at 735 (citing Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449, 461-66 (1958); Tally v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960)).  
125 Id. at 725.  
126 Id. at 737.  For example, both constitutional privilege found in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment and 




from considerations of policy, and perhaps in other cases for special reasons a witness may be 
excused from telling all that he knows.”127  Similarly, Justice Stewart argued, a reporter had a 
“very real interest” protected by the First Amendment in not telling all he knows because the 
privilege exists in the First Amendment to protect both journalists and society’s interest in 
effective newsgathering.128 
The interest was especially keen, Justice Stewart continued, in newsgathering cases, 
because “First Amendment rights require special safeguards.”129  Relying on precedent, he noted 
that the Court had previously concluded that “‘[t]he Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations 
as to all forms of governmental action.  Witnesses cannot be compelled to give evidence against 
themselves.  . . . Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press . . . or political belief 
and association be abridged.’”130  As such, the government faced a “heavy burden of 
justification” when seeking to restrict First Amendment freedoms by requiring journalists to 
testify as to the identity of their confidential sources.131  Distilling from this a rule, Justice 
Stewart would have required the government to “show that the inquiry is of ‘compelling and 
overriding importance’ [and] . . . also ‘convincingly’ demonstrate that the investigation is 
‘substantially related’ to the information sought.”132 
Having established his own test, Justice Stewart began cutting down the majority’s 
reasoning.133  First, he rejected the notion that the result of the majority’s position applied only to 
                                                
127 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  
128 Id. at 737-38.  
129 Id. at 738. 
130  Id. at 739 (quoting Watkins v. U.S., 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957) (alteration in original)). 
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 739-40.  More specifically, Justice Stewart offered a three-part test that where “the government must 
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a 
specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative 
means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the 
information.”  Id. at 743 (internal footnotes omitted). 




those cases where a journalist’s source had information regarding a crime.134  Instead, he feared 
that a grand jury’s broad investigative powers would also require journalists to reveal 
information about sources who neither were criminal nor possessed information about a crime.135  
Second, he asserted that often times subpoenaing a journalist would be unnecessary, because the 
government could discover the information it sought from a reporter through other means.136  
Third, he criticized the majority for its “absolute rejection of First Amendment interests,” which, 
he believed, would actually prevent the administration of justice, because “[p]eople entrusted 
with law enforcement responsibility, no less than private citizens, need general information 
relating to controversial social problems.”137  As a result of the chilling effect, he feared, police 
would no longer be able to gather information that would otherwise be launched into the public 
sphere.138   
In addition to Justice Stewart’s dissent in Branzburg, Justice Douglas wrote a dissent in a 
companion case, United States v. Caldwell.139  Justice Douglas would have gone further than any 
other Justice by recognizing a broad reporter’s privilege.140  As opposed to the rest of his 
colleagues, he would have found that “there is no ‘compelling need’ that can be shown which 
qualifies the reporter’s immunity from appearing or testifying before a grand jury, unless the 
reporter himself is implicated in a crime.”141  He reiterated his stance on an absolute privilege: 
“[The defendant reporter’s] immunity in my view is . . . quite complete, for, absent his 
                                                
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 745. 
137 Id. at 746.  
138 Id.  
139 Caldwell, 408 U.S. at 711; see also supra note 78 (explaining the facts of Caldwell’s case). 
140  Caldwell, 408 U.S. at 712. 




involvement in a crime, the First Amendment protects him against an appearance before a grand 
jury and if he is involved in a crime, the Fifth Amendment stands as a barrier.”142 
Having set forth his view, Justice Douglas turned to the arguments counsel made.143  The 
Justice did not think too much of the Times’s argument, writing, that it took “the amazing 
position that First Amendment rights are to be balanced against other needs or conveniences of 
government.”144  In his opinion, the Times conceded too much by admitting that First 
Amendment interests must be balanced against government interests.145  Instead, he believed, as 
already revealed, that “all of the ‘balancing’ was done by those who wrote the Bill of Rights[, 
who also] cast[ed] the First Amendment in absolute terms, . . . [and] repudiated the timid, 
watered-down, emasculated versions of the First Amendment which both the Government and 
the New York Times advance.”146   
Relying on First Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn,147 Justice Douglas 
explained the logic of finding an absolute privilege.  First, he cited Meiklejohn’s assertion that 
“people . . . must have absolute freedom of, and therefore privacy of, their individual opinions 
and beliefs regardless of how suspect or strange they may appear to others.”148  Moreover, “an 
individual must also have absolute privacy over whatever information he may generate in the 
course of testing his opinions and beliefs.”149  Thus, he saw First Amendment protections as 
extending to the expression of opinions and beliefs and the process by which the individual 
                                                
142 Id.  
143  Id. at 713. 
144  Id. 
145 Id.  
146  Id. 
147 As explained infra at notes 205-210, Meiklejohn believed that the First Amendment protected a citizen’s 
absolute right to speak about information related to democratic self-governance.  See generally ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).  On his death, the Times recounted 
Meiklejohn’s self-described view of freedom of speech: “[N]o matter what a person believes in, we must hear it”  
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1964, at 41. 
148  Caldwell, 408 U.S. at 714 (emphasis added). 




developed those beliefs.150  The concern for an individual’s independence from government in 
forming those opinions and beliefs was paramount, Justice Douglas argued, when they related to 
governance: 
[S]elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, 
integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, 
casting a ballot is assumed to express, and that [p]ublic discussions of public 
issues, together with the spreading of information and opinion bearing on those 
issues, must have a freedom unabridged by our agents.151 
  
Under this view, opinions and beliefs could only be developed suitably if individuals’ 
associations were unencumbered – allowing the freest sharing of ideas.152   
In short, Justice Douglas reframed the reporter’s privilege issue by reference to a right to 
free speech or free press and also a right to “privacy of association.”153  In this way, Justice 
Douglas broke little new ground by relying on the well-established principle that the 
“[g]overnment is . . . precluded from probing the intimacies of . . . intellectual relationships in 
the myriad of such societies and groups that exist in this country.”154  Therefore, a reporter 
cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be brought in front of a grand jury and forced to 
explain his “own preconceptions and views about” his current subjects.155 
 As a result of the Court’s decision, Justice Douglas saw two potential effects on freedom 
of expression.156  First, he argued that sources would be less likely to communicate with 
                                                
150 Id.  
151 Id. (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255 
(1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original). 
152 Id. at 715.  
153 Id.  
154 Id. at 716 (quoting Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 565 (1963); see also 
Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“It is 
hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as 
effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of governmental action in the cases above were thought 
likely to produce upon the particular constitutional rights there involved.”).  
155  Caldwell, 408 U.S. at 720. 




journalists.157  Second, he asserted that journalists would “write with more restrained pens” out 
of fear that they would find themselves in front of a grand jury and potentially subject to 
contempt charges.158  These effects would impermissibly inhibit both the reporter’s right to 
gather news and the public’s right to receive that news.159   
Justice Douglas also had policy concerns.  He believed that press subpoenas were 
indicative of the growing influence of government, which increasingly invaded both public and 
private spheres: “The intrusion of government into this domain is symptomatic of the disease of 
this society.  As the years pass the power of government becomes more and more pervasive.  It is 
a power to suffocate both people and causes.  Those in power, whatever their politics, want only 
to perpetuate it.”160  He went on to lament, “Now that the fences of the law and the tradition that 
has protected the press are broken down, the people are the victims.  The First Amendment, as I 
read it, was designed precisely to prevent that tragedy.”161 
Diametrically Opposed Views 
 
Placing the majority’s views next to the dissents’ shows a stark disagreement.  More to 
the point, it shows that the Justices could not even agree on what the issue was let alone what the 
right result was.  As explained, the majority viewed Branzburg and the companion cases as 
criminal law cases.162  This view is defensible, as the only issues in Branzburg and the very 
similar companion cases was whether a reporter could protect a source who was committing a 
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158  Id. 
159 Id.  
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161 Id. at 724; see also id. at 722 (“A reporter is no better than his source of information.  Unless he has a 
privilege to withhold the identity of his source, he will be the victim of governmental intrigue or aggression.  If he 
can be summoned to testify in secret before a grand jury, his sources will dry up and the attempted exposure, the 
effort to enlighten the public, will be ended.  If what the Court sanctions today becomes settled law, then the 
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crime with no other purpose apart from the crime itself.  On the other hand, the dissents viewed 
the cases as raising important questions about the reach of the First Amendment because the 
journalists were, in fact, informing the public about criminality.163  Justice Powell, perhaps 
unsure as to which perspective should take precedence, fell somewhere in the middle, 
recognizing that important questions as to both issues must be resolved.  Unfortunately, because 
the majority and the dissent viewed the cases from fundamentally different perspectives, neither 
opinion attempted to resolve the hard question: the clash between the competing interests. 
This has left lower courts to sort out competing interests in cases where law enforcement 
and First Amendment concerns may weigh more or less heavily as a result of the facts of a 
specific case than they did under the facts of Branzburg.  Depending on the facts of any given 
case and their similarity to the facts of Branzburg, a court may be more or less likely to lean on 
the majority or dissent in Branzburg.  And, as will be shown, that is exactly what has happened 
in the lower courts.  Indeed, if Branzburg is the bones of the reporter’s privilege, these lower 
court decisions have put meat on those bones.  As such, these cases, informed by both the 
majority and the dissent in Branzburg, are the most important cases relating to the reporter’s 
privilege as they explain how Branzburg applies in cases that are not equivalent to the facts of 
Branzburg. 
  
                                                




CHAPTER 3.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
How “Uninhibited”? How “Robust”? How “Wide-Open”?  
It is, I think, impossible to conceive of liberty, as secured by 
the Constitution against hostile action, whether by the Nation 
or by the States, which does not embrace the right to enjoy 
free speech and the right to have a free press.164 
 
The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”165  Speaking of this Amendment, I.F. Stone, the famed investigative 
reporter who took Senator Joseph McCarthy to the mats for his dogmatic pursuit of alleged 
communists, once wrote, “The [free speech] philosophy to which we are indebted runs in a great 
line from Madison, the Father of the Constitution, to Brandeis, and from them to Black and 
Douglas.”166  He was right.167   
In 1799, James Madison, the drafter of the First Amendment, explained that “the 
[A]mendment is a denial to Congress of all power over the press.”168  Justice Louis Brandeis 
                                                
164 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
165 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
166 I.F. STONE, THE BEST OF I.F. STONE 55 (2007) (quoting I.F. Stone, The Crisis Is Coming for a Free Press, 
I.F. STONE’S WEEKLY, (JULY 9, 1971)). 
167  Mostly.  None of these First Amendment absolutists wrote on a clean slate, but rather built on a tradition of 
First Amendment thinkers who believed in varying levels of freedom of speech.  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY, 35 (1863) (“But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human 
race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold 
it.  If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, 
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision 
with error.”); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, 51-52 (1874) (“And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to 
play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.  
Let he and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors in a free and open encounter?  Her confuting is 
the best and surest suppressing.”); THE WORKS OF DR. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, 319 
(William Duance ed., 1809) (“Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government; when this support is 
taken away, the constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny is erected on its ruins.  Republics and limited 
monarchies derive their strength and vigor from a popular examination into the actions of the magistrates; this 
privilege in all ages has been; and always will be abused.” (quoting Benjamin Franklin, On Freedom of Speech and 
the Press, PENN. GAZETTE, Nov. 1737)); Letter from Thomas Jefferson, former President of the United States, to 
Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roche Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, former Major General of the Continental 
Army (1823) (“The only security of all is in a free press.  The force of public opinion cannot be resisted when 
permitted freely to be expressed.  The agitation it produces must be submitted to.  It is necessary, to keep the waters 
pure.”). 
168 JAMES MADISON, THE KENTUCKY-VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND MR. MADISON’S REPORT OF 1799 60 




summarized Madison’s and the other Founders’ views as he saw them, writing, “Those who won 
our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that, without free speech and 
assembly, discussion would be futile.”169  Justices Black and Douglas carried an expansive view 
of the First Amendment into the latter half of the Twentieth Century, writing, “[The First 
Amendment] leaves, in [our] view, no room for governmental restraint on the press.”170 
The Court, though, has never accepted Madison, Douglas, and Black’s absolutist view of 
the First Amendment that would prohibit the government from ever passing a law that abridges 
                                                                                                                                                       
late 1920s, the Supreme Court had presumed that this admonition extended not only to Congress and other branches 
of the federal government, but to state governments as well.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) 
(“For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press – which are protected by the 
First Amendment from abridgment by Congress – are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”).  Justice Harlan 
suggested this was the case almost twenty years beforehand.  See Patterson, 205 U.S. at 464 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(“As the 1st Amendment guaranteed the rights of free speech and of a free press against hostile action by the United 
States, it would seem clear that, when the 14th Amendment prohibited the states from impairing or abridging the 
privileges of citizens of the United States, it necessarily prohibited the states from impairing or abridging the 
constitutional rights of such citizens to free speech and a free press.”). 
169  Unlike Madison, Black, and Douglas, Brandeis was not an absolutist.  See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (explaining that speech could only be suppressed when there were “reasonable ground[s] to 
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced”).  While it is unclear, it is likely that Stone added 
Brandeis to his list of First Amendment torchbearers as a result of Justice Brandeis’s eloquent language in Whitney.  
See generally id.  In that case, one of the several criminal syndicalism cases the Supreme Court heard, Justice 
Brandeis famously wrote: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to 
develop their faculties, and that, in its government, the deliberative forces should prevail over the 
arbitrary.  They valued liberty both as an end, and as a means.  They believed liberty to be the 
secret of happiness, and courage to be the secret of liberty.  They believed that freedom to think as 
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth; that, without free speech and assembly, discussion would be futile; that, with them, 
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; 
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty, 
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. 
Id. at 375. 
170 New York Times Co. v. U.S, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (Douglas, J., concurring, joined by Black, J.) (emphasis 
added).  Black’s absolutist convictions were well known.  During oral argument in New York Times v. United States 
(the Pentagon Papers case), then-Solicitor General Erwin Griswold in response to questioning by Justice Black 
stated somewhat exasperatedly, “Now Mr. Justice Black, your [absolutist] construction of that [Amendment] is well 
known and I certainly respect it.  You say that no law means no law and that should be obvious.  And I can only say 
Mr. Justice that to me, it is equally obvious that no law does not mean no law and I would seek to persuade the 





in any way freedom of speech or press.171  No doubt influenced by these views, however, the 
Court has proclaimed that the history of the United States demonstrates “a profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open.”172  This “national commitment” has led the Court to strike down, again and again, state 
and private action that finds itself in the long shadow of the First Amendment.173   
First Amendment Theories and Their Relation to a Reporter’s Privilege 
Having rejected an absolutist approach, the challenge for the Court became defining 
exactly how “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate should be.174  How committed is the 
                                                
171  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973) (stating that “no amount of ‘fatigue’” resulting from defining 
the outer bounds of the First Amendment “should lead [the Court] to adopt a convenient ‘institutional’ rationale – an 
absolutist, ‘anything goes’ view of the First Amendment – because it will lighten our burdens.”); see also JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 109 (1980) (“[W]e should face the validity 
of such an ‘absolutist’ approach head-on and recognize that one simply cannot be granted a constitutional right to 
stand on the steps of an inadequately guarded jail and urge a mob to lynch the prisoner within.”); Robert Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1972) (“Any [absolutist] reading is, of 
course, impossible.  Since it purports to be an absolute position we are entitled to test it with extreme hypotheticals.  
Is Congress forbidden to prohibit incitement to mutiny aboard a naval vessel engaged in action against an enemy, to 
prohibit shouted harangues from the visitors’ gallery during its own deliberations or to provide any rules for 
decorum in federal courtrooms?”); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of 
the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1965) (noting that the absolutist view has never persuaded a majority 
of the Court). 
172 New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
173 See, e.g., U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (concluding that even false facts are protected by 
the First Amendment); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (striking down a jury verdict in favor of 
inflammatory protestors at a funeral); U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (striking down as 
unconstitutionally overbroad a federal law aimed at suppressing animal cruelty); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 
U.S. 234, 246 (2002) (finding unconstitutional a federal statute that “proscribe[d] the visual depiction of an idea – 
that of teenagers engaging in sexual activity”); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (finding that a third 
party’s illegal conduct in acquiring information does not affect an innocent party’s First Amendment rights to 
disseminate the same); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (striking down law attempting 
to prohibit the dissemination of obscenity and indecent material); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 
391 (1992) (striking down a content-based ordinance that punished cross-burning); U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 
319 (1990) (upholding a citizen’s right to desecrate the flag); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (same); 
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (finding broad prior restraint unconstitutional); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that a state cannot make the act of expressing oneself with offensive 
words a criminal one). 
174  John Hart Ely succinctly explained that the brevity of the First Amendment’s language leaves much to be 
desired.  See ELY, supra note 171.  Indeed, the Court’s broad interpretation of the First Amendment beyond its 
express language, which on its face only applies to Congress, “requires a theory to get us where the Court has gone.”  
Id.  Moreover, with the Court’s rejection of the absolutist approach, it is necessary to look to other theories to define 
the still undefined reach of the Amendment.  See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE 




nation to its own commitment?  This is the question the Court has tried to answer in the last 
ninety-four years.175  Absent an absolutist view, the size of the First Amendment’s shadow is 
determined by First Amendment theory.176  As such, scholars have offered a variety of theories 
to explain the contours of the First Amendment’s protections; indeed, First Amendment doctrine 
is rife with numerous theories attempting to explain the reasons for protecting some speech while 
not protecting other speech.177  There is the marketplace of ideas theory,178 the liberty theory,179 
                                                                                                                                                       
Two famed free speech scholars have aptly summarized the difficulties of defining the outer limits of First 
Amendment protections.  Melville Nimmer recognized that absent an absolute stance, courts will be engaged in the 
questionable procedure of deciding what speech merits protection and what speech does not merit protection: 
If we may not cling to the anchor of an absolute, unqualified rule, is not the alternative no rule at 
all?  If the judges are not required to protect all speech, doesn’t this mean that the only speech 
which will be protected is that which, on an ad hoc basis, the judges may from time to time 
approve?  That this fear is not fanciful is all too clearly illustrated by a line of cases in which the 
Court engaged in what has been called ad hoc balancing. 
Melville Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and 
Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 938 (1968).  Alexander Meiklejohn expressed similar concerns 
attendant to adopting a rule that was not absolute in nature: 
To take an absolutist position is no more than to try to define precisely the command of the 
Constitution and to stand by that definition.  The critical question is: What does the first 
amendment mean us to protect?  It has long been contended that an explicit answer is unavailable 
and that the only possibility is a pragmatic case-by-case method in which speech and other 
constitutional objectives are continually, yet never definitively, adjusted to one another.  But 
surely, we need to investigate how far this process can be transcended and how precisely we can 
interpret the Constitution. 
Alexander Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEO. L. J. 234, 235 (1966). 
175 Schenck v. United States, an espionage case where the petitioner distributed anti-draft materials, was the 
first case where the Supreme Court had been called on to decipher the meaning of the First Amendment.  Schenck v. 
U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919).  But see Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (refusing to reach the First 
Amendment question, but noting that “the main purpose of [the right to free speech and the press] is ‘to prevent all 
such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments.’”).  Since then, the Court 
has undertaken carefully to define that Amendment’s scope.  See Miller, e.g., 413 U.S. at 23 (“We acknowledge . . . 
the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression.”). 
176  See, e.g., SUSAN DENTE ROSS, DECIDING COMMUNICATION LAW: KEY CASES IN CONTEXT 19 (2004) 
(comparing and contrasting the reach of the First Amendment under one theory and under another theory). 
177 I reiterate the words of Harry Wellington, who wrote apologetically in the 1970’s, “Those to whom nothing 
which I am about to say will be new may I hope, excuse me, if on a subject which for now three centuries has been 
so often discussed, I venture on one discussion more.”  Harry Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 
1105, 1105 (1979) (quoting MILL, supra note 167, at 1105 (internal alterations omitted)).  For a general discussion 
of widely accepted First Amendment theories see LEE LEVINE, ROBERT C. LIND, SETH D. BERLIN & C. THOMAS 
DIENES, NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 1.02 (4th ed. 2011). 
178 Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas . . . .”); see also see also MILTON, supra note 167. 
179 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the 
First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at 
all.”); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O., v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 446 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing the 




the checking value theory,180 the self-governance theory,181 the prior restraint theory,182 the 
absolutist theory,183 the moral theory,184 the market failure theory,185 and so on and so forth.186   
Despite the wide variety of theories put forward, the Court and scholars consistently 
invoke three theories more than any others.187  The self-governance theory, the liberty theory, 
and the marketplace of ideas theory comprise this theoretical trinity.188  While less widely 
                                                                                                                                                       
to their own “[f]ears of alien ideologies”); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) (“The liberty model holds that the free speech clause protects not a marketplace but 
rather an arena of individual liberty from certain types of governmental restrictions.”); Martin Redish, The Value of 
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) (noting that, at bottom, most free expression values are sub-species of 
the broader self-realization value). 
180  Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977).  
But see Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First Amendment in 
Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 108 n.86 (1990) (criticizing Blasi for basing his theory on “a number of 
questionable premises,” including the presumptions that citizen access to speaking platforms, an antagonistic 
populace, and an informed populace exist). 
181 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 147, at 25 (describing the democratic town hall where voters both express 
themselves and form opinions through entertaining others’ ideas); see also New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”). 
182  Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (“In determining the extent of the 
constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the 
guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication.”); see also New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 714 
(1971) (“‘Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity.’” (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
183 See supra notes 170 and accompanying text. 
184  David Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. 
PA. L. REV. 45, 69 (1975) (“[I]t is clear that strong moral ideas are implicit in the [F]irst [A]mendment and that 
moral analysis may clarify the proper constitutional interpretation and application of those ideas.”). 
185 See Baker, supra note 179, at 981 (“Critics of the classic marketplace of ideas theory, relying either on the 
failure of the [theory’s] assumptions . . . or specifically on failures of the economic market (such as monopolization 
of communication channels or difficulties of organizing interest groups), have advocated various forms of 
governmental intervention to improve market functioning.”). 
186 For explanations of several other First Amendment theories see JEROME BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, 
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 14-17 (2008) and Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First 
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1786 (2004).  This 
abundance of First Amendment theories has actually done less to explain the Amendment than to confuse its 
understanding altogether.  As Professor Schauer puts it,  
[I]f there exists a single theory that can explain the First Amendment’s coverage, it has not yet 
been found.  Yet if all of the historically recognized and judicially mentioned normative theories 
are available – self-expression, individual autonomy, dissent, democratic deliberation, the search 
for truth, tolerance, checking governmental abuse, and others – then their collective coverage is so 
great as to be of little help in explaining the existing state of First Amendment terrain.   
Id. at 1786. 
187 See LEVINE, LIND, BERLIN & DIENES, supra note 177 at § 1.05. 




acknowledged, a fourth theory, the checking value, also merits discussion here.189  These 
theories merit discussion because from time to time the Court has invoked these theories to find 
protection for speech,190 and, at other times, the Court has invoked these theories to deny 
protection for speech.191  These theories are especially important in the context of a reporter’s 
privilege because some may support a constitutional reporter’s privilege and other’s may not.192   
At the same time, these theories are not the end-all-be-all when it comes to defining First 
Amendment protections.  These four theories, as understood today, are largely after-the-fact 
rationales to explain how far the First Amendment was intended to reach (or, more honestly, the 
progenitors of the theories think it should reach).193  As Professor Blasi explained, “The theory 
underlying a clause of the Constitution often depends more on the claims that have been pressed 
over the years in the name of the clause than on the grievances and value judgments that 
originally induced its adoption.”194  Simply then, no theory answers as many questions as its 
                                                
189  See generally Blasi, supra note 180. 
190 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (asserting constitutional protection from tort 
liability for funeral protest, “because ‘speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence 
of self-government.’” (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010) (discussing the marketplace of ideas theory in the process of overturning 
political speech restrictions); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 185 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (making an 
appeal to the checking value to support his contention that an editorial privilege does protect journalists from being 
required to divulge their editorial processes); New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964) (invoking 
the self-governance theory to find constitutional protections for citizens who criticize government officials). 
191 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1982) (“We consider it unlikely that visual depictions of 
children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often constitute an important and necessary 
part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work.”); Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“But 
implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social 
importance.”); Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“It has been well observed that 
[some] utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”). 
192 Professor Ugland has explained, for example, that those judges who view the First Amendment as intended 
to protect merely “expressive freedom” are more likely not to find a reporter’s privilege.  See Ugland, supra note 64, 
at 41. 
193 See Blasi, supra note 180, at 523 (“For in Anglo-American law, theories are typically rationalizations for 
desired or decreed adjudicative results – rationalizations which come to have a life and integrity of their own and 
which do influence future perceptions and decisions, but rationalizations nonetheless.”). 




advocates would suppose, and every theory is, at times, selectively invoked to protect challenged 
speech in any single case.195 
For this reason, it would be wrong to argue that a reporter’s privilege should be 
foreclosed merely because it fails to find support in any one theory.196  Instead, the prominent 
theories should be read as evincing different rationales for protecting speech – separate chapters 
of a grander First Amendment book that value speech for its own sake on the individual level 
and speech for its ends on the societal level.197  In short, the reach of the First Amendment 
should not be limited based on the label one gives a theory, but should rather be informed by the 
theories taken together. 
The Self-Governance Theory 
  
The Preamble to the Constitution reads, “We the People of the United States, in Order to 
form a more perfect Union . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America.”198  In other words, the citizens of the various states established the federal government 
by outlining in the Constitution what power the new government enjoyed.199  It was the people’s 
government: “The government of the Union . . . is emphatically and truly, a government of the 
people.  In form, and in substance, it emanates from them.  Its powers are granted by them, and 
are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”200 
Because U.S. citizens retain power over a government that is, first and foremost, an agent 
                                                
195 Id. at 526 (“The result [of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence] has been a pattern of 
aborted doctrines, shifting rationales, and frequent changes of position by individual Justices.”). 
196 Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1252 (1983) (noting that “the Court has been generous about the range of 
values relevant in [F]irst [A]mendment theory, and unreceptive to those who ask it to confine [F]irst [A]mendment 
values to a particular favorite”).  
197 Thomas Emerson was a main advocate of this position, arguing that the First Amendment existed to protect 
self-expression, reveal truth, and protect social and political participation from being squelched, among others.  See 
Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-79 (1963).  
198 U.S. CONST. pmbl.  
199  Meiklejohn, supra note 174, at 256; see also New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) 
(describing Madison’s view that “[t]he people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty”). 




of the people,201 it makes sense that people should be informed so that they can effectively 
exercise that power.202  To be informed for the purposes of self-governance, it is generally 
agreed that citizens must be, at least, “minimally competent.”203  Therefore, many have argued 
that the First Amendment protects the people’s right to discuss information about their 
government as a means toward achieving “minimal competence.”204  This is the self-governance 
theory. 
The self-governance theory can be defined narrowly, speaking only of the right of the 
people to share opinions that relate to democratic decision making, or broadly defined, 
encompassing the right of the people to share ideas and thereby shape their culture both socially 
and politically.205  The breadth of the theory depends on the emphasis placed on the values 
underlying the theory.  At least five values underlie the self-governance theory: participation in 
democratic government, the attainment of political truth, efficiency in majority rule, restraint on 
corruption, and the promotion of government stability.206  But, however one describes the 
breadth of the theory’s application, these values stand support the proposition that it is “the right 
                                                
201 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).  
202 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 147, at 3 (“We Americans think of ourselves as politically free.  We believe in 
self-government.  If men are to be governed, we say, then that governing must be done, not by others, but by 
themselves.  So far, therefore, as our own affairs are concerned, we refuse to submit to alien control.”).  
Surprisingly, whatever Meiklejohn may think about normative principles of self-governance, a body of 
literature acknowledges not only that citizens do not need to be ultra-informed for a democracy to run smoothly at 
all.  MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW AND WHY THAT MATTERS 23 (noting 
that “many believe that the need for a generally informed citizenry is overstated”), 49 (“The strongest argument 
against the need for an informed public draw on liberal, protective theories of democracy.  Because it is assumed 
that there is little that a citizen is required to do, it follows there is little a citizen is required to know.”) (1997).  Yet, 
still others have come to the opposite conclusion that “civic education . . . [is] the keystone to democracy.”  Id. at 39.  
Delli Carpini and Keeter argued that only a threshold level of minimal competence is necessary for democracy to 
function.  In spite of this pragmatic view, even Delli Carpini and Keeter conceded that “[p]olitical information is to 
democratic politics what money is to economics: it is the currency of citizenship.”  Id. at 8. 
203 DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, supra note 202, at 53. 
204 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (“The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is 
secured by the First Amendment has long been settled . . . .”). 
205 See Emerson, supra note 197, at 883 (noting that the theory “embraced the right to participate in the 
building of the whole culture, and included freedom of expression in religion, literature, art, science and all areas of 
human learning and knowledge”). 




of all members of [a democratically-organized] society to form their own beliefs and 
communicate them freely to others.”207   
This type of speech is protected not for its own sake, but for the ends it serves: “The 
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be 
responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an 
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system.”208  In this way then, the First Amendment, under a self-governance ideal, 
operates more as a procedural restraint on government than as a substantive guarantee to the 
product of speech like the truth.209  As the philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn explained, “[The 
First Amendment] is a device for the sharing of whatever truth has been won.  Its purpose is to 
give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest possible participation in,” not 
substantive “understanding of those problems which the citizens of a self-governing society must 
deal.”210 
 While self-governance is a simple idea, its realization has been hard fought.  It grew out 
of Britain’s system of suppression through the use of “constructive treason, seditious libel, and 
prior restraints.”211  Under this system, until 1694, publishers were required to apply for licenses 
                                                
207  See Emerson, supra note 197, at 883.  
208 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
209 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 147, at 88. 
210 Id. (emphasis added).  While Meiklejohn is often credited with expounded the theory of self-governance, 
some have argued, in my opinion correctly, that the self-governance principle can be traced to Judge Learned 
Hand’s opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten.  See Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government 
Theory of the First Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1990).  As Judge Hand 
explained in his opinion enjoining the Postmaster General from not mailing circulars protesting, among other things, 
the draft, “[The circulars] fall within the scope of that right to criticize either by temperate reasoning, or by 
immoderate and indecent invective, which is normally the privilege of the individual in countries dependent upon 
the free expression of opinion as the ultimate source of authority.”  Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539 
(S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
211 William Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 




to print – a prior restraint212 on publishers’ freedom of expression.213  While formal licensing did 
not find its way to colonial America,214 constructive treason and seditious libel did.215  Under 
constructive treason statutes, a citizen could be thrown in jail for advocating war against the 
Crown, aiding and abetting the Crown’s enemies, or making threats on the life of the King.216  
Perhaps more influential in the history of self-governance, however, was the development of 
seditious libel in England and America.217 
 In England, “a publication was considered seditious if it defamed the government or 
undermined its authority.”218  Thus, for example, one man was sentenced in 1664 for 
“deliver[ing] a handwritten message to a [priest] requesting him to bewaile . . . those 
wickednesses which go unpunished by the magistrate.”219  Although the rate of prosecutions 
varied, by the turn of the century, the Crown began to invoke seditious libel laws more 
vigorously.220  It expanded the definition of libel to cover both attacks on individuals within the 
government and the government itself: “If men should not be called to account for possessing the 
people with an ill opinion of Government, no Government can subsist; for it is very necessary for 
every Government, that the people should have a good opinion of it.”221 
                                                
212 Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 566 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“In its simple, most blatant form, a 
prior restraint is a law which requires submission of speech to an official who may grant or deny permission to utter 
or publish it based upon its contents.”). 
213 See Mayton, supra note 211, at 98.  
214 The closest thing to a form of licensing that came to the American shores was the Stamp Act of 1765.  As 
one author explained, “There was little doubt about the destructive intention of the measure, and vehement protests 
came from many quarters.”  See Edward A. Bloom, “Paper Wars” for a Free Press, 56 THE MODERN LANGUAGE 
REV. 481, 486 (1961). 
215 See Mayton, supra note 211, at 98.   
216 Id. at 99. 
217 See New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (explaining that the history of seditious 
libel in Britain and the United States informed the “central meaning of the First Amendment”). 
218  MICHAL R. BELKNAP, AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 27 (1994).  
219 Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37. STAN. 
L. REV. 661, 698 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
220 Id. at 735.  
221  Id. (quoting Queen v. Tutchin, 90 Eng. Rep. 1133, 1133-34).  William Blackstone, a consistently quoted 
source of the Supreme Court, believed that prosecutions for seditious libels were entirely appropriate: “The liberty 




 Eventually, seditious libel found its way to the shores of colonial America222 and later 
into the federal and state statutes of the United States of America.223  Most famously, in an 
attempt to hold on to power in the late 1700s, John Adams’s Federalists took a page out of the 
Crown’s book and passed the Alien and Sedition Acts with the aim to suppress opposition.224  In 
part, the Sedition Act “provided for the punishment of anyone who unlawfully combined to 
oppose the laws of the United States.”225  Republicans vehemently opposed the Acts at the time 
on the basis that they contravened the First Amendment’s guarantee of citizens’ right to associate 
and share ideas to hold government officials accountable:  
[The Alien and Sedition Acts] exercise[] . . . a power not delegated by the 
Constitution, but, on the contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by on of the 
amendments thereto, – a power which, more than any other, ought to produce 
universal alarm, because it is levelled against the right of freely examining public 
characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, 
which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other 
right.226 
 
Luckily for the Republicans, the Act was short lived; originally passed in 1798, it was set to – 
and did – sunset on March 3, 1801.227  While in force though, ten men were convicted of 
                                                                                                                                                       
publication, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.”   William Blackstone, 
Commentaries *152-53. 
222 Most famously, in November of 1734, John Peter Zenger, a printer in colonial New York, was arrested and 
tried for seditious libel after he published the texts allegedly disparaging the Crown.  Livingston Rutherfurd, JOHN 
PETER ZENGER: HIS PRESS, HIS TRIAL, AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ZENGER IMPRINTS 45 (1904).  Zenger was later 
found not guilty.  Id. at 125. 
223  See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States (Sedition Act), ch. 74, 1 Stat. 
596 (1798). 
224 See Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 SUP. CT. 
REV. 109, 111 (1970) (“As a defense measure, designed to protect the country against alien opinion and the aliens 
themselves . . . , . . . the Federalists enacted, over the intense opposition of the Republicans, the Alien and Sedition 
Laws, which Federalist prosecutors and Federalist judges proceeded to use in an effort to silence their opponents.”).  
225 Id. at 113; see also Brennan, supra note 171, at 15 (“[I]f any person shall write, print, utter or publish . . . 
any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house 
of the Congress . . . or the President . . . , with intent to defame . . . or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt 
or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States . . 
. .” (quoting 1 Stat. 596 (1798)).  
226 4 Elliot’s Debates 528-29 (1798).  




violating its prohibitions and were subjected to fines and jail time.228  After the Act expired, 
President Thomas Jefferson pardoned the convicted men.229   
President Jefferson’s actions would later lead Justice Holmes to the conclusion that “the 
United States through many years had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798 by 
repaying fines that it imposed.”230  Other justices agreed,231 and Justice Black later denounced 
the Act, writing, “I cannot now agree to an interpretation . . . which gives a new life to the long 
repudiated anti-free speech and anti-free press philosophy of the 1798 Alien and Sedition 
Acts.”232  The Supreme Court as a whole, however, refused to address the constitutionality of the 
Sedition Act until the mid-1960s – over 150 years after Congress passed the Act.233 
 In New York Times v. Sullivan, Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the Court, 
finally declared that although the Act “was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity 
has carried the day in the court of history.”234  In fact, he used the repugnance for the Act to 
                                                
228 Id. at 114.  
229 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane, (Sept. 6, 1819), found in Thomas Jefferson, The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, (Paul Leicester Ford, ed. 1899). 
230 Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
231 Beauharnais v. People of State of Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 289 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven in the 
absence of judicial condemnation, the political disapproval of the Sedition Act was so emphatic and sustained that 
federal prosecution of the press ceased for a century.”).  
232 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 183 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Communist Party of U.S. v. 
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 155 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“The enforcement of these 
statutes, particularly the Sedition Act, constitutes one of the greatest blots on our country’s record of freedom.”); 
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 66 n.23 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Act as “a 
weapon to suppress the political opposition of the Jeffersonians”); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O., v. Douds, 339 U.S. 
382, 453 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Fears of alien ideologies have frequently agitated the nation and inspired 
legislation aimed at suppressing advocacy of those ideologies.  At such times the fog of public excitement obscures 
the ancient landmarks set up in our Bill of Rights.  Yet then, of all times, should this Court adhere most closely to 
the course they mark.” (footnote omitted)). 
233 See generally New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Stromberg v. People of 
State of Cal., 283 U.S. 359, 367 (1931) (“[W]e do not find it necessary, for the purposes of the present case, to 
review the historic controversy with respect to ‘sedition laws’ or to consider the question as to the validity of a 
statute dealing broadly and vaguely with what is termed seditious conduct . . . .”); Gitlow v. People of State of New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (“We need not enter upon a consideration of the English common law rule of 
seditious libel or the Federal Sedition Act of 1798, to which reference is made in the defendant’s brief.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
234 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.  Notably, the presently enforced Espionage Act adopted in the early twentieth 
century has been attacked as similar to the Alien and Sedition Act and also unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Grooms v. 




illuminated the “central meaning of the First Amendment”: citizens could not be punished for 
criticizing their elected officials.235  As a result, criminal libel laws were held unconstitutional as 
they imposed “the pall of fear and timidity . . . upon those who would give voice to public 
criticism[, which would create] an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot 
survive.”236  And, therein lies the irony: the Acts intended to limit free expression and 
association would later come to define that speech deserving of the most protection. 
By placing political speech at the center of the First Amendment, Sullivan is the 
quintessential self-governance case.237  As Henry Kalven summarized, “The Amendment has a 
‘central meaning’ – a core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot function, 
without which, – in Madison’s phrase, ‘the censorial power’ would be in the Government over 
the people and not ‘in the people over the Government.’”238  Since Sullivan, the Court has 
repeatedly reaffirmed this view.239   
 The self-governance theory supports providing strong protections for a confidential 
reporter-source relationship if that source is handing over information related to self-
governance.240  In fact, Justice Stewart’s spirited dissent in Branzburg relied on this theory:241 his 
entire opinion was centered around the belief that “[e]nlightened choice by an informed citizenry 
                                                                                                                                                       
speech that emanated out of the jurisprudence following the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918, 
both of which were far more egregious than anything that John Adams may have attempted in the Alien and Sedition 
Acts of 1798.”); see also William Brennan, The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of 
Security Crisis, 18 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 11 (1988) (discussing the Espionage Act as an extension of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts that infringed on civil liberties). 
235 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278. 
236 Id.  
237  Henry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on “the Central Meaning of the First Amendment,”  
1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 209 (1964) (explaining that “the opinion almost literally incorporated Alexander 
Meiklejohn’s thesis that in a democracy the citizen as ruler is our most important public official”). 
238  Id. 
239 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (“Political speech, of course, is at the core of what 
the First Amendment is designed to protect.”) (quotation marks omitted)). 
240 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 




is the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised.”242  He believed that an unfettered 
press advanced the “self-fulfillment” of the people by providing important information, which 
was a precondition of self-governance.243  “The press ‘has been a mighty catalyst in awakening 
public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and 
employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events,’” he wrote.244   In short, 
Stewart argued that the Court had relied on the self-governance theories in other cases to 
recognize accessory rights to speech – like the right to receive information – and should have 
done the same in reporter’s privilege case.245   
Justice Douglas, also dissenting, agreed with Justice Stewart: “[E]ffective self-
government cannot succeed unless the people are immersed in a steady, robust, unimpeded, and 
uncensored flow of opinion and reporting . . . .”246  Douglas saw at least two deleterious effects 
on the public’s ability to self-govern under the Branzburg Court’s ruling: first, sources will be 
less likely to come forward, and, if they do come forward, they will not be as candid; and second, 
reporters will be more likely to temper their stories to avoid landing in front of the grand jury.247  
Taken together, Douglas feared that the Court’s ruling prohibited the press from doing exactly 
what the Constitution contemplated that it do: “explore and investigate events, inform the people 
                                                
242 Id. at 726.  
243 Id. at 727.  
244 Id. (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965)).  The press was especially important in an age of a 
confluence of private and public power.  Id.   
245 Id.  Invoking the self-governance theory, the recognition of a constitutional reporter’s privilege was an easy 
question for Stewart: 
[The need for a privilege] follows as a matter of simple logic once three factual predicates are 
recognized: (1) newsmen require informants to gather news; (2) confidentiality-the promise or 
understanding that names or certain aspects of communications will be kept off the record – is 
essential to the creation and maintenance of a news-gathering relationship with informants; and (3) 
an unbridled subpoena power-the absence of a constitutional right protecting, in any way, a 
confidential relationship from compulsory [sic] process – will either deter sources from divulging 
information or deter reporters from gathering and publishing information. 
Id. at 728. 
246  U.S. v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 715 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 




what is going on, and . . . expose the harmful as well as the good influences at work.”248 
Most recently, in the Court’s only other case touching (indirectly) on the press’s rights 
vis-à-vis its sources, four Justices also relied on the self-governance theory.249  In Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., the Court found that a news organization could be held liable for damages 
under a contract theory if that news organization violated a promise of confidentiality to a 
source.250  Dissenting from the Court’s holding, Justice Souter urged a view of the First 
Amendment that protected not just the speaker, but also considered the “importance of the 
information to public discourse.”251  Finding the disclosure of the anonymous source’s name 
itself was extremely newsworthy to a state gubernatorial race, he invoked the self-governance 
theory: “[F]reedom of the press is ultimately founded on the value of enhancing [political] 
discourse for the sake of a citizenry better informed and thus more prudently self governed.”252 
Setting aside cases where the source’s identity is newsworthy in and of itself, history 
supports the view that, in most cases, anonymity is necessary to self-governance.253  Indeed, 
many leaks relate to political speech if not, strictly speaking, government information.254  The 
Pentagon Papers Case is perhaps the most famous example.255  There, Daniel Ellsberg, a 
government intelligence contractor, secretly delivered a damaging report regarding progress (or 
the lack thereof) in Vietnam to the Times and the Washington Post under the guarantee of 
anonymity.256  More recently, the Times, relying on confidential sources, revealed that President 
                                                
248 Id. at 723.  
249 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 678 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter was joined 
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor.  
250 Id. at 672 (majority opinion).  
251 Id. at 678 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
252 Id.   
253 See Kielbowicz, supra note 68, at 483 (“At bottom, most leaks are a form of political speech.”). 
254  Id. 
255 See New York Times, Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  
256 DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS 372, 392 (2002) 




Obama has an active role in deciding which alleged terrorists should be targeted and killed by 
drones in the Middle East.257  The reporters behind that revelation used confidential sources to 
report this story, which went on to receive wide publicity.258  Other famous uses of confidential 
sources to report on governmental activity include President Jimmy Carter’s wish to develop a 
“neutron bomb,” the conditions of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, and Enron.259 
In confidential source cases where the information leaked relates to self-governance, the 
self-governance theory operates in two ways.  First, the reporter has a greater right to refuse to 
disclose source information because the reporter has an interest in keeping the path to 
confidential source information free from legal debris so that he may continue to inform the 
public.  Second, the public, as an interested party, has a right to receive the information.  The 
self-governance theory views the First Amendment as guaranteeing that government will not 
interfere with the exchange of political information.  If a reporter were required to divulge his 
source, then the government would not be respecting the procedural limits that the First 
Amendment was intended to establish under the self-governance theory. 
 
The Marketplace of Ideas Theory 
 
 Judges, scholars, and practitioners have invoked the marketplace of ideas theory with 
such frequency that it has become a constitutional cliché.260  The classical understanding of the 
marketplace of ideas theory comes from John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, an inquiry into the 
                                                
257  Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 29, 2012, at A1. 
258 Id. (noting the use of anonymity for at least one source who divulged information about the still classified 
drone program). 
259 These cases are summarized in Free Flow of Information Act: Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Lee Levine, Partner, Levine, Sullivan, Koch, & Schulz L.L.P.). 
260 Simply, the marketplace of ideas metaphor “has had as major an impact as any Supreme Court decision on 
popular and academic thinking about the First Amendment.”  Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of 




“struggle between Liberty and Authority.”261  In On Liberty, Mill rejected the idea that the 
government could suppress citizens views, even if the majority sanctioned the suppression.262  
According to Mill, even a citizen’s erroneous facts and harmful beliefs were important in the 
marketplace because they had the potential to increase the contrast between right and wrong.263  
In Mill’s words, “If the [suppressed] opinion is right, [society is] deprived of the opportunity of 
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, [society loses] what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”264  This theory 
rests then, for better or worse, on the assumption that “[w]rong opinions and practices gradually 
yield to fact and argument.”265 
 Beyond increasing the contrast between right and wrong, Mill believed that the majority 
must not censor a minority view for two other reasons.266  First, it is impossible for the majority 
to know whether the idea it suppressed was wrong or dangerous:267 “Those who desire to 
suppress [an opinion], of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible.  They have no 
authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means 
                                                
261 See MILL, supra note 167, at 8.  
262 Id. at 35-36.   
263 Id.  
264 Id.  
265 Id. at 41.  Some thought that this assumption, among others, was for the worse.  See Jerome A. Barron, 
Access-the Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 766 (1970).  Professor Jerome Barron, for example, argued, 
“[The marketplace of ideas theory is] romantic because it builds a system of legal rights and duties on the 
assumption that there is a self-operating and self-correcting mechanism in the communication of ideas that is called 
somewhat hopefully the ‘marketplace of ideas.’  But there is no marketplace of ideas.”  Id. at 780.  Because the 
marketplace is not perfect, Barron suggested that the government set up a correcting communication structure that 
was more “hospitable” to differing viewpoints.  Id. at 781. 
 Barron was not alone.  As discussed, below, Professor Baker also rejected the marketplace of ideas theory 
and the idea that it “find[s] or creat[es] societal ‘truth.’”  See Baker, supra note 179, at 966.  Professor Frederick 
Schauer also rejected the theory.  See Frederick Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in 
Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263 (1978).  Schauer thought the marketplace of ideas theory should not 
be viewed as a theory at all, but rather as explaining certain “guiding principles” of First Amendment theory.  Id. at 
269 n.19. 
266  See MILL, supra note 167, at 36. 




of judging.”268  Second, allowing the ideas into the marketplace would force citizens to test their 
existing beliefs.269  Indeed, “[h]owever unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit 
the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that 
however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a 
dead dogma, not a living truth.”270   
Justice Holmes pulled Mill’s theory into the twentieth century in the 1919 case Abrams v. 
United States.271  In Abrams, the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether 
Jacob Abrams, a Russian sympathizer, could be sent to jail for twenty years for tossing leaflets 
out of New York City windows.272  The Court upheld the conviction under the Espionage Act,273 
finding that the twenty-year sentence did not violate the First Amendment as the language used 
in the pamphlets “was obviously intended to provoke and to encourage resistance to the United 
States in the war.”274   
Holmes dissented in Abrams.275  He stood by his previous stance that in a time of war 
government could punish speech that amounted to a “clear and imminent danger” likely to cause 
                                                
268 Id.  
269 Id. at 70. 
270 Id. at 68.  
271  Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
272  Id. at 618. 
273  18 U.S.C. §§ 793 et seq. 
274  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 623.  Among other things, the circulars stated: 
‘Socialists, Anarchists, Industrial Workers of the World, Socialists, Labor party men and other 
revolutionary organizations Unite for Action and let us save the Workers’ Republic of Russia! 
‘Know you lovers of freedom that in order to save the Russian revolution, we must keep the armies 
of the allied countries busy at home.’ 
Id. at 623. 
275 Id. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Interestingly enough, in affirming the conviction of Abrams, the Court 
principally relied on four of its previous Espionage Act cases: Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Baer v. U.S., 
249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 204 (1919); and Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211 (1919).  Abrams, 250 
U.S. at 619.  In all three cases, the Court upheld the defendants’ convictions under the Espionage Act.  In all four 
cases, Justice Holmes wrote the opinions upholding the convictions.  Justice Holmes had a change of heart over the 
summer of 1919 after, among other things, reading Zachariah Chafee’s well-received article in Harvard Law 
Review, Freedom of Speech in War Time, which was released a month after Holmes’s original Espionage Act cases.  
See Fred D. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and Present Danger 




“substantive damage” to the state.276  In Abrams though, he did not believe anyone could 
“suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, 
would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the 
government arms or have any appreciable tendency to do so.”277   
Holmes’s dissent has importance beyond the facts of Abrams.  The real contribution 
Holmes made in his dissent was his invocation of marketplace of ideas.278  Holmes’s dissent is, 
                                                                                                                                                       
and Debs ‘were rightly decided,’ Holmes abandoned his earlier position and adopted Chafee’s.”); see also Zachariah 
Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919). 
276 Id. at 628.  
277 Justice Holmes was belittling Abrams contributions to the national debate in order to bring those 
contributions under the protection of the First Amendment – and, more specifically, Holmes was attempting to 
distinguish the speech at issue in Abrams from the speech in other Espionage Act cases, where he and the Court had 
upheld convictions for similar speech.  At one point Holmes characterized the writings at issue as “poor and puny.”  
Id. at 629.  Yet, it is unclear how these writings differed in any meaningful way from the writings in the previous 
cases except for the writings being untethered from the draft.   
Thus, Holmes’s observation that he had “never . . . seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law that 
alone were before this Court in the Cases of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs were rightly decided,” id. at 627 (internal 
citations omitted), is curious to say the least.  Compare Schenck, 249 U.S. 47 (six-month sentence for circular 
suggesting that “conscription was despotism”); Baer, 249 U.S. 47 (ninety-day sentence for the same); Frohwerk, 
249 U.S. 204 (ten-year sentence for the circulation of twelve articles suggesting, among other things, that it was 
improper for the United States to send troops to France); and Debs, 249 U.S. 211 (ten-year sentence for circular 
advocating “[s]ocialism, its growth, and a prophecy of its ultimate success”) with Abrams, 250 U.S. 616 (twenty-
year sentence for distributing pamphlets describing the “hypocrisy” of the United States). 
It is strange then that Holmes’s role in Abrams is often remembered as that of a First Amendment stalwart 
espousing romantic visions of the value of freedom of speech to the marketplace of ideas, see, e.g., Blasi, supra note 
210, at 16 (describing Holmes’s dissent as “majestic”), when, in fact, he found apparent comfort in distinguishing 
the Abrams case only because the speech and speaker were inconsequential.  In this way then, Holmes’s role in 
Abrams was more that of a cautious soldier attempting to complete a discrete about-face from his own past holdings, 
see, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the “Clear and Present Danger'” Theory of the First 
Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1118 (1989) (“Although he denied it, there is reason to believe that . . . Justice 
Holmes had changed his mind about the protection afforded speech under the first amendment to the Constitution.”), 
than that of a First Amendment stalwart.  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (admitting that some 
punishment “could be inflicted” on Mr. Abrams). 
Compare Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (“[T]he main purpose of [the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments] is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practised by 
other governments,’ and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the 
public welfare.” (citation omitted)) and Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51-52 (Holmes, J.) (“It well may be that the prohibition 
of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have 
been the main purpose . . . .”) with Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31 (“Only the emergency that makes it immediately 
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants  making any exception to the sweeping 
command, ‘Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.’”).  For a more comprehensive discussion 
of the Espionage Act cases and Justice Holmes roll in them see Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment 
Right to Free Expression: From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
773, 835 (2008). 
278 Indeed, Justice Kennedy, adopting Justice Holmes’s almost ninety-year-old language, recently wrote for the 




arguably, one of the most important contributions to First Amendment theory that any single 
justice has made and is worth reviewing verbatim.  Holmes began his discussion of the 
marketplace by admitting: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical.  If you 
have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all 
your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all 
opposition.  To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the 
speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do 
not care whole heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or 
your premises.279 
 
Essentially, Holmes opened by establishing a baseline: the natural response to opposition is to 
suppress that opposition in order to protect your own speech.280  Holmes was not faulting those 
advocating suppression because that seemed to be a perfectly logical course of action to take.281 
With the baseline set, Holmes turned to his normative proposition: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own 
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – 
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution.282 
 
Here, Holmes suggested that, on reflection, men would eventually realize that the best way 
forward was a “free trade in ideas” that would lead to “truth.”283  Some have taken this to mean 
                                                                                                                                                       
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’”  U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) 
(quoting Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 
(1967) (calling Holmes’s Abrams dissent a “fountainhead” for the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence). 
279 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
280 This approach tracks that of Mill’s in On Liberty.  See MILL, supra note 167, at 36-68.  
281  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
282 Id. 




that the underlying rationale for guaranteeing an open marketplace was to ensure that truth win 
out over falsity by consistently testing ideas against other ideas.284   
Blasi, however, has suggested that Holmes’s own view of the marketplace of ideas was 
not based on guarantee of truth, but anchored in the idea that – truth aside – the process of 
competition was a valuable.285  One can find slivers of support for this idea in the closing 
paragraphs of the dissent: 
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.  Every year if not every day we 
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect 
knowledge.  While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we 
loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten 
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an 
immediate check is required to save the country.286  
 
                                                
284 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 179, at 967 (“According to classic [marketplace of ideas] theory, truth is 
discovered through its competition with falsehood for acceptance.”); see also EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8 (1989) (explaining under Justices Holmes’s and Brandeis’s view, “speech is normally the 
means relied on to eliminate error, suppression should not be allowed unless the danger of speech is ‘clear’”). 
285 Justice Holmes’s theory was idiosyncratic.  As Professor Blasi explained, Justice Holmes was shaped by 
empiricist literature standing for the idea that “all propositions are subject to perpetual testing. And that process of 
testing, . . . must always hold out at least the possibility that prior understandings will be displaced.”  Vincent Blasi, 
Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 19 (2004).  Blasi views Holmes’s theory as one based 
not on some search for truth in the market, but on competition among ides: “Holmes, the old soldier and proud 
Darwinist, thought that one of the valuable functions of dissenting speech, including speech that advocates violent 
revolution, is its capacity to generate some of the grievances, aspirations, and mobilizations that force political 
adaptation and transformation.”  Id. at 45 (emphasis added); see also Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of 
Speech § 1.02[B] (1984) (“It may be concluded, then, that if freedom of speech does not produce absolute ‘truth,’ it 
is nevertheless a necessary condition to an enlightenment which will direct us toward as close an approximation of 
truth as nonomniscient humanity can reach.”). 
 Others have recognized this “competition view” of the marketplace of ideas theory as well.  As the famed 
Pulitzer Prize winning writer and journalist E.B. White said in a letter defending the conception of journalism as a 
marketplace for ideas in competition: 
The press in our free country is reliable and useful not because of its good character but because of 
its great diversity.  As long as there are many owners, each pursuing his own brand of truth, we 
the people have the opportunity to arrive at the truth and to dwell in the light.  . . .  For a citizen in 
our free society, it is an enormous privilege and a wonderful protection to have access to hundreds 
of periodicals, each peddling its own belief.  There is safety in numbers: the papers expose each 
other’s follies and peccadillos, correct each other’s mistakes, and cancel out each other’s biases.  
The reader is free to range around in the whole editorial bouillabaisse and explore it for the one 
clam that matters – the truth. 
Letter from E.B. White to W.B. Jones, Dir. of Commc’ns, Xerox Corp. (Jan. 30, 1976) available at 
http://www.lettersofnote.com/2012/03/e-b-white-on-free-press.html. 




Holmes recognized then that society is often left to make important decisions based on 
“imperfect knowledge.”287  Despite this failing, he thought that competition in a free and open 
marketplace of ideas was pivotal to a democratic society in search of truth (even though it did 
not guarantee that truth would ever be found).288  For this reason, he rejected the idea that 
seditious libel laws, which by definition suppressed some unpopular ideas, comported with the 
First Amendment: 
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment 
left the common law as to seditious libel in force.  History seems to me against 
the notion.  I had conceived that the United States through many years had shown 
its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798 (Act July 14, 1798, c. 73, 1 Stat. 596), 
by repaying fines that it imposed.289 
 
Holmes, however, did not entertain the idea that the government could never regulate speech 
under the marketplace of ideas theory.290  Instead, he conceded that the government could punish 
                                                
287 Id.  
288  The truth-seeking version of the marketplace of ideas theory is more criticized than the competition 
version, which is less well recognized.  It is widely criticized for the assumptions that it rests on.  See BARON & 
DIENES, supra note 186, at 8-9; see also Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 15 (1984) (explaining that the marketplace of ideas theory is based on several assumptions, namely the idea 
that truth can defeat falsity and that people rationally process new information and incorporate it into their pool of 
knowledge).   
Professor Baker argued against the truth-seeking version of the marketplace of ideas theory, writing that “[t]he 
assumptions on which the classic marketplace of ideas theory rests are almost universally rejected today.  Because 
of this failure of assumptions, the hope that the marketplace leads to truth, or even to the best or most desirable 
decision, becomes implausible.”  See Baker, supra note 179, at 974.  Among other things, Baker argues that the 
marketplace of ideas theory is not helpful, because it is based on the idea that there is an objective truth, that people 
act and consider new evidence rationally, and that the market will not be poisoned by those with the most power and 
money.  See id. at 974-81. 
These legal conclusions about the marketplace of ideas are also supported by mass communication studies and 
sociology and psychology studies.  See, e.g., Regina Lawrence & Matthew Schafer, Debunking Sarah Palin: 
Mainstream News Coverage of ‘Death Panels,’ 13 JOURNALISM 766 (2012) (explaining that despite relatively 
forceful debunking of the claim that the Affordable Care Act did not contain panels that decide who lives and dies, 
public belief in the existence of these panels remained relatively unchanged throughout the healthcare debates); 
Monica Prasad, Andrew J. Perrin, Kieran Bezila, Steve G. Hoffman, Kate Kindleberger, Kim Manturuk, Ashleigh 
Smith Powers, “There Must Be a Reason”: Osama, Saddam, and Inferred Justification, 79 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 
142, 157 (2009) (noting that “when presented with correct information about the lack of a link between Iraq and Al 
Qaeda from a trusted source, most of [test subjects] deflected this information”); Ziva Kunda, The Case for 
Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 480, 495 (1990) (explaining that “[p]eople are more likely to 
arrive at those conclusions that they want to arrive at”). 
289 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  




speech if it would create a “clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain 
substantive evils.”291  
 While the Supreme Court has not defined the reach of the marketplace of ideas theory, it 
is clear that Holmes’s pen left a mark on the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.292  The 
Court has repeatedly invoked the marketplace of ideas theory to strike down bars to false 
speech,293 anonymous speech,294 flag burning,295 political commentary,296 silent protest,297 and 
political advocacy,298 among other things.  As Justice Brennan recounted in New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, “The constitutional safeguard [protecting freedom of speech] . . . ‘was fashioned to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people.’”299 
 Like the self-governance theory, the marketplace of ideas theory weighs in favor of 
recognizing a constitutional reporter’s privilege.  If there was no privilege, a confidential source 
might not disclose information out of fear of reprisal or prosecution thereby depriving the 
                                                
291  Id.  In other instances, the Court has employed Holmes’s theory to deny protection to other “valueless” 
speech.  See Baker, supra note 179, at 970-74 (citing, for example, Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Paris Adult 
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292 As Justice Stevens noted in 2007, “Justice Holmes dissent . . . has emphatically carried the day.”  Morse v. 
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speech than to the dangers of its misuse.”). 
295 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418-19 (1989) (“To paraphrase Justice Holmes, we submit that nobody 
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296  Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of the First Amendment is the 
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297 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 146 n.5 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
298  Fed. Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986). 




marketplace of potentially information.300  Simply, requiring journalists to testify will cause 
sources to clam up, and, therefore, the marketplace will become starved and eventually 
emaciated.301  On the other hand, if courts protect journalists, they protect sources, and, 
therefore, the marketplace will be enriched by the information contributed by confidential 
sources.302  Unsurprisingly then, Justices Stewart and Douglas relied, in part, on the marketplace 
of ideas theory to support the recognition of a reporter’s privilege.303  Between the two, Justice 
Douglas put it best, “Today’s decision will impede the wide-open and robust dissemination of 
ideas and counterthought which a free press both fosters and protects.”304 
 Setting legal arguments aside for a moment, the marketplace of ideas theory also is 
attractive from a journalism perspective, as studies have found that the use of anonymous 
sources in newsgathering results in diverse news.305  One study, for example, found that the use 
of confidential sources “permits not just more information but more antagonistic information.”306  
Others have summarized the “wealth of scholarship” as finding that confidential sources 
invigorate the public sphere by adding “scope and importance to a story,” prompt sources who 
are otherwise uncomfortable with coming forward to come forward, act as a “tributary” for the 
broader public knowledge, and seem, in the eye of the public, more believable than named 
sources.307  In short, confidential sources lead to an “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public 
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sphere, and, therefore, the marketplace theory cautions in favor of protecting those sources as 
conduits to the public. 
The Checking Value Theory 
 
 Vincent Blasi’s checking value theory is relatively new when compared to the 
marketplace of ideas and self-governance theories, but it is nonetheless influential.308  The 
checking value theory was conceived to address contemporary free speech problems by taking 
into account the relationship between big government and a professional, institutional press.309  
As a result of the largess of the modern administrative state, Blasi believed that “well-organized, 
well-financed, professional critics . . . [must] serve as a counterforce to government.”310   Blasi 
found First Amendment protection for these type of “professional critics” in a line of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence holding that “free speech, a free press, and free assembly” are valuable 
because they “check[] the abuse of power by public officials.”311  In common parlance, Blasi 
developed his theory to find protection for the institutional press so it could act as a “watchdog 
for society.”312 
While the press, under this theory, is ultimately responsible for the collection and 
publication of important civic information, the theory does not allow the public to abdicate its 
responsibility.313  The checking value simply redefines the public’s responsibility, limiting it to 
demanding change when it believes that government official “misconduct” runs afoul of its 
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expectations.314  As Blasi put it, “Under the checking value, that determination must be made by 
each citizen in deciding when the actions of government so transcend the bounds of decency that 
active opposition becomes a civic duty.”315 
Because of this relationship to self-governance, the question becomes whether Blasi’s 
theory is simply a restatement of the self-governance theory: 
The checking value has much in common with Professor Meiklejohn’s self-
government value.  Both are exclusively concerned with the political 
consequences of speech and thus both support First Amendment doctrines that 
give special protection to communications that relate to the political system in 
certain specified ways.  Both values emphasize the importance of 
communications for readers and listeners; neither is especially concerned with the 
benefits writers and speakers may derive from engaging in the act of self-
expression.316 
 
Despite the similarities, he insisted that the concepts differed in several ways.317  For example, 
the checking value is narrower than the self-governance theory; the checking value finds speech 
relating to “the particular problem of misconduct by government officials” as deserving special 
protection.318  Thus, Meiklejohn’s self-governance theory is broader, as it reaches “all speech 
relevant to the process by which citizens decide how to vote.”319 
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 The checking value is different in another way as well: it incorporates balancing.320  In 
the self-governance model, if speech is related to self-governance – however that may be defined 
– that speech merits absolute protection.321  The same cannot be said for the checking value.322  
Certainly, Blasi believed that political speech should be protected, but, as a consequentialist, 
Blasi believed that speech deserved protection only “if the good consequences of the speech 
outweigh the bad.”323  To merit protection under Blasi’s theory then, it must be shown that 
speech is related to governmental malfeasance and that it is a net gain for society.324 
 Unlike the self-governance, the checking value focuses on competing groups (as opposed 
to competing ideas).325  As Blasi explained, the checking value theory “sees political decision-
making more as a product of contending forces and counterforces, with some groups continually 
pitted against other groups.”326  It further views these groups as unequal in their power.327  Public 
officials, for example, “have more political power” than ordinary voters, and “they have attitudes 
                                                                                                                                                       
U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (“The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental 
affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public 
events and occurrences, including court proceedings.”). 
While it is somewhat easy to define government misconduct as illegal actions taken by officials, some have 
pointed out that Blasi’s theory fails to provide any real guidance as to how far the terms like “official misconduct” 
should reach.  See Redish, supra note 179, at 612 (“At different points, Blasi refers to speech concerning ‘abuse of 
power,’ the [‘]misuse of official power,’ and ‘breaches of trust by public officials,’” implying that these are the 
operative terms.  But the meaning of these terms is by no means self-evident.”).  In this way then, Blasi’s theory 
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and skills more attuned to the acquisition and retention of such power.”328  This imbalance begs 
for a counterweight with as much power as public officials.329   
In the professional press, Blasi found a counterweight: “A theory based on the checking 
value might therefore envision a special role for the professional press, and thus in some 
instances treat journalists different than ordinary citizens in determining what rights are 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”330  This theory, where the press as an institution is viewed 
as different than individual citizens, was alluded to years earlier in Justice Black’s concurring 
opinion New York Times v. United States, the Pentagon Papers Case: 
The Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the press 
would remain forever free to censure the Government.  The press was protected 
so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.  Only a free 
and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And 
paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any 
part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant 
lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.331 
 
 While Blasi’s theory has achieved considerable exposure when compared to other 
contemporary First Amendment theories, it is not without its critics.332  Professor Redish has 
argued that the checking value simply recasts existing free speech theory in a different light.333  
“Because the checking function ultimately derives from the principle of democratic self-rule, and 
because that principle in turn follows from the self-realization value, the checking function is 
merely one concrete manifestation of the much broader self-realization value,” Redish argued.334   
The critics aside, however, it is clear that Blasi’s theory has had some immeasurable pull on 
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modern First Amendment jurisprudence, and, of the theories mentioned, it is the only one 
attempting to fashion a theory around the press as an institution.335 
In developing his theory, Blasi specifically contemplated what kind of protection his 
theory would provide to journalists attempting to protect their sources.336  That protection would 
be great: “I would interpret the First Amendment to grant an unqualified privilege protecting the 
identity of all confidential government-employee sources . . . .”337  According to Blasi, an 
unqualified privilege was necessary under the checking value theory because “information 
relevant to the abuse of power is frequently available only from insiders who stand to lose a great 
deal should their roles in the dissemination process be discovered.”338  To Blasi, the value of 
confidential sources was “a consideration that subordinates all others,”339 because those sources 
are – presumably – the only avenue to the information they hold about the government.340  In 
Branzburg, Justice Stewart leaned on much of the same logic: 
As . . . public aggregations of power burgeon in size and the pressures for 
conformity necessarily mount, there is obviously a continuing need for an 
independent press to disseminate a robust variety of information and opinion 
through reportage, investigation, and criticism, if we are to preserve our 
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constitutional tradition of maximizing freedom of choice by encouraging diversity 
of expression.341 
 
Much like Blasi then, Justice Stewart also saw the press as a necessary counterweight to the 
growing size of government.342 
Blasi further viewed the checking value as making few exceptions to the reporter’s 
constitutional right to keep his source confidential – even if the source broke the law by, for 
example, divulging classified information.343  The privilege could only be overcome if the 
information disclosed had the “demonstrable, immediate, and irrevocable effect of causing 
extremely serious harm to a criminal defendant’s opportunity to receive a fair trial or to 
important diplomatic or military endeavors.”344  While it is unclear what constitutes a 
“demonstrable, immediate and irrevocable effect,” Blasi believed that the Times could not have 
been required to reveal the identity of Daniel Ellsberg, the source of the Pentagon Papers.345   
Blasi even thought that under his theory the First Amendment would require the 
government to provide access to sources of information in some instances:  “When the source 
[under control of the government] wants to cooperate with the press, the reporter-source 
relationship may produce the kind of in-depth coverage of government that is of the highest 
value to a proponent of the checking value.”346  Indeed, a prisoner, under the checking value, 
could not constitutionally be restricted from talking to the press – even if that meant the 
government must provide access to the prisoner.347   
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In sum, the purpose of the First Amendment according to the checking value theory is 
“the dissemination of information about the behavior of government officials.”348  Blasi’s 
checking value, then, is the theory most supportive of a powerful reporter’s privilege when that 
privilege is invoked in cases of confidential government sources. This must be the case because 
if the government was able to interfere with the reporter-source relationship, the press would be 
unable to act as a critical and independent check on the government.349  
The Liberty Theory 
 
 “The liberty model holds that the free speech clause protects not a marketplace but rather 
an arena of individual liberty from certain types of governmental restrictions.”350  Protection is 
required under this theory “because of the way the protected conduct fosters individual self-
realization and self-determination without improperly interfering with the legitimate claims of 
others.”351 According to Edwin Baker, the proponent of the theory, it “bars certain governmental 
restrictions on noncoercive, nonviolent, substantively valued conduct, including nonverbal 
conduct,”352 and its scope is defined by “by determining the purposes or values served by 
protected speech.”353 
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Two values, Baker asserted, are fundamental to freedom of speech.354  First, speech is 
indispensable because it leads to self-fulfillment or self-realization.355  Second and relatedly, 
speech is integral an individual must be able to participate in social and political change.356  
Derivative to these two values are two additional free speech values: the unfettered ability to 
search for truth and the need for society to be adaptable to changing social and political winds.357 
Baker viewed these values as fundamental, because they were required in order to bring 
legitimacy to the democratic system.358  Simply, if individuals were not allowed to achieve their 
maximum self-fulfillment and also affect change within society to reflect the fruits of their self-
fulfillment, then the resulting society would itself be illegitimate.359  Instead, the liberty theory, 
which respects these values, justifies its “welfare maximization policies [by weighing and 
considering] each person’s concerns equally, thereby respecting the equal worth of each.”360 
 Baker colored in the lines of his theory by comparing it to the marketplace of ideas 
theory.361  As an initial matter, the marketplace of ideas theory was insufficient to protect speech 
because it failed to protect “‘solitary’ uses of speech.”362  Why would it, Baker argued, when 
those ideas never enter the marketplace?363  Moreover, because the marketplace of ideas theory 
was, in his view, based solely on the acquisition of “truth,” Baker believed that it would fail to 
protect forms of speech, like storytelling that existed for the sake of entertainment – not truth 
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seeking.364  Additionally, Baker viewed the marketplace of ideas theory as one that draws lines 
on the basis of content; it would, he thought, protect only that speech that has something 
worthwhile to public controversy.365 
Unlike the marketplace theory then, Baker asserted that his theory would protect solitary 
speech and entertaining speech.366  Indeed, “[t]o engage voluntarily in a speech act is to engage 
in self-definition or expression.”367  Frankly, it did not matter that the speaker spoke in private or 
simply intended to entertain others because both forms of speech aided self-fulfillment.368   
Having defined what is protected, Baker turned to what speech was not protected: “to the 
extent that speech is involuntary, is not chosen by the speaker, the speech act does not involve 
the self-realization or self-fulfillment of the speaker.”369  Coercive speech interferes with others’ 
right to define their own self-fulfillment, and, therefore, should not be protected by a theory that 
places a premium on the autonomy of the individual in finding himself.370  
To illustrate the theory, Baker imagined a woman telling a man that she will reveal to the 
world his bad acts unless he pays her $1,000.371  On the other hand, Baker offered a similar 
hypothetical where a woman told the same man only that she would reveal his bad acts only if he 
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followed through with those bad intentions.372  It is the story of the blackmailer and the 
whistleblower.373   
According to Baker, while the marketplace of ideas theory would protect both acts of 
speech, because “in both whistle blowing and blackmailing, the content of the speech and its 
effect either on the person exposed or on the public could be the same,”374 the liberty model 
would only protect the speaker in the second example because the speaker in the first example is 
not respecting the individual autonomy of the man she is blackmailing: 
In the first, the speaker attempts to transfer decision-making control to herself 
while, in the second, the speaker does not try to prevent the other from making his 
decision but merely forces him to take responsibility, an imposition that respects 
rather than subverts the other’s integrity and autonomy.  Since whistle blowing, 
but not blackmailing, involves using speech directly to make the world 
correspond to the speaker’s substantive values rather than merely to increase the 
speaker’s wealth (or area of decision-making domination) and does so without 
disrespecting the listener’s integrity, it is not coercive; therefore, the first 
amendment should protect [the woman in the second example] . . . .  In contrast, 
blackmail disrespects the other’s autonomy[;] . . . [thus,] the state can protect 
people’s autonomy by forbidding blackmail, a coercive use of speech.375 
 
 For the same reason that First Amendment protection under the liberty theory does not 
extend to the blackmailer, Baker also argues that it does not extend to disclosures of classified or 
other secret documents as part of calculated espionage.376  He admitted this, however, only 
begrudgingly:377 arguing that adversarial countries resort to threats of violence and a spy who 
releases sensitive information, either to a country directly or through a publisher, gives an 
antagonistic country leverage to make such threats.378  Therefore, the spy becomes a participant 
in violence or potential violence, which the First Amendment does not protect: “The [F]irst 
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[A]mendment extends protection until one’s speech becomes merely one’s method of 
involvement in a coercive or violent project.”379 
In sum, under the liberty theory, the First Amendment’s protections reach as far as the 
individual’s non-coercive speech.380  For this reason, the liberty theory is indifferent to the non-
coercive content of an individual’s speech and to the motives behind the speech.381  Indeed, the 
blackmailer may have good motives in trying to force another to divulge information, but those 
motives do not bring that coercive speech within the walls of the First Amendment’s 
protections.382  Similarly, the party being blackmailed may also have beneficent motives for his 
speech; nonetheless, these motives do not his their speech to be protected if the speech is 
coercive or violent.383  
 The Supreme Court and individual justices have recognized that the First Amendment 
protects “liberty.”384 As Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor recognized in their 
dissent in Citizens United, “Freedom of speech helps ‘make men free to develop their faculties,’ 
it respects their ‘dignity and choice,’ and it facilitates the value of ‘individual self-
realization.’”385  Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed:  
The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the 
human spirit – a spirit that demands self-expression.  Such expression is an 
integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity.  To suppress 
expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the 
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individual’s worth and dignity.  Such restraint may be ‘the greatest displeasure 
and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him.’386 
 
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in 1969, was most pointed in his belief that the First 
Amendment protects self-realization when he overturned the conviction of a Georgia man who 
possessed allegedly obscene films.387  In reversing the conviction, Justice Marshall explained, 
“[The First Amendment means] that a State has no business telling a man . . . alone in his own 
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.  Our whole constitutional heritage 
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”388   
 Accepting Baker’s theory and the Court’s recognition of it, how does the theory, a theory 
focused on the individual, apply to the press as a commercial institution though?  Baker did not 
believe it did.389  He did not believe that the First Amendment’s protections extended to 
commercial speech,390 because much like the blackmailer, who also did not merit protection 
under his theory, commercial speech lacked a “respect for human autonomy and self-
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determination.”391  For many of the same reasons that he found no protection for commercial 
speech generally, he also found no protection for the profit-oriented, institutional press.392   
Nonetheless, Baker contemplated some degree of protection for the press under his 
theory: he found this protection in the press clause – a “fourth estate theory” tangential to the 
liberty theory.393  To do this, he imported a theory similar to Blasi’s checking value – into the 
press clause only; it existed next to the liberty theory, but served a different purpose.394  
Professor Baker described his tweak to Blasi’s theory, writing: 
[T]he focus of the fourth estate theory is a source that the government does not 
control.  Its basis is more a distrust of power than a faith in truth or rationality.  
The mandate of the press clause is to protect a limited institutional realm of 
private production and distribution of information, opinion, and vision, of fact and 
fancy.395 
 
Baker’s reliance on a version of the checking value led him to find that the press has an 
institutional right not to testify as to the identity of their confidential sources.396  According to 
Baker, “The instrumental justification for protecting the [journalist’s] work product follows from 
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anyone’s values, human freedom requires a realm in which people can make value choices that 
control commercial speech.  That realm can only be a political sphere where people, not market 
forces, decide.  The very purpose of legal regulation, of political choice, is often to consider which 
values we want to create and which we want to discourage – that is, to consider what type of 
people do we want to be.  The market’s incapacity to embody this self-definitional dialogue makes 
a public or political sphere essential. 
Id. at 205.  As he explained by way of an example, “No one associated with [a] whiskey company need believe that 
more drinking would make for a better world.  The only necessary belief is that promoting the advocated activities 
will increase profits.”  Id. at 204.  Bringing both points together, Professor Baker explained, “The market’s 
substitute for [the] political process is the market defining people in a manner that serves profit.  From the 
perspective of human self-determination, this market substitute is rightly subject to severe criticism.”  Id. at 205.  
Said another way, commercial speech offers only a unidirectional discussion, where the public is not normally 
allowed to contribute.  For that reason, the public regulation of commercial speech is entirely appropriate.  Id.  
(“Since different economic forms tend to create different types of persons, any defense of freedom as self-
determination or any version of the person as being the subject of human will, necessarily implies that people should 
have a right to choose the content and determine the boundaries of the economic system.”). 
392 Id. at 229.  
393 Id.  
394 Id. at 233. 





the belief that maintaining the integrity of the press promotes a better society and makes our 
liberty more secure.”397  For society to serve this function, the press must have “institutional 
integrity,” which would not exist if the government was allowed to appropriate its work product 
or otherwise interfere with its independence.398 
The Content-based Nature of the Four Theories 
  
 Something different propels each of these theories.  The self-governance theory protects 
political speech the most strenuously because it places that speech at the center of the First 
Amendment.399  The marketplace is propelled by the belief that ideas injected into the 
marketplace will benefit society through the rigmarole of public debate.400  A belief in an 
independent, expert branch of government whose job it is to reveal government malfeasance 
propels the checking value.401  And, the liberty theory is propelled by a belief in the importance 
of self-realization.402  While these theories are a rather motley bunch when considered together, 
they do all share a single characteristic: they are all content based.403 
 The marketplace of ideas only concerns itself with true speech that is “bartered” over in 
the marketplace.404  The political speech theories – the self-governance theory and the checking 
value – focus protection on political speech, while only protecting other speech, if at all, as a 
secondary concern.405  Finally, the liberty theory, while seemingly content neutral, admittedly 
                                                
397 Id. at 244. 
398 Id. at 246.  
399  See supra notes 198-259 and accompanying text. 
400  See supra notes 260-307 and accompanying text. 
401  See supra notes 308-349 and accompanying text. 
402  See supra notes 350-398 and accompanying text. 
403  See, e.g., Matthew L. Schafer, The First Amendment as a Wall: A Pragmatic View, LIPPMANN WOULD 
ROLL (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.lippmannwouldroll.com/2013/01/13/the-first-amendment-as-a-wall-a-pragmatic-
view/ (“In general then, these theories all view some speech – implicitly or explicitly – as more deserving of 
protection than other speech.  Speech that serves the underlying purpose of each theory is protected almost 
absolutely, but speech that only tangentially advances the underlying purpose is – or, at least, logically – should be 
protected to a lesser degree, if at all.”). 
404  See supra notes 191 and 285 and accompanying text. 




only protects speech that aids in citizens’ self-realization.406  All rest on content-based 
distinctions.407 
In deciding whether these theories argue in favor of protecting certain kinds of speech 
then, it makes sense that the content of the speech would be taken into account: the more 
political the speech the more protection it would deserve under political theories; the more 
truthful the speech the more protection it would deserve under the marketplace of ideas theory 
and so forth.408  Making this appraisal would be especially important in the context of the 
reporter’s privilege because of the sheer breadth of possible leaks of personal, corporate, or 
government information.409  The information at stake in Branzburg, for example, arguably had 
relatively little First Amendment value because it related solely – at least in most respects – to 
private criminal matters.410  Because few of four widely accepted First Amendment theories 
traffic in these types of informational goods, there may not be a great First Amendment interest 
in protecting the source in that instance.411  On the other hand, if the confidential source gave the 
reporter information about government malfeasance – corruption in the highest ranks of the 
                                                
406  See supra notes 369-370 and accompanying text.  As noted, the liberty theory protects self-realization in 
part because it believes that self-realization is necessary to democracy.  See Baker, supra note 179, at 991. 
407 See Schafer, supra note 403.  
408  See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J., concurring 
in judgment) (arguing that an assessment of the newsworthiness of the leak should be undertaken); see also Monica 
Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 13, 33-34 (1988) (arguing that First Amendment jurisprudence requires a sensitivity to the type of speech at 
issue in any given case).  But see id. at 32 (“The Branzburg analysis, with its focus on preventing unwarranted 
impediments to the criminal prosecution of radical political groups and the so-called ‘counterculture’ by 
government, did not address the constitutional value of the expression at issue in such cases, much less in cases 
involving other definable categories of sources and the information provided by them for public dissemination." 
(emphasis added)). 
409  David Abramowicz, Calculating the Public Interest in Protecting Journalists’ Confidential Sources, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1949, 1978-79 (2008) (explaining that “some journalistic uses of confidential sources benefit the 
public more than others”); see also Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First 
Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POLICY __ (2013) (forthcoming) 
(arguing that leaks by government employees are, by definition, leaks about the government and, therefore, worthy 
of First Amendment protection). 
410  See supra notes 69 and 78. 
411  In Branzburg and the companion cases, it was alleged that the reporter witnessed criminal activity that was 




executive branch, for example – these four theories may require the protection of the confidential 
source.412  This may be the case, because the source would be directly serving the interests of at 
least three, and arguably four, of the First Amendment theories detailed: the self-governance, 
checking value, and marketplace of ideas theories.413  In this way, First Amendment theory is 
pivotal in the calculus of whether a reporter should be compelled to divulge his source’s 
identity.414 
First Amendment Theory Applied: The Right of Access to Information, the Right to 
Publish, and Journalistic Liability 
 
In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court did not view the reporter’s privilege as a 
speech question, and, therefore did not consider how First Amendment theories may have related 
to the types of information that was sought to be disseminated.415  The dissent, on the other hand, 
did.416  The dissent viewed the subpoenas as directly interfering with speech for a number of 
reasons: subpoenas inhibited the right of access to information;417 they interfered with right to 
                                                
412  See generally Kitrosser, supra note 409. 
413  See supra notes 240-259 and 348-349 and accompanying text 
414  See Langley & Levine, supra note 408, at 50 (“Where the information sought to be disseminated involves 
the operation of government, information that is concededly at the ‘core’ of the First Amendment’s protections, 
constitutional jurisprudence, even in the context of asserted rights of ‘access to information’ or ‘newsgathering,’ 
indicates that a journalist should enjoy a broad privilege when he promises confidentiality in exchange for 
information about the government and its operations.”). 
415 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972) (“But these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or 
assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that 
the press publish what it prefers to withhold. . . .  The use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden or 
restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means within the law. No attempt is made to 
require the press to publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to disclose them on request.”). 
 In order to even reach the question of how newsworthy the information was or how deserving of protection 
the information was under the four First Amendment theories outlined, the majority would have first had to find that 
the First Amendment was implicated.  Since it did not believe it was, id., there was no reason to establish a balance 
between the weight of the government’s interest and the reporter’s interest in disseminating information to the 
public. 
416 Id. at 723 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without 
freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be impermissibly compromised.”).  
417 Id. at 728 (“News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire 




publish the information without government interference;418 and they punished the media for 
publishing information.419  Because the dissent thought Branzburg was a First Amendment case, 
it considered whether the Amendment required the recognition of a reporter’s privilege.420   
Like the Branzburg dissent, the judge in James Risen’s case, Judge Brinkema, also 
singled out First Amendment concerns in discussing a constitutional reporter’s privilege.421  
Quoting a Fourth Circuit case, Judge Brinkema explained, “[I]f courts routinely required 
journalists to disclose their sources, ‘the free flow of newsworthy information would be-
restrained and the public’s understanding of important issues and events would be hampered in 
ways inconsistent with a healthy republic.’”422  This echoes the Branzburg dissent’s concern 
about public access to information about how government works.423  In a later opinion, Judge 
Brinkema, again finding a privilege, cited to Risen’s affidavit where Risen alleged that he could 
not have gathered the information absent a privilege.424  This also mirrors the Branzburg 
dissent’s concern about a reporter’s right of access to information.425 
In Risen’s case, the First Amendment concerns of the Branzburg dissent have, in some 
respects, been resurrected and must be grappled with to understand how courts approach 
reporter’s privilege cases in general.  As such, this section looks briefly at Supreme Court First 
Amendment cases relating to the right to gather news, publish news, and be free from 
                                                
418 Id. (“News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the 
right to publish would be impermissibly compromised.” (emphasis added)).   
419 Id. at 731-32 (“In the event of a subpoena, under today’s decision, the newsman will know that he must 
choose between being punished for contempt if he refuses to testify, or violating his profession’s ethics 10 and 
impairing his resourcefulness as a reporter if he discloses confidential information.” (emphasis added) (internal 
footnote omitted)). 
420 Id. at 733-36.  
421 June 28 Mem. Op., supra note 13, at 18-19. 
422 Id. at 19 (quoting Ashcraft v. Conoco. Inc. 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
423 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
424 July 29 Mem. Op., supra note 39, at 18 (quoting Risen Aff. ¶¶ 51-52 (I could not have written Chapter 9 of 
State of War (and many, if not all of the above-referenced articles and books) without the use of confidential 
source(s).”)).  




punishment for those actions.  First, it offers an analytical framework to illustrate the relationship 
among these three different rights.  Next, it briefly explains the scope of a reporter’s right to 
publish information and provides an overview of existing case law relating to a reporter’s right to 
gather news and to be free from punishment after publication.  Thereafter, this section points out 
potential pitfalls to the Court’s approach and concludes that these pitfalls have created confusion 
as to what rules apply in any given case. 
Conceptualizing the Rights surrounding Publication 
 
The disagreement between the Branzburg majority and dissent and the disagreement 
between the Branzburg majority and Judge Brinkema stems from the position of a newly 
asserted right, the reporter’s privilege, in relation to the established and highly protected right to 
publish information free from government restraint.  Said differently, the jurists disagree as to 
whether the reporter’s privilege is enough like “speech” to implicate the First Amendment.426   
                                                
426 As First Amendment theories are often used as guideposts for courts, the scope of protection for 
newsgathering is largely informed by whatever theory the Court finds most applicable, if any.  See Blasi, supra note 
180, at 591 (“The emphasis given various fundamental values dictates to a large degree how one responds to the 
category of First Amendment claims which can be grouped together under the heading ‘newsgathering.’”).  
Professor Blasi, therefore, has argued that the Court failed to find protection in Branzburg, because it “rejected any 
theory of the First Amendment which assigns to the professional press a special watchdog function over public 
officials.”  Id. at 593.  The rejection of any “watchdog theories” is unsurprising, because the reporting in Branzburg 
– on the Black Panthers and drug manufacturers – did not feature government incompetence or official abuses of 
power.  Id.  Instead, they were just stories about private parties involved in criminal acts and journalists had just as 
much of an obligation to respond to subpoenas about criminal acts as any other citizen.  Id.  As Blasi pointed out, 
“At no point in the [Branzburg] opinion did Justice White allude to the seditious libel analogy or the Meiklejohn 
theory, nor did he indicate that the reporters’ claims would have been stronger had their unnamed sources been 
government officials willing to inform on the wrongdoing of their colleagues.”  Id; see also Langley & Levine, 
supra note 408, at 32 (“The Branzburg analysis, with its focus on preventing unwarranted impediments to the 
criminal prosecution of radical political groups and the so-called ‘counterculture’ by government, did not address 
the constitutional value of the expression at issue in such cases, much less in cases involving other definable 
categories of sources and the information provided by them for public dissemination.”). 
As alluded to, unlike the majority, Justice Douglas, dissenting in a companion case to Branzburg, exalted 
Meiklejohn’s self-governance theory.  U.S. v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Under 
this theory, he found that two principles should have animated the Court’s opinion.  Id. at 714-15.  First, Douglas 
asserted that the Bill of Rights gave people the “absolute freedom of . . . their individual opinions.”  Id. at 714.  
Second (and important in the newgathering context of the case), he found that Meiklejohn’s theory demonstrated 
that “effective self-government cannot succeed unless the people are immersed in a steady, robust, unimpeded, and 
uncensored flow of opinion and reporting which are continuously subjected to critique, rebuttal, and re-
examination.”  Id. at 715.  Because the majority refused to validate these principles, Douglas believed that sources 




Defining how close is close enough or how alike is alike enough to merit First 
Amendment protection, as the Court failed to do in Branzburg, is difficult; it is difficult to 
conceive how not protecting confidential sources amounts to infringing speech.  Even when 
judges consider the same facts, their differing perspectives as to the similarity of government 
interference with speech and interference with newsgathering makes it difficult to predict the 
outcome of any given case.427  The result is dramatic: some judges will find First Amendment 
protections and others will completely ignore these considerations. 428  Understanding how 
judges can come to such opposing conclusions is important, because without that understanding 
it is impossible to anticipate how courts will resolve newsgathering cases.429 
                                                                                                                                                       
public’s right to know would be unconstitutionally interfered with; “The press has a preferred position in our 
constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring 
fulfillment to the public’s right to know.  The right to know is crucial to the governing powers of the people.”  Id. 
The public’s right to know can be construed as similar to the right to receive information.  The Supreme Court 
has recognized on various occasions that the First Amendment protects the right to speak as well as the right to 
receive that speech.  Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see also Bd. of Educ., Island Trees 
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[T]he right to receive ideas is a necessary 
predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.”); Virginia 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information 
and ideas.”).  For a robust discussion of the public’s right to know see Genevra Kay Loveland, Newsgathering: 
Second-Class Right Among First Amendment Freedoms, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1440, 1445 (1975). 
427 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 
461 (1958) (explaining that government actions that only discourage but do not directly abridge First Amendment 
rights are only “struck down when perceived to have the consequence of unduly curtailing the liberty of[, for 
example,] the freedom of the press”) (emphasis added)).  In cases where government action only interferes with a 
right indirectly, that interference will be judged unconstitutional only if five justices “perceive” that the interference 
is “undue[].”  Id.  The malleability of this approach to government actions that only indirectly interfere with First 
Amendment freedoms is obvious. 
428 Compare Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (majority opinion) with U.S. v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
429 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); see also TURNER, TURNER, & LEWIS, supra 
note 78, at 61 (explaining that the First Amendment’s protection for newsgathering is much more “attenuated” than 
it is at the moment of publication”); Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News: A Sequential 
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 113, 119 (2008) (explaining that subpoenas 
and other actions against journalists illustrate “the doctrinal, historical, and theoretical infirmities of the broader 




To begin, it is helpful to view newsgathering cases as within a reporting spectrum.  At the 
center of the spectrum is speech itself: publication.  Publication is strenuously protected.430  
Certainly, the government may not, in almost all cases, prevent the publication of news.431  Nor 
may the government censor parts of publications.432  These actions would be prohibited by all of 
the main First Amendment theories.433  For a long time, the Court has subscribed to the view that 
“[l]iberty of the press within the meaning of the constitutional provision, it was broadly said, 
meant ‘principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or (from) 
censorship.’”434 
Publication is only part of making the news.  If publication is at center of the reporting 
spectrum, enjoying the most protection, to the left are those preparatory activities in the run up to 
publication, like editorial decision making and newsgathering.435  To the right are those activities 
that take place after publication but nonetheless relate to a journalists newsgathering, like 
protecting the process by which news was gathered and being free from punishment for what 
was published.436  The farther out from the center in either direction a claimed right lies on the 
continuum the more likely it is that judges will disagree as to whether the First Amendment is 
implicated. 
                                                
430  Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (“[T]he chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous 
restraints upon publication.”). 
431 New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (“‘Any system of prior restraints of expression 
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’” (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963))). 
432 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936) (“Liberty of the press within the meaning of the 
constitutional provision, it was broadly said, meant ‘principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous 
restraints or (from) censorship.’” (internal citation omitted)); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 151 (1946) 
(finding that upholding a postage order would “grant the Postmaster General a power of censorship” over Esquire 
Magazine). 
433 See TURNER, TURNER, & LEWIS, supra note 78, at 61 (“First Amendment protection is at its maximum 
when government tries to prohibit publication of information.”).  
434 Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 249 (internal citation omitted).  
435 These activities include things like guaranteeing confidentiality to a source, attending trials, and reviewing 
government documents.  




This ambiguity on the fringes has not stopped reporters from arguing for greater First 
Amendment rights, however.  On the left side of the spectrum, reporters have argued that the 
First Amendment prevents the government from injecting itself into the editorial process.437  
Reporters have also argued that the government may not interfere with access to information: 
thus, they have claimed a constitutional right of access to information in or relating to public 
records,438 courtrooms,439 or prisons,440 among other things.  As Lawrence Tribe said in oral 
argument in Richmond Newspapers, Inc., “The First Amendment is violated when the 
government exercises . . . power” to limit the press’s access to information.441   
The right side of the reporting spectrum is home to those instances where the government 
or a private party attempts to punish a reporter or subsequently interfere with the reporter’s work 
as a result of publication.  On this end of the spectrum, reporters have argued that they cannot be 
punished for publishing information illegally obtained by another.442  They have asserted that the 
First Amendment prevents the search of newsrooms.443  Reporters have also contended that 
courts cannot enforce judgments against them for violating state tort laws absent certain 
                                                
437 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (“The choice of material to go into a 
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public 
issues and public officials – whether fair or unfair – constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment.  It has 
yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First 
Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”).  
438  Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (finding a First Amendment right to publish information 
contained in public records). 
439  Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (a majority of the court finding a First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials); see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) 
(finding a First Amendment right of access to a transcript of preliminary matters in a criminal trial); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment guarantees a right of 
access to criminal trials). 
440  Pell, 417 U.S. 817 (holding that the press has no special right of access to prisons); see also Saxbe v. Wash. 
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (finding no violation of the First Amendment where warden prohibited face-to-face 
interviews of inmates and pre-selection of a specific interviewee); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) 
(finding no special right of access to prisons). 
441 Oral Argument at 22:40, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (No. 79-243), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1979/1979_79_243.  
442  See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (finding the broadcast of a phone call illegally 
intercepted by another to be protected by the First Amendment).  
443  See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (finding constitutional a search of the newsroom 




circumstances.444  And, of course, reporters have advanced the claim that the First Amendment 
confers on them the right to decline answering subpoenas seeking the identities of their sources 
or their work product.445 
The Right to Gather News and be Free from Punishment for Publication 
 
Newsgathering rights of the press were not well established when the Supreme Court 
ruled on Branzburg.446  Branzburg began a trend toward recognizing these rights by establishing 
that “news gathering is not without [some degree of] First Amendment protections.”447  What it 
failed to do, however, was explain when and why some newsgathering activities deserved 
                                                
444 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (finding unconstitutional a jury charge in a right of 
privacy case insofar as it failed to instruct the jury that it must find knowing or reckless disregard for the truth).  
Notably, reputational torts, like defamation, aimed at punishing the press after publication have traditionally been 
treated differently than those cases where the government itself is a party.  The holdings of these cases are quite 
clear as compared to cases where the government is attempting to prosecute a newspaper or reporter.  See New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (“We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State's power to 
award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. Since this is 
such an action, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable.” (internal footnote omitted)).   
The decision in Sullivan was seen as so momentous that one First Amendment scholar said that it was an 
“occasion for dancing in the streets.”  Kalven, supra note 237, at 221 n.125 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn).  
Sullivan and its actual malice standard would eventually spawn a whole host of Supreme Court decisions that would 
create robust protections for those critical of government officials, public figures, and even private persons.  Masson 
v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 510 U.S. 496 (1991); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Harte-
Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 
(1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 
466 U.S. 485 (1984); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 
U.S. 111 (1979); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 185 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative 
Publ’g, Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Beckley Newspapers 
Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 274 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 
(1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).   
445 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also App. C (listing courts of appeals reporter’s 
privilege cases). 
446 See LEVINE, LIND, BERLIN & DIENES, supra note 177, at § 1.05 (noting that even as of the 2000’s, “[t]he 
freedom of the press to gather the news, free of excessive governmental interference, and its ability to obtain access 
to government institutions and to information in the hands of government are . . . less well developed [than the right 
to publish]”).  
447 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707; see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (“There is an 
undoubted right to gather news ‘from any source by means within the law . . . .’”); id. at 681 (“[W]ithout some 
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 





protection and others did not.  This work has been left to subsequent Supreme Court justices.448  
As such, newsgathering cases after Branzburg are important because they are the only hints at 
how far a general newsgathering right exists.449 
As a general matter, the Court’s case law after Branzburg reveals that the right to gather 
news and the right to be free from punishment for publication are rights deserving of some 
degree of protection as newsgathering rights.  In an attempt to define the scope of protection 
afforded to these rights, the Court has developed two main rules.450  The first rule, which rooted 
in the Branzburg majority, is a simple one: “[T]he First Amendment does not invalidate every 
incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal 
statutes of general applicability.”451  The second rule is equally simple: the government cannot 
punish the press for publication “absent a need . . . of the highest order.”452  The Court applies 
the first principle in cases where it views the government interference with the press as an 
indirect restraint on speech and the second principle in cases where it views the government 
interference as a direct restraint on the press.453  The problem in these cases is not the rules 
themselves, but determining when one rule should take precedence over another – whether an 
interference is indirect or direct.454 
Under Branzburg’s “indirect interference” principle, the Court has upheld numerous 
generally applicable laws and regulations that prevent reporters from accessing certain 
                                                
448 See LEVINE, LIND, BERLIN & DIENES, supra note 177, at § 1.05 (noting that, in most instances, the scope of 
the newsgathering right is uncertain).  
449 See generally id. § 16.06 (discussing the effect of Branzburg on subsequent case law).  
450 A complete review of newsgathering law is outside of the scope of this paper.  For a full review of the 
Supreme Court’s newsgathering jurisprudence see Barry McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of 
Information: Towards A Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249 (2004).   
451 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682; see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (listing 
cases). 
452 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527-28 (2001) (listing cases). 
453 See LEVINE, LIND, BERLIN & DIENES, supra note 177, at § 1.05 
454 See, e.g., Note, The Rights of Sources – The Critical Element in the Clash over Reporter’s Privilege, 88 




information for the purposes of newsgathering.455  In Pell v. Procunier, for example, the Court 
ruled against journalists and inmates who brought an action against the director of the California 
Department of Corrections.456  The parties sued the Department, because it had rescinded a 
previous regulation granting the press special access to prisoners.457  After the regulation was 
rescinded, the press could no longer interview specific prisoners.458  As such, the press was 
subject to the same generally applicable law that prevented all members of the public from 
interviewing specific inmates.459 
 In finding that the Department’s actions were constitutional, the Court noted that the 
press was not arguing that its rights to publish were infringed.460  The Court used this fact to 
juxtapose the actions at issue against protected activities like publication, writing, “It is one thing 
to say . . . that government cannot restrain the publication of news emanating from such sources.  
It is quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative 
duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the 
public generally.”461  The Court further explained, “The Constitution does not . . . require 
government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the 
public generally.”462  In other words, the generally applicable regulation preventing press access 
                                                
455  See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); 
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
456  Pell, 417 U.S. at 820-21. 
457 Id. at 819. 
458 Id. at 831. 
459 Id. (noting that “the promulgation of § 415.071 did not impose a discrimination against press access, but 
merely eliminated a special privilege formerly given to representatives of the press vis-à-vis members of the public 
generally”). 
460 Id. at 829.  
461 Id. at 834. 




to specific prisoners was not unconstitutional because the First Amendment did not require the 
government to provide the press with access in the first place.463   
Certainly, the regulation promulgated by the Department in Pell limited the amount of 
information available to the press to publish.464  That interference, in the Court’s view, was only 
an indirect interference with the press’s right to publish – an interference not meriting serious 
First Amendment consideration.465  Or, as illustrated by the reporter spectrum, the right asserted 
lied too far from the point of publication to merit protection.  As the Court said, “The media 
plaintiffs do not claim any impairment of their freedom to publish, for California imposes no 
restrictions on what may be published about its prisons, the prison inmates, or the officers who 
administer the prisons.”466   
The Court took the same approach in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, except in this instance, 
the government action came after publication (that is, from the right side of the spectrum).467  In 
Zurcher, Stanford University’s student newspaper published pictures of a student protest.468  
After publication, city officials became aware of the pictures’ existence and searched the offices 
of the paper.469  For many of the same reasons explained in Pell, the Court found in favor of the 
city officials.470  First, the Court found that the right asserted was too tangentially related to the 
right to publish: “[S]urely a warrant to search newspaper premises for criminal evidence such as 
the one issued here for news photographs taken in a public place carries no realistic threat of 
prior restraint or of any direct restraint whatsoever on the publication of the Daily or on its 
                                                
463  Id. 
464 Id. at 819.  
465 Id.  
466  Id. at 829 (emphasis added). 
467  Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
468 Id. at 551.  
469 Id.  
470  “[The Founders] . . . did not forbid warrants where the press was involved, did not require special showings 
that subpoenas would be impractical, and did not insist that the owner of the place to be searched, if connected with 




communication of ideas471  Once again, the Court found the enforcement of a generally 
applicable law – here being subject to reasonable searches – only indirectly, if at all, interfered 
with publication itself.472  As such, the Court never considered First Amendment concerns 
stemming from searches of newsrooms.473 
Nevertheless, in other instances, the Court has found that even generally applicable laws 
can constitute direct interferences with the First Amendment.  On several occasions, for example, 
it has upheld the right to gather information relating to the judicial process.474  Most prominently, 
the press has won cases where it argued for access to courtroom proceedings.475  In these cases, 
the closure of the courtroom extended to all people; they were generally applicable government 
actions preventing the press from gathering information and sharing it with the public.476  Even 
though the Court was dealing with generally applicable laws perhaps valid under the indirect 
interference rule (especially since they only prevented access to information as in Pell and not 
publication of information), it gave serious consideration to First Amendment values.477  It did 
so, because closing courtrooms would prevent “the individual citizen [from] effectively 
                                                
471 Id. at 567 (emphasis added).  
472 Id. at 554 (“Under existing law, valid warrants may be issued to search any property, whether or not 
occupied by a third party, at which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a 
crime will be found.”). 
473 See generally id.  
474 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (a majority of the court finding a First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials); see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) 
(finding a First Amendment right of access to a transcript of preliminary matters in a criminal trial); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment guarantees a right of 
access to criminal trials). 
475 See supra note 474.  
476  Press-Enter. Co., 478 U.S. at 3-4 (noting that all public was prevented from attending the preliminary 
hearing); Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 598 (explaining that all general public was excluded from the 
courtroom); Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 560 (plurality opinion) (noting that the judge “ordered that the 
Courtroom be kept clear of all parties except the witnesses when they testify” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 




participat[ing] in and contribut[ing] to our republican system of self-government” by depriving 
him of information.478   
The Court saw the generally applicable laws at issue in these cases differently because it 
viewed the interferences as direct interferences with First Amendment rights.  As an initial 
matter, the Court saw the closure orders as preventing the press from acting as a check on 
government – in these cases the judicial branch.479  Second, it found that the public had a First 
Amendment right – the right to receive information – that was directly interfered with by the 
closure.480  As Chief Justice Burger said in one such case 
Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen.  In a variety of contexts this 
Court has referred to a First Amendment right to receive information and ideas. 
What this means in the context of trials is that the First Amendment guarantees of 
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing 
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time that 
Amendment was adopted.481 
 
                                                
478 Id. 
479  Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment of the Court, incorporated his view of the First Amendment’s 
purpose from a dissent in an earlier case.  Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 584 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30-38 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  In that earlier case, Stevens 
adopted the self-governance theory as support for finding a newsgathering right: “It is not sufficient . . . that the 
channels of communication be free of governmental restraints.  Without some protection for the acquisition of 
information about the operation of public institutions . . . , the process of self-governance contemplated by the 
Framers would be stripped of its substance.”  Houchins, 438 U.S. at 31-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(internal citation and quotations omitted). 
 Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justice Marshall, essentially agreed with Stevens’ view of the self-
governance theory and agreed with the Court that criminal trials must be open to the public.  See Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 586-87 (Brennan, J., concurring).  “Implicit in this structural role is not only ‘the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’ but also the antecedent 
assumption that valuable public debate – as well as other civic behavior – must be informed.”  Id. 
In future newsgathering cases, the Court would echo these Justices’ First Amendment views.  For example, in 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, a case where the Court upheld the press’s right of access to pre-trial sexual 
assault testimony, the Court prefaced its discussion with an understanding of the First Amendment as “serve[ing] to 
ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-
government.”  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).  As Justice Brennan recognized for 
a majority of the Court in Globe Newspaper Co., “The First Amendment is . . . broad enough to encompass those 
rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to 
the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.”  Id. 
480 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 576 (plurality opinion) (“Instead of acquiring information about 
trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through 
the print and electronic media.”). 




Justice Brennan, concurring in a similar case, echoed that sentiment, writing, “The ‘common 
core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of 
government’ that underlies the decision of cases of this kind provides protection to all members 
of the public ‘from abridgment of their rights of access to information about the operation of 
their government.’”482 
Even outside the courtroom context, the Court has found generally applicable laws to 
directly infringe with freedom of speech when reporters are punished for the publication of 
information they have gathered.483  These are newsgathering liability cases where parties attempt 
to hold reporters liable for publication after publication has occurred.484  In some instances, 
reporters receive the information lawfully from someone who collected the information 
unlawfully.485  In others, reporters break promises with sources of information,486 they publish 
information found in public records,487 or they publish sensitive confidential information.488  In 
                                                
482 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 517 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
483 See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979) (“Our recent decisions demonstrate that state 
action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.”). 
484 See LEVINE, LIND, BERLIN & DIENES, supra note 177, at § 13.04. 
485 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (emphasis added); see also id. at 544-45 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting) (“The anti disclosure provision is based solely upon the manner in which the conversation was 
acquired, not the subject matter of the conversation or the viewpoints of the speakers.  The same information, if 
obtained lawfully, could be published with impunity.”). 
486  Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (“The question before us is whether the First 
Amendment prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper’s 
breach of a promise of confidentiality given to the plaintiff in exchange for information.”). 
487  Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975); Id. at 472 n.1 (“It shall be unlawful for any news 
media or any other person to print . . . the name or identity or any female who may have been raped or upon whom 
an assault with intent to commit rape may have been made.” (emphasis added)).   
In the 1975 case Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, the Court addressed whether a state could sanction the 
press for publishing truthful information that was in the public sphere.  Id. at 471.  There, the reporter for a 
television station discovered the victim’s name after reviewing indictments available in the public court record.  Id. 
at 472-73.  Rejecting Cohen’s arguments, the Court found that the state could not punish the publication of truthful 
information on the public record.  Id. at 491.  The Court reasoned that individuals rely on the press for information 
about their government: “[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to 
observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in 
convenient form the facts of those operations.”  Id. at 492 (emphasis added). 
488  Virginia v. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 829 (1978); id. at 830 n.1 (“Any person who shall divulge 
information in violation of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” (emphasis added)).   
In Landmark, a reporter was punished after publishing the name of a judge who was being investigated by a 




all instances, the question is whether states can impose liability for the publication of the 
information.489   
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court addressed whether a plaintiff could bring an action 
against a radio commentator who broadcasted a telephone call that was illegally intercepted by 
an unknown third party for damages under federal and state statutes.490  The broadcaster argued 
that he could not be punished for the broadcast because the “disclosures were protected by the 
First Amendment.”491  The Supreme Court found that the pertinent question was: “Where the 
punished publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in 
itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing 
publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?”492   
                                                                                                                                                       
punishment, because the purpose of the First Amendment is “to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”  
Id. at 838; see also Smith v. Daily Mail Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979) (a non-generally applicable law).   
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Supreme Court made its first effort to distill a general rule from 
Cox and Landmark and their reliance on First Amendment theory relating to self-governance (and to a lesser degree 
the marketplace of ideas).  Id. at 102-03.  In Daily Mail, the Charleston Daily Mail refused to publish the name of a 
juvenile who allegedly shot and killed a student, because a state statute made doing so a misdemeanor.  Id. at 99.  
Despite the prohibition, another newspaper, the Charleston Gazette, published the juvenile’s name, and the next day 
the Daily Mail followed suit since the name was public at that point.  Id. at 99-100.  The state indicted both 
newspapers for violating the non-disclosure statute.  Id. at 100.  The question before the Court was whether a 
newspaper could be punished for publishing truthful information that it legally obtained on its own.  Id.   
Relying in part on Cox and Landmark, the Court formulate[d] what would come to be known as the Daily 
Mail principle: “[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then 
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest 
of the highest order.”  Id at 103.  The Court recognized that the state had an interest in protecting the identity of a 
juvenile offender, but ultimately concluded that “the [press’] constitutional right must prevail . . . .”  Id. at 104 
(citing Davis v. Ala., 415 U.S. 308 (1974)).  It thought this must be the case, because preventing a newspaper from 
publishing truthful information it gathered through the normal reporting process would inject the government into 
the editorial process; as the court put it, “A free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the sufferance of 
government to supply it with information.”  Id. at 104.  While in not so many words, the Court seemed concerned 
about press independence from government – a cornerstone of both the checking value and the self-governance 
theories.  Id. 
489  See supra notes 485-488. 
490  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518-19 (2001). 
491 Id. at 520.  
492  Id. at 528 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) 




The Court said no.493  In coming to that conclusion, the Court explained that no matter 
the initial illegal action by a third party to retrieve the information, the imposition of “sanctions 
on the publication of truthful information of public concern” infringes on “the core purposes of 
the First Amendment.”494  In short, the Court saw the damages sought under the statutes as 
directly infringing on protected speech,495 and, therefore, the application of the rule demanding a 
“need . . . of the highest order” for the imposition of liability to be constitutional.496 
Direct interference cases like Bartnicki evidence the Court’s willingness to, under certain 
circumstances, even apply strict First Amendment scrutiny to even laws of general 
applicability.497  Again, it is a question of degree: would the interference caused by allowing 
recovery for damages so interfere with protected speech that First Amendment considerations 
must be analyzed?  Depending on the facts of a case, the answer is not self-evident.498  
Aggravating the matter, the Court has rarely explained why it views some laws as directly 
                                                
493 Id. at 533-34.  
494  Id. 
495 Id.  Notably, the Court never rebutted the dissent’s assertion that the laws did not directly interfere with 
speech because they were “content neutral; they only regulate information that was illegally obtained; they do not 
restrict republication of what is already in the public domain; they impose no special burdens upon the media; they 
have a scienter requirement to provide fair warning; and they promote the privacy and free speech of those using 
cellular telephones.”  Id. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing for the application of the indirect interference 
rule that holds that laws of general applicability are enforceable against the press as well as the public). 
496 Id. at 527-28 (listing cases). 
497 See supra notes 485-488.  A legitimate criticism is that, for the most part, these laws are not laws of 
generally applicability because they apply only to certain types of speech even though their application to those 
types of speech applied to everyone.  Bartnicki, however, was a law of general applicability in both ways: it applied 
to everyone equally and it applied to all types of speech.  See, e.g., Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 545 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (noting that the Court was extending the what was once a rule limited to “certain truthful information” to 
a law that was content neutral). 
498  For example, Justice Stewart in Zurcher viewed the enforcement of a search warrant against a newspaper as 
interfering with speech, because the search would interfere with the day-to-day operations of the newsroom.  
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 571 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  Thus, he would have given the speech 
more First Amendment protection.  Id.  Unfortunately, the majority in Zurcher failed to rebut Justice Stewart’s 
viewpoint or explain how a court should distinguish between permissible generally applicable laws and those 




interfering with speech and requiring greater First Amendment protection, and some as only 
indirectly interfering and requiring less.499 
Thus, even twenty years after Branzburg was decided, the internal confusion that existed 
between the majority and dissent’s views in Branzburg – whether the imposition of generally 
applicable laws against the press required a weighing of First Amendment values – continues to 
rear its head.500  The inability of the Court to explain when a government action directly 
interferes with protected speech and when it does not makes it difficult to know when a court 
ought to apply one principle or the other; indeed, the answer obviously does not lie in whether a 
law is a generally applicable one or not.501  As Erik Ugland has explained, “The mixed success 
of media litigants and the lack of conclusive rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court have yielded a 
body of law that is conflicted in both its outcomes and its rationales.”502 
 
                                                
499 See generally Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).  This ambiguity in distinguishing between 
permissible and impermissible laws is best evidenced by the Court’s opinion in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.  See id.  
In Cohen, the Court was presented with the question of whether a confidential source could, consistent with the First 
Amendment, recover damages when the newspaper revealed the source’s identity.  Id.  The majority believed that 
the case was governed by the Court’s line of cases holding that laws of general applicability – in this case, a state 
tort law – governed and, therefore, found that the First Amendment did not bar damages.  Id. at 671-72.  Indeed, the 
tort at issue was a generally applicable one.  Id. (holding only that the First Amendment was not implicated without 
considering any First Amendment values).   
The dissent, however, disagreed.  Id. at 672 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 676 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
In the dissent’s view, the case was not one where the media was attempting to avoid a generally applicable law.  Id. 
at 673-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Instead, the dissent viewed the damages award as a punishment for pure, 
truthful speech: the publication of the confidential source’s name that had political value.  Id. at 675-76.  As such, 
the enforcement of liability would constitute direct infringement with speech.  Id.  Therefore, it would have applied 
the rule that publication could not be punished absent a need of the highest order.  Id. at 676.  “To the extent that 
truthful speech may ever be sanctioned consistent with the First Amendment, it must be in furtherance of a state 
interest ‘of the highest order.’  Because the [lower court’s] opinion makes clear that the State’s interest . . . was far 
from compelling, [we] would affirm that court’s decision,” the dissent concluded.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
500 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 544 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court correctly 
observes that these are ‘content-neutral law[s] of general applicability’ which serve recognized interests of the 
‘highest order’: ‘the interest in individual privacy and . . . in fostering private speech.’  It nonetheless subjects these 
laws to the strict scrutiny normally reserved for governmental attempts to censor different viewpoints or ideas.  
There is scant support, either in precedent or in reason, for the Court’s tacit application of strict scrutiny.”).  
501  See McDonald, supra note 450, at 251. 




The Reporter’s Privilege as a Constitutional Newsgathering Right 
 
Unsurprisingly, this has left the academic literature about a reporter’s privilege in 
disarray.  Some scholars have argued that courts should not recognize any right to gather news 
under the First Amendment.503  Others, however, have argued for relatively modest First 
Amendment protections.504  And still others have advocated for greater protections.505  Randall 
Bezanson has curtly summarized much of the discussion, describing the “boring, dull, and . . . 
repetitive” literature as standing for the unimpressive idea that the right to publish, protected by 
the First Amendment, means nothing without the right to gather news for publication: 
(1) freedom of the press means freedom to publish; (2) because obtaining 
information is essential to its publication, newsgathering is an exercise of press 
freedom; (3) restrictions on newsgathering are, therefore, restrictions on the First 
Amendment freedom to publish, and should be valid only if First Amendment 
scrutiny can be satisfied (i.e. restrictions should be presumed unconstitutional, 
placing the burden of justification on the government); and (4) the level of 
scrutiny should be relatively strict (here is where the interstitial commentary 
focuses).506 
 
Although academic writing focused on newsgathering is in general disarray, there are 
pockets of scholarly work that clearly tackle the problems posed by Branzburg.507  While many 
have argued in support of a constitutional reporter’s privilege, Monica Langley, an investigative 
reporter at the Wall Street Journal, and Lee Levine, one of the nation’s preeminent First 
Amendment lawyers, have argued most convincingly that the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence 
                                                
503 Randall P. Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension Between Exemption and Independence 
in Newsgathering by the Press, 47 EMORY L.J. 895, 924 (1998) (having no qualms with press liability stemming 
from generally applicable laws). 
504 Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding Aggressive 
Newsgathering, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1143, 1161(2000) (advocating that “the government should be able to impose 
liability on the media only if it can prove that this is necessary to achieve an important government purpose”). 
505 Ugland, supra note 429, at 183 (arguing for a “qualified protection” for those engaged in gather news). 
506 See Bezanson, supra note 503, at 896. 
507 See, e.g., Marcus A. Asner, Starting from Scratch: The First Amendment Reporter-Source Privilege and the 
Doctrine of Incidental Restrictions, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 593 (1993); Glenn A. Browne, Just Between You and 
Me . . . for Now: Reexamining A Qualified Privilege for Reporters to Keep Sources Confidential in Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 739 (1988); Chemerinsky, supra note 504, at 1161; Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey 
Murray, déjà Vu All over Again: How A Generation of Gains in Federal Reporter's Privilege Law Is Being 




actually undermines Branzburg’s reasoning and factual differences between the Branzburg leaks 
and other types of leaks merit varying amounts of First protection.508   
First, Langley and Levine assert that in the case of information about government, a 
subpoena against journalists amounts to a direct interference with newsgathering and an 
impermissible punishment resulting from publication.509  “In the grand jury context, for example, 
a journalist who is held in contempt and jailed for refusing to testify about the source of his 
published report exposing governmental corruption is . . . effectively receiving punishment based 
on both the content of his published work and his newsgathering techniques,’” Langley and 
Levine explain.510  The same would also be true in the civil context where a government official 
sued a newspaper for libel.511   
Langley and Levine additionally argue that government action in subpoena cases directly 
interferes with speech because, without protection, a source may not come forward.512  While 
they recognize that it is impossible to prove how many sources have refused to speak absent First 
Amendment protection, they assert that the First Amendment, in newsgathering contexts where 
information about the government is at stake, does not require such proof.513  All that is required, 
they suggest, is the recognition “that information provided by confidential sources is increasingly 
necessary for the effective dissemination of information about government in this country, and 
                                                
508 Langley & Levine, supra note 408, at 47. 
509 As these commentators put it, “[I]t is difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between a right to gather 
news, on the one hand, and governmentally imposed punishment for publishing news [that is, pure speech], on the 
other.”  Id. at 46.  
510 Id.  
511 Id.  
512 Id. at 44-45.  This argument is a non-starter insofar as the Supreme Court rejected this argument in 
Branzburg.  See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972) (rejecting the chilling effect argument in the context 
of a source who allegedly has been involved in criminal conduct or has been a witness to that type of conduct). 




that such sources typically claim that such information will not be provided in the absence of a 
pledge of confidentiality by the press.”514 
Having attempted to frame the discussion as one of direct interferences with speech, 
Langley and Levine next address the First Amendment interests at stake: “[Case law subsequent 
to Branzburg] strongly suggest[s] . . . that the First Amendment would embrace at least a 
privilege protecting those confidential relationships that facilitate the dissemination of 
information about government, information that is at the ‘core’ of the First Amendment.”515  As 
such, Langley and Levine distinguish Branzburg on the basis of the identities of the sources and 
the content of the information they are divulging.516  As opposed to the politically violent sources 
and the drug manufacturers considered by the Court in Branzburg and the consolidated cases, 
confidential sources today are often public officials with important information about 
government.517  Because of this difference, Langley and Levine argue that lower courts should 
not indiscriminately apply Branzburg’s when the source is a public official who has information 
lying at the core of the First Amendment.518  Said differently, “Regardless of one’s evaluation of 
the Supreme Court’s balancing of competing interests in the factual context contemplated in 
Branzburg, the result reached in that case . . . is unsuited to resolving the constitutional 
considerations raised by the use of confidential sources to facilitate reporting about the 
government.”519   
                                                
514 Id. at 45 (internal footnote omitted).  
515 Id. at 41-43 (emphasis added).  
516 Id. at 25; see also id. at 40 (styling the sources at issue in Branzburg and the consolidated cases as 
“nongovernmental groups suspected of criminal wrongdoing”). 
517 Id. at 25 (“The confidential source relationships presented to the Court in Branzburg are distinctly foreign 
to the primary use of anonymous sources today, which is in reporting about the government and its operations.”); 
see also id. at 28 (noting that “one empirical study found that forty-two percent of former federal officials in 
policymaking positions acknowledged that they had provided confidential information to the press while in office”). 
518 Id. at 33.  




While Langley and Levine attempt to argue around Branzburg, other supporters of a 
reporter’s privilege have simply argued that the Branzburg Court was wrong.  Most 
commentators argue, for example, that Branzburg failed to give sufficient credence to news 
organizations’ arguments that the lack of a privilege would result in a “chilling effect.”520  In 
fact, this is one of the most often invoked arguments in favor of a privilege.521  There are two 
independent aspects to the chilling effect, which is a relatively simple argument.522  First, a 
chilling effect occurs when sources who would otherwise come forward refuse to do so, because 
a reporter is unable to promise them confidentiality.523  This will often be the case, it is argued, 
because sources may suffer private, civil, or criminal ramifications if their identities’ are released 
to an employer or a prosecutor.524  The second chilling effect occurs when journalists self-censor 
themselves out of fear that including certain information could put them in legal jeopardy.525 
The chilling effect argument is rather attractive to proponents because it shows the effects 
of not recognizing a reporter’s privilege as abridging several theories of the First Amendment.  
Certainly, if the result of requiring a journalist to testify before a grand jury is the decrease of 
information that would otherwise be available in the market, the marketplace of ideas theory 
                                                
520  See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Nestler, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of 
the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 201, 248 (2005); Donna M. Murasky, The Journalist’s Privilege: 
Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829, 852 (1974).  But see Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and 
Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of A Reporter's Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 386 
(2006) (arguing that whether a promise of confidentiality promotes whistleblowers to come forward is “open to 
serious question[ing]”). 
521  Josi Kennon, When Rights Collide: An Examination of the Reporter’s Privilege, Grand Jury Leaks, and the 
Sixth Amendment Rights of the Criminal Defendant, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 543, 554 (2008) (“The main 
argument relied on by journalists in asserting the need for a reporter’s privilege is that allowing grand juries the 
unbridled power to subpoena a reporter would have a ‘chilling effect’ on the free flow of information to the 
public.”). 
522 See Murasky, supra note 520, at 852.  
523 Id. 
524 See Langley & Levine, supra note 408, at 26 (“A pledge of confidentiality is . . . typically the price that a 
journalist must pay to secure meaningful information about the operation of government for dissemination to the 
public.”). 
525 See Murasky, supra note 520, at 852; see also U.S. v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., 




would be violated.526  Moreover, when the information lost is related to self-governance, under 
the self-governance and checking value theories, a source’s identity may be more deserving of 
protection than speech about private matters, for example.527  As one commentator argued, 
“When the source’s message carries with it high value in the marketplace of ideas, it is easier to 
see the justification for the reporter’s privilege, because there is a greater potential chilling effect 
on highly valued speech.”528  Another has agreed on substantially the same terms: “When the 
source is a government official, the public interest in the information is more closely tied to the 
purposes of the First Amendment than when the source is a private actor . . . [and] the potential 
harm of a chilling effect on the public interest is much higher.”529 
In Branzburg, although the Court said that the chilling effect argument was “not 
irrational,” it dismissed it as “speculative,” without discussing how the type of speech at issue 
may affect the chilling effect argument.530  The Court further called into question the evidence of 
a chilling effect, explaining, “[T]he evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a 
significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior 
common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen.”531  This 
demand for evidence has struck proponents of the privilege as odd, because the Court historically 
had not demanded empirical evidence of a chilling effect as a result of the government’s 
                                                
526 John T. White, Smoke Screen: Are State Shield Laws Really Protecting Speech or Simply Providing Cover 
for Criminals Like the Serial Arsonist?, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909, 928 (2001). 
527  Id. 
528  Id. 
529 Elizabeth Coenia Sims, Reporters and Their Confidential Sources: How Judith Miller Represents the 
Continuing Disconnect Between the Courts and the Press, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 433, 471 (2007). 
530 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-95 (1972).  The Court did, however, chastise those arguing for the 
privilege to the extent that it forcefully rejected the idea “that the First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement 
to conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime 
than to do something about it.”  Id. at 692.  Apparently then, to some extent, the content of the reportage in 
Branzburg and the companion cases was at least an implicit consideration in the analysis.  That is, the Court seemed 
more willing to refuse to find a privilege because the information in the articles was about the sources “criminal 
conduct” and “crime.”  Id. 




actions.532  As Justice Stewart’s Branzburg dissent pointed out, “The impairment of the flow of 
news cannot, of course, be proved with scientific precision, as the Court seems to demand.”533  
He saw this burden unsupportable by the Court’s previous jurisprudence that required that 
government action cause only something more than a de minimis chill.534 
Across the aisle, opponents of a reporter’s privilege do not place an emphasis on the First 
Amendment, but, like the majority in Branzburg, view the question from the criminal law 
perspective.535  More specifically, these opponents note that the Constitution contains not only a 
First Amendment, but also a Fifth and Sixth Amendment536 that grant criminal defendants certain 
rights like due process of the law537 and a process allowing them to subpoena witnesses to testify 
in their favor.538  Moreover, others argue that recognizing a reporter’s privilege, whether 
                                                
532 See Nestler, supra note 520, at 248 (“This demand [in Branzburg for empirical evidence] was without merit 
and epitomized the Court’s antagonism toward the idea of press privileges.  In contrast, the Supreme Court in 
several other cases has accepted at face value the premise that certain governmental actions would unnecessarily 
chill important First Amendment rights.” (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996); Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61 (1965); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 
153-54 (1959))); see also Sims, supra note 529, at 471 (arguing that the government should have the burden of 
proving that the probability of a chilling effect is small); Murasky, supra note 520, at 853 (“In many of the cases in 
which the Court has decided that government action would impermissibly chill the exercise of first amendment 
rights, the Court reached its conclusion only by inference.”). 
533 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 733 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
534 Id. at 734.  
535 Karl H. Schmid, Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An Analysis of United States Courts of 
Appeals’ Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1458 (2002) (noting that “[o]pponents’ 
arguments against journalist’s privilege primarily focus on the realm of criminal law”). 
536  See U.S. CONST. amend V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”); id. amend VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
537 Roma W. Theus, II, “Leaks” in Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 551, 554 (1998) 
(arguing that “an accused may move to dismiss an indictment on the ground that grand jury ‘leaks’ violated his or 
her Fifth Amendment due process rights”). 
538 See Kennon, supra note 521, at 565 (“Leakers not only compromise a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, 
they ‘undermine the legitimacy of government, distort the criminal justice system, and undermine the principles of 




statutory or constitutional, would “handicap the enforcement of law” and “thwart[]” investigators 
“in their search for criminals or information needed to protect the public.”539  For that reason, 
law enforcement personnel are generally against such a privilege.540   
Similarly, once at trial, some argue that a constitutional reporter’s privilege would inhibit 
the search for truth.541  If a reporter’s privilege is recognized, a jury will no longer have access to 
“every man’s evidence” as a journalist could refuse to testify as to the identity of his source.542  
This would interfere with the Sixth Amendment’s promise of a compulsory process to the 
defendant, which allows him to subpoena witnesses to testify.543  “The rights of criminal 
defendants should not be overlooked,” one commentator explained.  “First [A]mendment rights 
collide with the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to compulsory process and a fair trial when the 
reporter’s privilege is claimed in response to a discovery request by a criminal defendant.”544  
For no apparent reason, some have resolved this conflict by asserting that a reporter’s First 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 843 (1984) (“It would appear . . . that there are 
two principal bases for such a claim.  First, the deprivation of important information may affect the defendant's 
ability to fully present his case, raising due process concerns.  Second, being unable to call the reporter as a witness 
may violate the sixth amendment right to compulsory process.” (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI));  
539 Thomas C. Desmond, The Newsmen’s Privilege Bill, 13 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1949). 
540 Peter Meyer, Balco, the Steroids Scandal, and What the Already Fragile Secrecy of Federal Grand Juries 
Means to the Debate over A Potential Federal Media Shield Law, 83 IND. L.J. 1671, 1672 (2008) (“While, as a 
policy matter, a federal media shield law might seem imperative to an informed representative democracy, law 
enforcement officials have reasonably bristled at its potential consequences.” (emphasis added)). 
541  See Louis J. Capocasale, Using the Shield As A Sword: An Analysis of How the Current Congressional 
Proposals for A Reporter’s Shield Law Wound the Fifth Amendment, 20 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 339, 371 
(2006). 
542 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (citing U.S. v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (“For 
more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public (in the words 
sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every man’s evidence.  When we come to examine the various claims 
of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable 
of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a 
positive general rule.” (footnote omitted)).  
543 Cross-Examination, 12 TOURO L. REV. 761, 780 (1996) (explaining that there “are certain situations where 
‘a reporter’s privilege may yield to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights,” including a compulsory process).  But 
see Annett Swierzbinski, The Newsperson’s Privilege and the Right to Compulsory Process – Establishing an 
Equilibrium, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 694, 703 (1980) (suggesting that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
compulsory process should act as a limit on – not a bar to – the invocation of a reporter’s First Amendment 
privilege). 
544  Leslye DeRoos Rood & Ann K. Grossman, The Case for A Federal Journalist’s Testimonial Shield Statute, 
18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 779, 810 (1991) (while these authors were not opponents to a privilege, they nonetheless 




Amendment right to a privilege would “generally succumb to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right.”545  
The federal government’s intelligence community is especially antagonistic to the idea of 
a reporter’s privilege.546  Such a privilege, the government argues, would make it next to 
impossible for it to discover the identity of government officials and employees who leak 
information to the press.547  In opposing a statutory reporter’s privilege in 2007, the intelligence 
community, comprised of twelve government agencies, sent a joint letter to Senators Harry Reid 
and Mitch McConnell requesting that they kill consideration of the proposed statutory reporter’s 
privilege.548  “[T]he high burden placed on the Government by [a reporter’s privilege] will make 
it difficult, if not impossible, to investigate harms to the national security and only encourage 
others to illegally disclose the Nation’s sensitive secrets,” the officials cautioned.549 
                                                
545  See Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and Federal Criminal 
Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 501 n.95 (2002). 
 This argument comes in spite of the Supreme Court’s explanation that “[t]he authors of the Bill of Rights 
did not undertake to assign priorities as  between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as 
superior to the other.”  See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).  But see Kennon, supra note 
521, at 564 (arguing that this statement “does not ring true[, because t]he federal courts, including the United States 
Supreme Court, have on numerous occasions compromised one right in favor of the other”). 
546  See, e.g., Charlie Savage, White House Proposes Changes in Bill Protecting Reporters’ Confidentiality, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2009, at A17 (“The Obama administration has told lawmakers that it opposes legislation that 
could protect reporters from being imprisoned if they refuse to disclose confidential sources who leak material about 
national security, according to several people involved with the negotiations.”). 
547 See, e.g., Letter from J.M. McConnell, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, 
Robert Mueller, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Randall Fort, Assistant Sec’y of State, Dep’t of State, Charlie 
Allen, Under Sec’y for Intelligence and Analysis, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Scott Large, Dir., Nat’l Reconnaissance 
Office, Robert Murrett, Nat’l Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, James Clapper, Under Sec’y of Def. for Intelligence, 
Dep’t of Def., Michael Hayden, Dir., Cent. Intelligence Agency, Janice Gardner, Assistant Sec’y for Intelligence 
and Analysis, Dep’t of the Treasury, Keith Alexander, Dir., Michael Maples, Dir., Def. Intelligence Agency, & Rolf 
Mowatt-Larssen, Dir. of Intelligence & Counterintelligence, Dep’t of Energy, to Sens. Harry Reid & Mitch 
McConnel, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23, 2008) available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/mediashield/2008-01-23-
intelligence-community.pdf. 
548 Id. 
549  Id. at 1; see also Free Flow of Information Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Rachel Brand, Assistant Attorney General) (“It is therefore not an 
overstatement to say that the [reporter’s privilege] could encourage more leaks of classified information – by giving 
leakers a formidable shield behind which they can hide – while simultaneously discouraging criminal investigations 
and prosecutions of such leaks – by imposing such an unacceptably high evidentiary burden on the government that 




Separate from the criminal process, other academics question whether a strong reporter’s 
privilege would actually enrich public debate and knowledge.550  If a journalist was never held 
accountable, the public would essentially have to take the journalist at his word; the public would 
have no way to know whether the “renegade” journalist is actually telling the truth about what 
his source said.551  As one scholar explains, “[A] major practical problem with granting an 
absolute privilege is the inability of the citizenry to determine if the information that is intended 
to make it ‘better’ informed is inaccurate due to an unverified source.”552  Simply, some are 
concerned that a reporter’s privilege would encourage reporters to fabricate stories and make up 
sources.553 
Focusing on a prominent argument of proponents of a reporter’s privilege, opponents, 
like the majority in Branzburg, question the chilling effects purported magnitude.  First 
Amendment scholar Lillian BeVier has aptly pointed out that despite the wales of journalists 
asserting a privilege, there is no evidence that sources have refused to come forward since 
Branzburg.554  As she has explained, “No matter how often or how confidently press advocates 
make [the] prediction [that sources will dry up], the extreme consequences they forecast were the 
                                                
550 See Capocasale, supra note 541, at 370. 
551 Id.  
552 Id.  
553 See Desmond, supra note 539, at 6-7 (“Public officials argue that if newsmen do not have to reveal their 
sources, they will be enabled to write so-called ‘dope’ stories, using the device of attributing information to ‘in 
formed quarters’ or ‘insiders’ when such sources may be merely fictitious and designed to lend authenticity to 
unwarranted attacks on public figures”); see also Capocasale, supra note 541, at 373 (“To provide the news media 
with an absolute privilege to withhold confidential sources may increase the temptation for the news media to print 
false ‘scandalous,’ or ‘controversial’ stories about individuals in an effort to sell newspapers, since when confronted 
about the factual substance of the story if a federal investigation ensues, the newsgatherer could raise his or her 
shield.”); Lillian BeVier, The Journalist’s Privilege – A Skeptic’s View, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 467, 468 (“The 
implication that the Constitution empowers the press-just as it empowers elected officials-to act as the public's agent 
raises troubling issues of accountability.  If it is correct to conceive of the press as having the constitutionally 
conferred power to act on the public’s behalf as government agents do, then it is important to determine how the 
public is to hold the press accountable for the consequences of its performance.  On the issue of accountability, I 
have been able to discern questions, but not answers.”); Eliason, supra note 520, at 439 (“Where the leak to a 
reporter is itself a potential crime, however, a prosecutor must be able to discover the source if that crime is to be 
investigated.  Typically there will be only two witnesses to such a crime: the source herself (who, if questioned, may 
invoke the Fifth Amendment), and the reporter.”). 




privilege to be denied seem most unlikely to eventuate.”555  Others agree with her, relying on 
empirical studies that show a lack of any real chilling effect.556  As one former prosecutor bluntly 
said, “The truth remains that, despite a few recent high-profile cases and the protestations of 
large and well-funded media organizations, cases in which a reporter is compelled to testify and 
reveal confidential sources are still extremely rare.”557 
In addition to the critics, some journalists have argued that a reporter’s privilege should 
be used sparingly to avoid courts curtailing the privilege as a result of abuse.558  Most prominent 
of these was Geneva Olverholser’s Times editorial at the height of the Valerie Plame affair.559  
There a columnist, Robert Novak, outed Valerie Plame, covert CIA agent, after her husband, 
Joseph Wilson, attempted to reveal government malfeasance and deception in the run up to the 
invasion of Iraq.560  He later initially refused to reveal the source inside the George W. Bush 
administration who had given him the information.561  Olverholser, a former journalist and 
ombudsman at the Washington Post, wrote at the height of the Plame affair: 
It’s a cardinal rule of journalism: do not disclose the identity of someone who 
gives you information in confidence.  As a staunch believer in this rule for 
decades, I have surprised myself lately by concluding that journalists’ proud 
absolutism on this issue – particularly in a case involving the syndicated 
columnist Robert Novak – is neither as wise nor as ethical as it has seemed. 562  
 
                                                
555 Id.  
556 See Asner, supra note 507, at 612 (citing a 1971 and 1985 study for the proposition that empirical evidence 
does not show a chilling effect); see also Ryan J. Watson, David A. Becker et. al., Recent Decisions of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Constitutional Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 693 
(2006) (“The [D.C. Circuit’s] reluctance to find a reporter’s privilege under federal common law or the First 
Amendment, however, will most likely not have a significant effect on the relationship between the news media and 
its confidential sources, much less cause the ‘chilling effect’ on news gathering predicted by appellants.”);  
557 See Eliason, supra note 520, at 417. 
558 See, e.g., Geneva Overholser, The Journalist and the Whistle-blower, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A27.  
559 See Geneva Overholser, Reporter’s Privilege and the Novak Case, POYNTER (Feb 12, 2004, 6:23 PM) 
(discussing reaction to Overholser’s New York Times editorial). 
560 See generally VALERIE PLAME WILSON, FAIR GAME: HOW A TOP CIA AGENT WAS BETRAYED BY HER 
OWN GOVERNMENT 139-158 (2008).  
561  David Johnston, Novak Told Prosecutor His Sources in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2006, available 
at https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/12/washington/12leak.html. 




According to Overholser, a journalist abuses the privilege – which exists, at least in part, to 
protect a whistleblower from a hostile government – when he uses it to “deliver[] government 
retribution to the [initial] whistleblower.”563 
 The abuses highlighted by Overholser may also be contributing to courts’ apparent 
reluctance to expand or enforce existing law recognizing a reporter’s privilege.564  Pulling from 
the Plame case, as well as other suggested abuses,565 one commentator has explained, “The 
media’s inability to differentiate between a valid privilege claim and a contemptuous one has 
contributed to a shift in the courts and public opinion.”566  This failure to play the privilege card 
appropriately and responsibly hurts the press’s cause insofar as it fosters the “appear[ance] as if 
it is above the law.”567  As a result of the press’s over zealous invocation of the privilege, some 
argue, courts have walked back their support willingness to side with the press.568 
The Murky Status Quo 
 
It is clear that First Amendment theory has influenced how the press operates at the point 
of publication.569  It is less clear how the First Amendment influences the press at other points in 
the reporting process.  The outcome of those cases on the margin largely depends on whether the 
Court views the government’s actions in any given case as directly interfering with protected 
speech.  When the Court views the actions this way, the Court is more likely to find protection.  
                                                
563  Id. 
564 Kara A. Larsen, The Demise of the First Amendment-Based Reporter’s Privilege: Why This Current Trend 
Should Not Surprise the Media, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1235, 1261 (2005). 
565 Larsen also singled out Dan Rather’s use of a confidential source who provided false information as an 
instance of reporter abuse of a reporter’s privilege.  Id. at 1262  
566 Id. at 1261. 
567 Id.  
568 Id.; cf. Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 
CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1104 (2009) (explaining that in the context of privacy claims against the media, media abuses of 
personal privacy have created an “emerging trend toward[] a narrower and less predictable judicial conception of the 
news”).  
569 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 735 (1931) (“[F]reedom of the press guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to [means] that ‘every man shall be at liberty to publish what is true, with good motives and for 




When the Court views the actions as only indirectly interfering with speech, however, it is less 
likely to find any protection.  Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to predict why the Court will 
find that an action either directly or indirectly interferes with speech. 
This state of affairs has produced two rules that potentially govern in newsgathering 
cases.  First, in some cases, the press’s right to be free from punishment for the publication of 
truthful information will be vindicated absent a compelling government interest,570 and, in 
others, as was the case in Branzburg, the press will be subject to a wide variety of generally 
applicable laws, which are propelled by considerations outside the First Amendment.571 
Some, however, would argue that the Court in Branzburg got it wrong.  First, the Court 
spoke in equivocal, broad terms and failed to distinguish between the types of information at 
issue in Branzburg and other types of information that might be at stake in other cases.572  
Second, proponents of the privilege argue that the Court impermissibly and without the support 
of existing case law shifted the burden to the press to show that a chilling effect actually 
existed.573 
Opponents, however, stand by the Court’s broad Branzburg opinion.  They, like the 
Branzburg majority, focus on how a reporter’s privilege would inhibit law enforcement.574  This 
is especially the case in national security prosecutions where often the only evidence of the 
source’s identity lies with the reporter.575  Moreover, opponents also question the chilling effect 
                                                
570 See supra notes 474-499 and accompanying text.  
571 See supra notes 455-473 and accompanying text.  
572 See supra notes 426 and accompanying text.   
573 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 733 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“But we have never 
before demanded that First Amendment rights rest on elaborate empirical studies demonstrating beyond any 
conceivable doubt that deterrent effects exist.”).   
574 See supra notes 535-545 and accompanying text.   




argument by pointing to empirical studies suggesting that sources have not been deterred from 
coming forward as a result of Branzburg.576 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never undertaken a review of Branzburg, letting 
lower courts play with the limits of a reporter’s privilege.  And, as noted, the Court’s non-
reporter’s privilege case law is of little help in assessing the validity of either the proponents or 
opponents claims arising in the forty years since Branzburg.577  As such, the newsgathering law 
surrounding Branzburg and the reporter’s privilege is murky at best.  As the leading treatise 
Newsgathering and the Law explains, “The dimensions of the newsgathering right outside the 
context of access to judicial proceedings and records are . . . less certain.  [Y]et, the First 
Amendment does extend [some] protection to newsgathering, as the judicial decisions enforcing 
the journalists’ privilege attest.”578 
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577 See supra notes 427-429 and accompanying text.   




CHAPTER 4.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
James Risen published classified information revealing how U.S. officials mismanaged 
the sensitive task of feeding Iran rigged nuclear blueprints.  Risen’s use of a confidential source 
to reveal information about the government and public officials was indicative of other national 
security reporters’ newsgathering.  Dana Priest, a prominent national security reporter for the 
Washington Post, explained the difficulty of reporting on national security without confidential 
sources, writing, “Because the U.S. government has made secret nearly every aspect of its 
counterterrorism program, it would have been impossible to report even on the basic contours of 
these decisions, operations and programs without the help of confidential sources.”579   
Under the current state of the law, neither the journalists nor the confidential sources 
implicated in the sharing of classified information can be sure that their confidential relationship 
will be protect.  While this has always been the case since Branzburg v. Hayes, the situation is 
becoming more unmanageable in light of conflicting lower court rulings.  First, the Court has 
never explained how to determine the line of demarcation between a government action that 
directly interferes with speech and government action that only indirectly interferes with 
speech.580  This creates a problem because lower courts have been unable to agree on whether 
even the same government action triggers First Amendment protections.  Second, the Court’s 
subsequent jurisprudence that arcs toward recognition of a relatively robust newsgathering right 
                                                
579  See Mot. to Quash, supra note 4, Ex. 18 at 2 (Affidavit of Dana Priest).  Numerous reporters have signed 
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government at the local, state and national level.”). 




causes some courts to question the continuing vitality of Branzburg, while others do not.581  This 
leads to a third potential problem: for those courts that do believe that reporter’s privilege cases 
do not rise and fall on the Court’s opinion in Branzburg, they are left to fashion their own, and 
perhaps, conflicted rationales as to why some reporters should not be required to divulge their 
sources and why some should.  These rationales may be based on First Amendment concerns or 
they may not.582  Without guidance, there is no “right” answer. 
These flames are fanned by current political winds, as well: the Obama administration 
has aggressively prosecuted reporters’ confidential sources.583  In all, the administration has 
charged six former government employees under the Espionage Act, a statute that gives the 
government the power to prosecute those who disclose classified information.584  Before the 
Obama administration’s prosecutions, in the ninety-one years after the Espionage Act was 
passed, only three prosecutions against government officials for leaking information to the media 
took place.585  Several critics have come out against the ramped-up prosecutions calling them 
“selective,”586 misdirected,587 and “abject failure[s].”588  
                                                
581 Cf. supra note 515.  
582 See supra notes 415-420.  
583 See generally Josh Gerstein, The ‘Leaks’ War, POLTICO, June 8, 2012, 
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charting-obamas-crackdown-on-national-security-leaks.  One could argue that the prosecutions number seven.  A 
former translator released allegedly classified information to the Stanford Library.  See Pete Yost, Linguist Charged 
Under Espionage Act, BOSTON.COM, Nov. 7, 2012, 
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585 David Carr, Blurred Line between Espionage and Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2012, at B1.  The Bush 
administration toyed with the idea of prosecuting journalists, but never would.  As early as 2006, then-Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzales said on This Week, “There are some statutes on the book which, if you read the language 
carefully, would seem to indicate that [prosecuting journalists for disclosing classified information] is a possibility.”  
Adam Liptak, Gonzales Says Prosecutions of Journalists Are Possible, N.Y. TIMES, (May 22, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/washington/22gonzales.html. 
586 See Gerstein, supra note 583 (quoting Steven Aftergood, Federation of American Scientists). 
587 Phil Mattingly and Hans Nichols, Obama Pursing Leakers Sends Warning to Whistleblowers, Bloomberg, 
Oct. 17, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-18/obama-pursuing-leakers-sends-warning-to-whistle-




 More recently, congressmen also have suggested that reporters should be prosecuted for 
disclosing classified information or subpoenaed to reveal the name of confidential sources.589  In 
mid-2012 after several news outlets released classified information relating to cyber warfare, the 
Obama administration’s “Kill List,” and the death of Osama bin Laden, Republicans in the 
House of Representatives held a hearing on the constitutionality of subpoenaing and prosecuting 
reporters.590  “Put them in front of the grand jury,” South Carolina Representative Tim Gowdy 
advocated. “You either answer the question or you’re going to be held in contempt and go to jail, 
which is what I thought all reporters aspire to do anyway.”591 
Historically, the existence of a constitutional reporter’s privilege had always been a 
powerful weapon for journalists to invoke against overzealous national security claims, and, to 
the government’s credit, it had subpoenaed journalists only in the most exceptional 
circumstances in the twentieth century.  Lee Levine, a First Amendment lawyer, told the U.S. 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 2005: 
For almost three decades following the Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg v. 
Hayes, subpoenas issued by federal courts seeking the disclosure of journalists’ 
confidential sources were rare.  It appears that no journalist was finally adjudged 
in contempt or imprisoned for refusing to disclose a confidential source in a 
federal criminal matter during the last quarter of the twentieth century. That 
situation, however, has now changed.592 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
588 Conor Friedersdorf, The Obama Administration’s Abject Failure on Transparency, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 2, 
2012, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/02/the-obama-administrations-abject-failure-on-
transparency/252387/.  
589 Jamie Goldberg, House Republicans consider prosecuting reporters over leaks, L.A. TIMES, (July 12, 
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/11/nation/la-na-security-leaks-20120712.  
590 Id.    
591 Id.  
592  See Reporters’ Shield Legislation: Issues and Implications Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 




While no journalists have been prosecuted for revealing classified information yet, journalists 
like Risen recently have been subpoenaed593 and served prison sentences for refusing to answer 
questions regarding their confidential sources.594  Over the last twelve years, the Office of the 
Attorney General has approved at least forty-three subpoenas against journalists, asking for, 
among other things, the identities of their confidential sources and their work product.595  
Because it does not keep a file for such subpoenas, these numbers are likely conservative 
estimates.596 
This current climate, where journalists are not only subject to an increasing number of 
subpoenas, but also threats of prosecution in the first instance as well, makes understanding 
reporter’s privilege jurisprudence more important than ever.597  This thesis attempts to foster that 
understanding by asking several questions to inform how and why courts find or do not find a 
powerful reporters privilege.  As such, this thesis asks: 
RQ 1: How, if at all, have courts of appeals attempted to distinguish Branzburg v. Hayes? 
 
RQ 2: How, if at all, have courts of appeals enumerated tests for deciding whether a 
reporter’s privilege exists or made determinations essentially on an ad hoc basis?  
 
RQ 3: How, if at all, have courts of appeals relied on the leading First Amendment 
theories when deciding whether a reporter’s privilege exists or how broad the scope of 
the privilege is? 
  
                                                
593 See, e.g., Keith Coffman, Journalist asks delay in Colorado shooting case to fight subpoena, REUTERS 
(Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.news.yahoo.com/journalist-asks-delay-colorado-shooting-case-fight-subpoena-
233255218.html (explaining that a journalist was recently order to divulge the identities of law enforcement sources 
who provided her with information about the defendant’s notebook detailing the mass murder). 
594 See, e.g., After 226 days, freelancer Josh Wolf released from jail, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 4, 2007). 
http://www.archive.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=18369 (describing the longest jail term served by a 
journalist released in 2007). 
595 Letter from Carmen L. Mallon, Chief of Staff of the Office of Information Policy, Dep’t of Justice, to 
author (Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with author). 
596 See id.  
597 Indeed, this confluence of anti-journalist actions may have a serious effect on national security reporting 
like Risen’s specifically.  See William H. Freivogel, Publishing National Security Secrets: The Case for “Benign 
Indeterminacy,” 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 95, 95 (2009) (“More recently, national security cases have led to 
jail for some reporters, threats of jail for others, and warnings of criminal prosecution for still others.  These cases, 




CHAPTER 5.  METHOD 
 This thesis examines U.S. Courts of Appeals constitutional reporter’s privilege decisions.  
Because the Supreme Court has never revisited Branzburg v. Hayes, these courts have been 
responsible for shaping the reporter’s privilege over the last forty years.598  Consistent with 
similar past studies, this thesis collected all reporter’s privilege decisions issued after 
Branzburg599 to December 31, 2012. 
This thesis examines all cases relating to the reporter’s privilege in the constitutional and 
common law context.  There was no limitation placed on whether the proceeding in which the 
privilege was asserted was criminal or civil.  Further, there was no limitation placed on whether 
the decisions of the courts of appeals were published or not.  Nor was there a limitation placed 
on whether the reporter was attempting to expand the privilege outside the reporter-source 
context to a broader privilege, protecting, for example, the reporter’s work product or 
information gathered by the reporter in the absence of a confidentiality agreement.   
These decisions were all made to push the number of cases addressing the reporter’s 
privilege upward, as relatively few appellate court decisions exist relating to the reporter’s 
privilege as it relates to sources only.600  Moreover, any discussion regarding the courts of 
appeals’ views on the privilege, whether in the context of the reporter-source relationship or not, 
may inform those courts’ basic understanding of the privilege as it was traditionally understood 
in the context of the reporter-source relationship. 
                                                
598 See Schmid, supra note 535, at 1446 (“These courts were chosen for analysis because, at the federal level, 
they have been the courts of ‘last resort’ in journalist's privilege cases, with the exception of the Supreme Court's 
intervention in Branzburg.”). 
599 The Court decided Branzburg in June 1972.  See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
600 See Schmid, supra note 535, at 1447 (undertaking a similar study looking at criminal cases, while noting: 
“One notable limitation of this Article is the small number of cases analyzed.  Courts of appeals decided only 




Cases falling within the indicated time period and limitations were gathered using 
WestlawNext, a searchable, legal database of all court decisions issued in the United States.601  
More specifically, this thesis used West’s Key Number System,602 which searches cases by 
topics (called headnotes in WestlawNext), and found 165 headnotes were found under the 
following West Key Numbers:  Home > West Key Number System > 311H Privileged 
Communications and Confidentiality > VII. Other Privileges, k 400-k423 > Journalists k404.  
Next, cases that relied on state shield laws or state constitutions were discarded, as the focus here 
is on cases discussing First Amendment interests under the federal Constitution.  This process 
was done manually, as WestlawNext is not sensitive enough to remove federal cases that apply 
state law.  After removing these federal cases applying state law, forty-three cases remained.603 
 After narrowing the sample to forty-three cases, a second similar search was conducted to 
ensure that all reporter’s privilege cases were accounted for.  The second search was conducted 
using three separate West Headnotes related to the first search: Reporter’s Privilege,604 
Discovery Requests and Subpoenas,605 and Disclosure of Sources.606  These three separate 
headnotes yielded an additional thirty-eight cases.  Of these, all were accounted for in the first 
search except four cases, which were included in the final sample, bringing the sample to forty-
seven.607  Finally, six additional privilege cases cited within these forty-seven cases were added 
                                                
601 Press Release, Thompson Reuters, Thomson Reuters Unveils WestlawNext, the Next Generation in Legal 
Research (Feb. 1, 2010) available at 
https://store.westlaw.com/westlawnext/assets/pdf/WestlawNext_NexGeneration.pdf. 
602 According to Westlaw, “West topic and key numbers enable you to find cases stating or applying a legal 
concept, even if those terms aren't in the opinion.”  Westlaw Advantage: The West Key Number System, Westlaw 
STORE (last visited Jan. 10, 2013), https://store.westlaw.com/westlaw/advantage/keynumbers/default.aspx. 
603  See App. A. 
604  West Key Number System > 92 Constitutional Law > XVIII. Freedom of Speech, Expression, and the 
Press, k1490-k2309 > (U) PRESS IN GENERAL, k2070-k2084 > Reporter’s Privilege, k 2073. 
605  West Key Number System > 92 Constitutional Law > XVIII. Freedom of Speech, Expression, and the 
Press, k1490-k2309 > (U) PRESS IN GENERAL, k2070-k2084 > Discovery Requests and Subpoenas, k 2075. 
606  West Key Number System > 92 Constitutional Law > XVIII. Freedom of Speech, Expression, and the 
Press, k1490-k2309 > (U) PRESS IN GENERAL, k2070-k2084 > Disclosure of Sources, k 2074. 




to the sample because they were relevant, but were not captured by the first two search strategies.  
These final six cases brought the total number of cases reviewed to fifty-three.608 
 The cases were analyzed with a focus on several characteristics.609  First, note was made 
of whether the case was a civil or criminal case and what kind of civil or criminal case it was.  
Second, the kind of reporter’s privilege being invoked (source identity or work product) was 
noted.  Fourth, the analysis tracked whether the content alleged to be protected by the privilege is 
confidential or non-confidential information.  Fifth, it noted whether a private party or the 
government subpoenaed the reporter.  Sixth, it tracked who was subpoenaed – a reporter or a 
person with some other occupation, like an academic. 
 In addition to these categories, special attention was paid to courts’ analyses of the 
parties’ arguments with a focus on whether courts distinguished Branzburg and, if so, how.  
Similarly, it has taken special notice of which characteristics and First Amendment theories any 
single court stresses in finding or not finding a privilege. 
  
                                                
608 See App. C.  Cases with an asterisk denote those cases that were not accounted for in the first two search 
strategies.  
609 See LEVINE, LIND, BERLIN & DIENES, supra note 177, at § 16.01 (“[T]he privilege’s many forms and legal 
bases do lead to real-world differences in its application and, therefore, call for an understanding of those differences 
and an appreciation of how they came to develop.  Indeed, the truth is that the privilege, in all of its forms, continues 
to evolve, a phenomenon that renders a sense of how that evolution has progressed thus far essential.”); see also 




CHAPTER 6. RESULTS 
 Before addressing each research question in turn, it is worth setting the scene.  Of the 
cases reviewed, twenty-five or 47.2% were criminal cases610 and twenty-seven or 50.9% were 
civil cases.611 One case was a combination of both, accounting for 1.9% of the total.612  In 
twenty-one cases or 39.6% of all cases, the government, grand jury, or some other form of 
government prosecutor requested a subpoena.613  In twenty-two cases or 41.5% of cases, a non-
                                                
610 Notably, four cases were technically civil cases relating to an underlying criminal action.  These cases, 
however, were coded as criminal cases because of the criminal law enforcement interests underlying the civil action.  
See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987); 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Farr v. 
Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975). 
611 Criminal cases included: In re Request, 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 
2011); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 Fed.Appx. 430 (9th Cir. 2006); The New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 
F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re Special 
Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004); McKevitt, 339 F.3d 530; U.S. v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000); U.S. 
v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711 (2d Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67 (2d 
Cir. 1993); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992); U.S. 
v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580; U.S. v. 
Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1985); U.S. v. 
Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 
(3d Cir. 1980); Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 593 F.2d 1030; U.S. v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th 
Cir. 1976); Farr, 522 F.2d 464; Lewis v. U.S., 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975); Lewis v. U.S., 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
 Civil cases included: The New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006); Price v. Time, 
Inc., 416 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005); Lee v. Department of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Donohue v. Hoey, 
109 Fed.Appx. 340 (10th Cir. 2004); Fox v. Township of Jackson, 64 Fed.Appx. 338 (3d Cir. 2003); Ashcraft v. 
Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2000); Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998); In re 
Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998); Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 
(9th Cir. 1993); Church of Scientology Intern. v. Daniels, 992 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1993); Clyburn v. News World 
Communications, Inc., 903 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1989); von Bulow 
by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987); LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 
1134 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper 
Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of 
Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. 
Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976); Carey v. Hume, 492 
F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Baker v. F and F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 
986 (8th Cir. 1972). 
612 Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011).  
613  In re Request, 685 F.3d 1; Treacy, 639 F.3d 32; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 Fed.Appx. 430; Gonzales, 
459 F.3d 160; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 114; In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37; 
McKevitt, 339 F.3d 530; Sanders, 211 F.3d 711; Smith, 135 F.3d 963; Cutler, 6 F.3d 67; In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397; In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580; In re Grand Jury 
Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983; In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5; Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of Press, 593 F.2d 1030; Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539; Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373; Farr, 522 F.2d 464; 




governmental plaintiff requested a subpoena.614  In just ten cases or 18.9% of all cases, a non-
government defendant requested a subpoena.615  About 41.5% of the time or in twenty-two cases, 
the party requesting the subpoena sought the identity of a source,616 while in twenty-three cases 
or 43.4% of the time, the parties sought work product like a reporter’s notes or unpublished 
videotape from a broadcast.617  In one instance or 1.9% of cases, the subpoenaing party sought 
both types of information.618  In seven cases or 13.3% of the time, parties sought other types of 
information like testimony about the reporter’s newsgathering process or telephone records.619  
Finally, in thirty instances or 56.6% of all cases, reporters offered some form of 
confidentiality.620  In twenty-two cases or 41.5% of the time, reporters did not offer any 
confidentiality but still asserted a reporter’s privilege.621 
                                                
614 Chevron Corp., 629 F.3d 297; Lee , 413 F.3d 53; Donohue, 109 Fed.Appx. 340; Fox, 64 Fed.Appx. 338; 
Ashcraft, 218 F.3d 282 ; Gonzales, 194 F.3d 29; Cusumano, 162 F.3d 708; In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125; Shoen, 48 
F.3d 412; Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289; Church of Scientology Intern., 992 F.2d 1329; Clyburn, 903 F.2d 29; von Bulow by 
Auersperg, 811 F.2d 136; LaRouche, 780 F.2d 1134; In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789; Zerilli, 656 F.2d 705; Bruno & 
Stillman, Inc., 633 F.2d 583; Miller, 621 F.2d 721; Riley, 612 F.2d 708; Carey, 492 F.2d 631; Baker, 470 F.2d 778; 
Cervantes, 464 F.2d 986. 
615  Price, 416 F.3d 1327; Ahn, 231 F.3d 26; Smith, 869 F.2d 194; LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176; 
Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487; Burke, 700 F.2d 70; Criden, 633 F.2d 346; Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139; Silkwood, 563 
F.2d 433; Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517. 
616 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141; Lee, 413 F.3d 53; Price, 416 F.3d 1327; 
Donohue, 109 Fed.Appx. 340; In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37; Sanders, 211 F.3d 711; Ashcraft, 218 F.3d 
282; Ahn, 231 F.3d 26; In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125; Clyburn, 903 F.2d 29; Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487; LaRouche, 
780 F.2d 1134; In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789; Zerilli, 656 F.2d 705; Bruno & Stillman, Inc., 633 F.2d 583; Miller, 
621 F.2d 721; Riley, 612 F.2d 708; Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517; Farr, 522 F.2d 464; Carey, 492 F.2d 631; Baker, 470 
F.2d 778; Cervantes, 464 F.2d 986. 
617 In re Request, 685 F.3d 1; Treacy, 639 F.3d 32; Chevron Corp., 629 F.3d 297; The New York Times Co., 
459 F.3d 160; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 Fed.Appx. 430; McKevitt, 339 F.3d 530; Gonzales, 194 F.3d 29; 
Cusumano, 162 F.3d 708; Smith, 135 F.3d 963; Shoen, 48 F.3d 412; Cutler, 6 F.3d 67; Church of Scientology 
Intern., 992 F.2d 1329; Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289; Smith, 869 F.2d 194; LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176; von Bulow 
by Auersperg, 811 F.2d 136; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580; In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 
F.2d 983; Burke, 700 F.2d 70; Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139; Silkwood, 563 F.2d 433; Lewis, 517 F.2d 236; Lewis, 501 
F.2d 418. 
618 In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5. 
619 Fox, 64 Fed.Appx. 338; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397; In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850; Criden, 633 
F.2d 346; Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 593 F.2d 1030; Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539; Steelhammer, 
539 F.2d 373. 
620 In re Request, 685 F.3d 1; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141; The New York Times 
Co., 459 F.3d 160; Price, 416 F.3d 1327; Lee, 413 F.3d 53; In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37; Sanders, 211 
F.3d 711; Ashcraft, 218 F.3d 282; Ahn, 231 F.3d 26; Cusumano, 162 F.3d 708; In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125; In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397; Clyburn, 903 F.2d 29; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580; 




In general, the courts approved slightly more subpoenas that were requested in the 
criminal context than in the civil context.  Of all the subpoenas sought in criminal cases, just four 
or 16% of subpoenas were quashed.622  Nineteen or 76% of subpoenas were not quashed.623  Two 
or 8% were either remanded without deciding whether to quash the subpoena or were quashed in 
part.624  In civil cases, on the other hand, sixteen subpoenas or 59.3% of civil subpoenas were 
quashed625 – nine or 33.3% were not quashed.626  The courts remanded two subpoenas or 7.4% 
of all subpoenas without deciding whether the subpoena should be quashed.627 
Where no confidentiality was at issue, courts seemed less likely to find that a reporter’s 
privilege protected the information sought – whether that information was non-confidential work 
product or a non-confidential source.  For example, when the reporter promised confidentiality, 
thirteen subpoenas were quashed or about 43.3% of all subpoenas.628  On the other hand, fifteen 
                                                                                                                                                       
Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5; Zerilli, 656 F.2d 705; Bruno & Stillman, Inc., 633 F.2d 583; Criden, 633 F.2d 346; 
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139; Miller, 621 F.2d 721; Riley, 612 F.2d 708; Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 
593 F.2d 1030; Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517; Farr, 522 F.2d 464; Carey, 492 F.2d 631; Baker, 470 F.2d 778; 
Cervantes, 464 F.2d 986. 
621 In one instance, it was unclear whether the reporter offered confidentiality.  Fox v. Township of Jackson, 
64 Fed.Appx. 338 (3d Cir. 2003). 
622 Ahn, 231 F.3d 26; Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487; Burke, 700 F.2d 70; Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517. 
623 In re Request, 685 F.3d 1; Treacy, 639 F.3d 32; The New York Times Co., 459 F.3d 160; In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 201 Fed.Appx. 430; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141; In re Special 
Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37; McKevitt, 339 F.3d 530; Sanders, 211 F.3d 711; Smith, 135 F.3d 963; In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397; In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850; LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176; In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580; In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983; Criden, 633 F.2d 346; Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of Press, 593 F.2d 1030; Farr, 522 F.2d 464; Lewis, 517 F.2d 236; Lewis, 501 F.2d 418. 
624 Cutler, 6 F.3d 67; Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139. 
625  Price, 416 F.3d 1327; Fox, 64 Fed.Appx. 338; Ashcraft, 218 F.3d 282; Cusumano, 162 F.3d 708; Shoen, 48 
F.3d 412; Church of Scientology Intern., 992 F.2d 1329; Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289; Clyburn, 903 F.2d 29; Smith, 869 F.2d 
194; LaRouche, 780 F.2d 1134; In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5; Zerilli, 656 F.2d 705; 
Riley, 612 F.2d 708; Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373; Baker, 470 F.2d 778; Cervantes, 464 F.2d 986. 
626  Lee, 413 F.3d 53; Donohue, 109 Fed.Appx. 340; Gonzales, 194 F.3d 29; In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125; von 
Bulow by Auersperg, 811 F.2d 136; In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789; Miller, 621 F.2d 721; Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539; 
Carey, 492 F.2d 631. 
627  Bruno & Stillman, Inc., 633 F.2d 583; Silkwood, 563 F.2d 433. 
628 Price, 416 F.3d 1327; Ashcraft, 218 F.3d 282; Ahn, 231 F.3d 26; Cusumano, 162 F.3d 708; Clyburn, 903 
F.2d 29; LaRouche, 780 F.2d 1134; Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487; In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 





or about 55% of subpoenas were not.629  When a reporter did not promise confidentiality, 
subpoenas were only quashed in six instances or about 27.3% of the time.630  Fourteen subpoenas 
were not quashed or about 63.6% of all subpoenas seeking non-confidential information.631 
Finally, the government seemed to have much better luck with having its subpoenas 
enforced than non-governmental plaintiffs and defendants.  Of the twenty-one cases where the 
government was the party seeking a subpoena, courts approved eighteen of those subpoenas or 
85.7% of all requested subpoenas.632  Two were quashed (9.5%)633 and one (4.8%) was 
remanded.634  In the twenty-two instances where a non-governmental plaintiff requested a 
subpoena, twelve or 54.5% of all such subpoenas were quashed,635 while nine or 40.9% were not 
quashed636 and one (4.5%) was remanded.637  When a defendant sought a subpoena, six 
                                                
629 In re Request, 685 F.3d 1; The New York Times Co., 459 F.3d 160; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith 
Miller, 438 F.3d 1141; Lee, 413 F.3d 53; In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37; Sanders, 211 F.3d 711; In re 
Madden, 151 F.3d 125; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580; In re 
Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789; Criden, 633 F.2d 346; Miller, 621 F.2d 721; Farr, 522 F.2d 464; Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of Press, 593 F.2d 1030; Carey, 492 F.2d 631. 
In one instance (3.3%), a subpoena was quashed in part.  U.S. v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980).  
In another instance (3.3%), a subpoena was neither quashed nor not quashed, and the court remanded the case back 
to the lower court.  Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1980). 
630 Shoen, 48 F.3d 412; Church of Scientology Intern., 992 F.2d 1329; Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289; Smith, 869 F.2d 
194; Burke, 700 F.2d 70; Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373. 
631 Chevron Corp., 629 F.3d 297; Treacy, 639 F.3d 32; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 Fed.Appx. 430; 
Donohue, 109 Fed.Appx. 340; McKevitt, 339 F.3d 530; Gonzales, 194 F.3d 29; Smith, 135 F.3d 963; In re Shain, 
978 F.2d 850; LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176; von Bulow by Auersperg, 811 F.2d 136; In re Grand Jury 
Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983; Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539; Lewis, 517 F.2d 236; Lewis, 501 F.2d 418. 
Two subpoenas (9.1%) were remanded to the lower court.  Cutler, 6 F.3d 67; Silkwood, 563 F.2d 433. 
632  In re Request, 685 F.3d 1; Treacy, 639 F.3d 32; The New York Times Co., 459 F.3d 160; In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 201 Fed.Appx. 430; In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37; McKevitt, 339 F.3d 530; Sanders, 211 F.3d 
711; Smith, 135 F.3d 963; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397; In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850; In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580; In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983; Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of Press, 593 F.2d 1030; Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539; Farr, 522 F.2d 464; Lewis, 517 F.2d 236; Lewis, 501 F.2d 
418; Carey, 492 F.2d 631. 
633  In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5; Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(Steelhammer was later overruled on rehearing, but was included in the sample because its precedential value is still 
in question). 
634 Cutler, 6 F.3d 67. 
635 Fox, 64 Fed.Appx. 338; Ashcraft, 218 F.3d 282; Cusumano, 162 F.3d 708; Shoen, 48 F.3d 412; Church of 
Scientology Intern., 992 F.2d 1329; Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289; Clyburn, 903 F.2d 29; LaRouche, 780 F.2d 1134; Zerilli, 
656 F.2d 705; Riley, 612 F.2d 708; Baker, 470 F.2d 778; Cervantes, 464 F.2d 986. 
636  Chevron Corp., 629 F.3d 297; Lee, 413 F.3d 53; Donohue, 109 Fed.Appx. 340; Gonzales, 194 F.3d 29; In 
re Madden, 151 F.3d 125; von Bulow by Auersperg, 811 F.2d 136; In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789; Miller, 621 F.2d 




subpoenas (60%) were quashed638 and just two (20%) were not quashed.639  One (10%) was 
remanded.640 
Although the small sample size prevents a showing of statistical significance, in broad 
terms, a few potential conclusions can be reached.  First, courts seem less likely to quash 
subpoenas in criminal cases than in civil cases.  Second, courts seem less likely to quash 
subpoenas when confidentiality is not at issue.  Third, the courts appear much more likely to 
approve subpoenas when the party requesting the subpoena is the government. 
RQ 1: How, if at all, have courts of appeals attempted to distinguish Branzburg v. Hayes? 
Branzburg v. Hayes is the only reporter’s privilege case the Supreme Court has ever 
decided.  Therefore, Research Question 1 asked how courts of appeals did or did not distinguish 
Branzburg in order to find a reporter’s privilege or not.  In general, courts of appeals’ treatment 
of Branzburg is extremely variable and, as with so many things in law, escapes an easy 
summation – numerical or otherwise.  Overall, courts refused to distinguish Branzburg in the 
grand jury context – the same context that the Supreme Court was dealing with in Branzburg and 
its companion cases.641  Other courts extended Branzburg’s logic, which focused heavily on the 
                                                                                                                                                       
637 Bruno & Stillman, Inc., 633 F.2d 583.  
638 Price, 416 F.3d 1327; Ahn, 231 F.3d 26; Smith, 869 F.2d 194; Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487; Burke, 700 F.2d 
70; Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517. 
639 LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176; Criden, 633 F.2d 346. 
640 Silkwood, 563 F.2d 433. 
641  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“As can be seen 
from the account of the underlying facts in Branzburg, there is no material factual distinction between the petitions 
before the Supreme Court in Branzburg and the appeals before us today.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 F. 
App’x 430, 433 (9th Cir. 2006); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The First Amendment 
argument is an uphill one in light of the Supreme Court’s Branzburg decision, but it has several facets and we take 
them in order.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The circumstances of the present 
case fall squarely within those of Branzburg.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584-86 (6th Cir. 1987); 
cf. U.S. v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 2000) (“However, the First Amendment erects no absolute bar 
against government attempts to coerce disclosure of a confidential news source . . . .” (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 679-708 (1972)).  But see The New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(finding a common law privilege even in the grand jury context while refusing to find a First Amendment privilege); 
id. at 179 (Sack, J., dissenting) (“But, as the majority implicitly acknowledges by treating [First Amendment 
concerns] and the common law privilege separately, any limits on the constitutional protection imposed by 




public’s interest in law enforcement, to the criminal context.642  On the other hand, other courts 
were able to distinguish Branzburg in the criminal trial context and did find a reporter’s 
privilege.643  In the civil context, some courts found that the logic of Branzburg extended even to 
subpoenas in civil cases, while others found Branzburg’s logic inapplicable in the civil 
context.644 
Two circuits have refused to distinguish Branzburg, treating it as a talisman of sorts and 
finding that its holding applies not only to the grand jury context, but to other contexts as well.  
McKevitt v. Pallasch, a 2003 Seventh Circuit case, is the greatest exemplar of this type of 
case.645  McKevitt stands out for several reasons.  First, Judge Posner took several other courts of 
appeals to task for actually finding a reporter’s privilege in criminal cases in spite of Branzburg: 
“Some of the cases that recognize the privilege . . . essentially ignore Branzburg . . . [and] some 
                                                
642 See, e.g., U.S. v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[The television station], however, attempts to 
escape from the balance Branzburg struck between the public’s interest in effective law enforcement and the press’s 
First Amendment rights by arguing that the Branzburg decision only applies to grand jury proceedings, not the trial 
setting we have before us now.  Although the district court agreed with [the television station], we find little 
persuasive force in this distinction.  Surely the public has as great an interest in convicting its criminals as it does in 
indicting them. (internal citation omitted)); see also In re Request, 685 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Our analysis is 
controlled by Branzburg, which held that the fact that disclosure of the materials sought by a subpoena in criminal 
proceedings would result in the breaking of a promise of confidentiality by reporters is not by itself a legally 
cognizable First Amendment or common law injury.” (emphasis added)). 
643 See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The policies supporting a 
First Amendment privilege would appear to be stronger here, where a defamation plaintiff seeks to compel 
disclosure of the name of a confidential informant, than they were in either Branzburg.”); U.S. v. Cuthbertson, 630 
F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980) (“First, the interests of the press that form the foundation for the privilege are not 
diminished because the nature of the underlying proceeding out of which the request for the information arises is a 
criminal trial.  CBS’s interest in protecting confidential sources, preventing intrusion into the editorial process, and 
avoiding the possibility of self-censorship created by compelled disclosure of sources and unpublished notes does 
not change because a case is civil or criminal.”); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The 
precise holding of Branzburg subordinated the  right of the newsmen to keep secret a source of information in face 
of the more compelling requirement that a grand jury be able to secure factual data relating to its investigation of 
serious criminal conduct.  The application of the Branzburg holding to non-grand jury cases seems to require that 
the claimed First Amendment privilege and the opposing need for disclosure be judicially weighed in light of the 
surrounding facts and a balance struck to determine where lies the paramount interest.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
644  Compare Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Although Branzburg may limit the scope 
of the reporter's First Amendment privilege in criminal proceedings, this circuit has previously held that in civil 
cases, where the public interest in effective criminal law enforcement is absent, that case is not controlling.”) with  
McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (criticizing courts of appeals that have adopted a privilege 
even in the civil context); see also Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(distinguishing Branzburg). 




audaciously declare that Branzburg actually created a reporter’s privilege.”646  Second, McKevitt, 
although not a grand jury case like Branzburg, refused to find that fact important enough to 
distinguish it from the criminal context before it: 
The federal interest in cooperating in the criminal proceedings of friendly foreign 
nations is obvious; and it is likewise obvious that the newsgathering and reporting 
activities of the press are inhibited when a reporter cannot assure a confidential 
source of confidentiality.  Yet that was Branzburg and it is evident from the result 
in that case that the interest of the press in maintaining the confidentiality of 
sources is not absolute.647   
Having found that Branzburg controlled even in the criminal context, the court refused to quash 
a subpoena.648   
The Sixth Circuit is the only other circuit that has applied Branzburg as strictly as the 
Seventh Circuit.649  In a grand jury case, the court absolutely refused to ignore Branzburg.650  As 
the court said when it chose not to find a privilege, “Because we conclude that acceptance of the 
position urged upon us by [the reporter] would be tantamount to our substituting, as the holding 
of Branzburg, the dissent written by Justice Stewart (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) 
for the majority opinion, we must reject that position.”651  In so finding, the court approvingly 
cited the Branzburg majority’s language, which found that there was no privilege in either the 
grand jury or the criminal trial context652 and rejected reliance on Justice Powell’s concurring 
                                                
646  Id. at 532. 
647  Id. at 532. 
648 Id. at 535.  In another case, Justice White apparently did not view Branzburg’s logic to be as sweeping as 
Judge Posner would seem to believe.  In an in chambers opinion addressing a petition to stay a civil contempt order 
for the refusal of a reporter to produce documents, Justice White noted that Branzburg did not hold “either that 
newsmen are constitutionally privileged to withhold duly subpoenaed documents material to the prosecution or 
defense of a criminal case or that a defendant seeking the subpoena must show extraordinary circumstances before 
enforcement against newsmen will be had.”  New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317, 1322 (1978) 
(White, J., in chambers). 
649 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987). 
650 Id. at 583.  
651 Id. at 584.  




opinion to find a privilege, writing, “Perhaps Justice Powell’s [concurrence] has provided too 
great a temptation for those inclined to disagree with the majority opinion.”653 
Somewhat similar to the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the Fourth Circuit at first seemed 
unlikely to adopt any reporter’s privilege as a result of Branzburg.  Indeed, in its first reporter’s 
privilege case after Branzburg, United States v. Steelhammer, a civil case, the court found that 
“the absence of a claim of confidentiality and the lack of evidence of vindictiveness tip the scale 
to the conclusion that the district court was correct in requiring the reporters to testify.”654  A few 
years later, however, the court explicitly relied on Branzburg to find a privilege in the civil 
context: “In determining whether the journalist’s privilege will protect the source in a given 
situation, it is necessary for the district court to balance the interests involved.”655  It cited 
Branzburg itself for that proposition that a reporter’s privilege exists.656  It failed, however, to 
cite its prior holding that no privilege existed absent confidentiality and vindictiveness.657  Thus, 
it is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit has or has not recognized a reporter’s privilege in the 
civil context.658 
It has taken a stricter approach to the reporter’s privilege in the criminal context, focusing 
on the importance of confidentiality and vindictiveness.659  As the court said in In re Shain, a 
criminal case where the government subpoenaed reporters to testify as to a nonconfidential 
                                                
653 Id. at 586.  
654 U.S. v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 1976) (Winter, J., dissenting), adopted en banc, U.S. v. 
Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977).  United States v. Steelhammer could be interpreted as suggesting that 
balancing is appropriate but that, in absence of vindictiveness or confidentiality, it is unlikely that the scales will tip 
in favor of a reporter’s privilege.  That proposition is difficult to maintain in light of In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th 
Cir. 1992). 
655 LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)).  
656  Id. 
657 See generally id.  
658 Compare  Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (Winter, J., dissenting), adopted en banc, Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 
539 with Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that Branzburg required courts to 
balance the interests of the reporter and the party seeking to compel the reporter’s testimony) and LaRouche, 780 
F.2d 1134. 




source, “We hold that the incidental burden on the freedom of the press in the circumstances of 
this case does not require the invalidation of the subpoenas issued to the reporters, and absent 
evidence of governmental harassment or bad faith, the reporters have no privilege . . . .”660  
According to the court, it based its decision on Branzburg and its opinion in Steelhammer,661 
finding that they stood for the proposition that there was no “reporter’s privilege not to testify in 
criminal prosecutions about relevant evidence known to the reporter.”662 
Other courts, however, have taken a more conservative approach to interpreting 
Branzburg, limiting it to either the grand jury context or the broader criminal context.  The Third 
Circuit has, arguably, taken the most restrictive view of Branzburg.  In Riley v. City of Chester, 
for example, the court was presented with the question of whether a reporter had to name the 
source of her information about a candidate running for mayor.663  The court recognized that 
Branzburg held that “a journalist does not have an absolute privilege under the First Amendment 
to refuse to appear and testify before a grand jury.”664  The court refused to extend this holding 
beyond the grand jury context: “The limitation imposed by the Court in Branzburg v. Hayes on 
the ability of a journalist to refuse to disclose information is not applicable to the facts in this 
case.”665  The court there went on to find that a privilege did exist and quashed the subpoena.666 
                                                
660 Id. at 852.  
661 Id.  
662 Id.  It ignored its prior decision that found a privilege in the civil context. 
663  See generally Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979).  In Riley, the Third Circuit found a 
common-law privilege, as opposed to a First Amendment privilege.  This case, as are all Third Circuit cases, are 
nonetheless included in this sample, as the concerns expressed in finding the privilege are, at bottom, First 
Amendment concerns.  Cf.  Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 716 (1st Cir. 1998) (asserting that whether 
the reporter’s privilege is considered a constitutional one or a common law one is largely a “semantic question” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
664 Riley, 612 F.2d at 714. 
665 Id.  
666 Id. at 718 (“Finally, the interests [of in the press] referred to earlier compel us to call for restraint in the 
judicial imposition of sanctions on the press.  Because of the importance to the public of the underlying rights 
protected by the federal common law news writer’s privilege and because of the “fundamental and necessary 




Just a year later, the court also distinguished Branzburg in the criminal, non-grand jury 
context.667  In United States v. Cuthbertson, the court was presented with the question of whether 
Mike Wallace and 60 Minutes could be forced by several defendants to turn over notes prepared 
during investigative reporting that concerned criminal conspiracy and fraud charges.668  The 
defendants specifically argued that the court’s prior reasoning in Riley did not apply, because the 
current case was a criminal one.669  In finding that the privilege did exist in the criminal, non-
grand jury context, the court failed to mention Branzburg at all, except for support for the 
proposition that there is a First Amendment right to gather news.670 
The Second Circuit initially followed a similar tack to the Third Circuit.  First, it found 
that there is a reporter’s privilege in the civil context.671  It did so by finding that Branzburg’s 
logic that focused on the interests of law enforcement did not apply in the civil context.672  
Similarly, like the Third Circuit, the court would also later find a privilege in the criminal 
                                                                                                                                                       
to avoid an unnecessary confrontation between the courts and the press.  Although there may be cases in which the 
confrontation is inevitable, this was clearly not one of them.”). 
667  U.S. v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980). 
668 See generally id.  
669 Id. at 146.  
670 Id.  On the other hand, the Third Circuit did require a book author to produce certain documents relating to 
his book, which was also the subject of a mail and wire fraud case.  In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 
983 (3d Cir. 1985).  Notably, although the court refused to uphold any privilege from having to produce the 
documents, it did not base its decision on Branzburg, which it failed to cite in the majority opinion at all.  See 
generally id.  The Third Circuit also ignored Branzburg in other subsequent cases like In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125 
(3d Cir. 1998), where it cited the case for only an unrelated issue, and Fox v. Township of Jackson, 64 Fed.Appx. 
338 (3d Cir. 2003), where the court dismissed a party’s reliance on Branzburg in a footnote. 
671 See generally, e.g., In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982); Baker v. F and 
F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).  But see Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011) (refusing to 
find a privilege where a filmmaker was not acting as a member of the “independent press” but rather as a hired 
storyteller); Gonzales v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding a weaker privilege 
when the information was non-confidential) and von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 
1987) (refusing to find a privilege when the person asserting the privilege could not show she did so as part of a 
journalistic exploit). 
672 See, e.g., In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d at 9 (“[T]his case presents a less 
compelling argument for disclosure than in Branzburg v. Hayes, . . . because we are dealing with a civil action rather 
than questioning by a grand jury.”); Baker v. F and F Inv., 470 F.2d at 784 (“Branzburg v. Hayes . . . , involving as 
it did the right of a journalist to withhold disclosure of confidential sources from a grand jury investigating criminal 




context.673  In United States v. Burke, defendants subpoenaed a reporter for work product 
regarding an article that related to their criminal trial.674  Even though the case was a criminal 
one, the court held that there was “no legally-principled reason for drawing a distinction between 
civil and criminal cases when considering whether the reporter’s interest in confidentiality 
should yield to the moving party’s need for probative evidence.”675  It cited Branzburg just 
once.676 
After Burke, though, the court would walk back its privilege in the criminal context.677  In 
a later opinion, the court would find that “Burke’s articulation of a general test applicable to all 
phases of a criminal trial was not necessary to the resolution of that case[, and, therefore,] Burke 
should accordingly be considered as limited to its facts.”678  It then went on to hold that 
“[w]hatever the doctrinal considerations, we must certainly follow Branzburg when fact patterns 
parallel to Branzburg are presented for our decision” and refused to quash the defendant’s 
subpoena to the reporter because the conduct of the reporter in the present case – “refus[ing] to 
answer questions that directly related to criminal conduct that he had observed and written 
about” – was the same conduct at issue in Branzburg.679  In its most recent case, the court would 
seemingly reaffirm this view, finding that it had “recognized that our Court once set too high a 
bar for overcoming the privilege in criminal cases and consciously lowered that bar.”680 
                                                
673 U.S. v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983).  
674 Id. at 76.  
675 Id. at 77.  
676 Id. (explaining that Branzburg applied only when “a reporter was asked to testify before a grand jury”). 
677 See U.S. v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1993).  
678 Id. at 73.  
679 Id.  See also The New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006) (refusing to recognize a 
First Amendment privilege in light of Branzburg, but finding a common law privilege); cf. U.S. v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 
711 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding no privilege preventing the government from prosecuting a book author when the author 
refused to name his source).  In Cutler, the Second Circuit did not even acknowledge its holding in The New York 
Times Co.  See generally Cutler, 6 F.3d 67. 




The Ninth Circuit has recognized a reporter’s privilege in both the civil and criminal 
context.681  As the court said in the criminal context, “The application of the Branzburg holding 
to non-grand jury cases seems to require that the claimed First Amendment privilege and the 
opposing need for disclosure be judicially weighed in light of the surrounding facts and a balance 
struck to determine where lies the paramount interest.”682  In that case, Farr v. Pitchess, a 
reporter received information about the Charles Manson trial that was supposed to be subject to a 
gag order.683  Even though the court held that the privilege existed, the court found that the 
interest in judicial enforcement of its orders was greater than the reporter’s interest.684 
Having previously found that the reporter’s privilege existed in non-grand jury cases, the 
Ninth Circuit would later apply the privilege in the civil context as well.685  The court interpreted 
its prior decision in Farr v. Pitchess as finding that “a ‘partial First Amendment shield’ . . . 
protects journalists against compelled disclosure in all judicial proceedings, civil and criminal 
alike.”686  Applying the reporter’s privilege, the court quashed the subpoena issued by the 
plaintiff in a defamation case.687 
In the first case the Eighth Circuit heard after the Supreme Court decided Branzburg, the 
Eighth Circuit found a reporter’s privilege in the civil context.688  In that defamation case, the 
court relegated Branzburg to a mere footnote.689  In that footnote, the court severely limited 
Branzburg, confining it to the grand jury context and writing that the Court in Branzburg was 
                                                
681 Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975).  
682 Id. at 468.  The court thought this was the case because the interests in the criminal trial context were less 
than the grand jury context.  On the other hand, the court has refused to find a privilege in the grand jury context.  
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 Fed.Appx. 430 (9th Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397 
(9th Cir. 1993); Lewis v. U.S., 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975); Lewis v. U.S., 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974).  
683 Farr, 522 F.2d at 466.  
684 Id. at 469.  
685 Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).  
686 Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1292 (citing Farr, 522 F.2d at 467).  
687 Id. at 1296.  
688  Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972). 




only “asked to address the constitutional aspects of grand jury efforts to acquire from 
professional journalists information about possible law violations committed by their news 
sources.”690  Declining to give any weight to Branzburg, the court concluded, “The [Supreme] 
Court was not faced with and, therefore, did not address, the question whether a civil libel suit 
should command the quite different reconciliation of conflicting interests pressed upon us here 
by the defense.”691 
Although the First Circuit had previously applied the same logic as the Eighth Circuit to 
find a privilege in civil cases,692 it has refused to find a privilege in the criminal context.693  In In 
re Special Proceedings, a journalist was subpoenaed after he broadcast a surveillance tape 
relating to a grand jury investigation despite a court order that restricted the attorneys in the case 
from releasing such videotapes.694  The court appointed a special prosecutor to investigate the 
leak, and the prosecutor subpoenaed the reporter for the identity of the source of the tape.695  The 
reporter refused to testify.696   
The court refused to recognize a First Amendment privilege, admitting that “[t]he First 
Amendment argument is an uphill one in light of the Supreme Court’s Branzburg decision, but it 
has several facets and we take them in order.”697  Because the “Supreme Court flatly rejected any 
notion of a general-purpose reporter’s privilege for confidential sources,” the First Circuit Court 
                                                
690 Id. 
691 Id.  
692 Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st Cir. 1980) (“Whether or not such a 
privilege is available to a defendant in a civil defamation case where the plaintiff is not a public figure is a question 
left open by recent Supreme Court precedent.”); see also Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 716 (1st Cir. 
1998) (quashing a subpoena and explaining that “when a subpoena seeks divulgement of confidential information 
compiled by a journalist or academic researcher in anticipation of publication, courts must apply a balancing test”).  
The Eighth Circuit has yet to have an opportunity to decide whether there is a privilege in the criminal context. 
693 In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004).  
694 Id. at 40.  
695 Id. at 41.  
696 Id.   




of Appeals in this case could not recognize one.698  Even though this was not a grand jury 
subpoena, the Court in Branzburg focused generally on “the importance of criminal 
investigations, the usual obligation of citizens to provide evidence, and the lack of proof that 
news-gathering required such a privilege” to find that Branzburg was still applicable.699 
The Fifth Circuit has taken a similar position.  Although it has narrowly construed 
Branzburg as holding that “reporters must disclose the names of confidential informants except 
where the grand jury power was abused,”700 it has found a privilege only in certain 
circumstances.  In its first reporter’s privilege decision after Branzburg, for example, the Fifth 
Circuit found a reporter’s privilege, but only because it was a civil case.701  In fact, it relied on 
the parts of Branzburg emphasizing the right to gather news to support its finding of a privilege 
in the civil context.702  And, in any event, the majority opinion in Branzburg, the court would 
later say, was only a plurality opinion that was due less deference.703  This has created an odd set 
of circumstances where the court relied on Branzburg for support for broad pronouncements of 
the importance of newsgathering and the protection of confidential sources,704 but declined to 
rely on Branzburg for its main holding that journalists do not have a privilege. 
In the criminal context, however, the Fifth Circuit has refused to distinguish Branzburg’s 
holding.705  In United States v. Smith, an arson case where a television station produced an 
                                                
698 Id.  The First Circuit would later refuse to find a privilege in general criminal proceedings as well.  See In 
re Request, 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
699 In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d at 44. 
700 Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980).   
701 Id. at 725.  In that case, the court actually held that the “case [was] controlled by . . . Branzburg.”  Id.  The 
controlling aspect of Branzburg, however, was not the Supreme Court’s refusal to find a privilege, but rather that 
cases “policies supporting a First Amendment privilege.”  Id. 
702 Id 
703 In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983).  
704 Miller, 621 F.2d at 725.  
705 U.S. v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998).  Notably, the Eleventh Circuit, which was initially a part of the 
Fifth Circuit and is subject to the Fifth Circuit’s precedent prior to its creation, refused to find that Branzburg 
required that a court not allow journalists to assert a privilege.  See U.S. v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 




interview with a suspect of the crime, the court did not accept the reporter’s argument that 
Branzburg was distinguishable because this case was a criminal trial and not a grand jury.706  As 
the court explained: 
[The television station . . . attempts to escape from the balance Branzburg struck 
between the public’s interest in effective law enforcement and the press’s First 
Amendment rights by arguing that the Branzburg decision only applies to grand 
jury proceedings, not the trial setting we have before us now.  Although the 
district court agreed with [the station], we find little persuasive force in this 
distinction.  Surely the public has as great an interest in convicting its criminals as 
it does in indicting them.707 
 
Moreover, the court noted that the Supreme Court had said in passing that the interests it 
considered applied both to “grand jury investigation[s and] criminal trial[s].”708  As such, the 
Fifth Circuit ordered the television station to hand over the video of the interview, including the 
outtakes.709 
In its first chance to construe Branzburg, the D.C. Circuit noted that the civil context may 
be different from the criminal context, but declined to find that difference controlling insofar as it 
related to the Supreme Court’s commentary on the interests of journalists to protect their 
sources.710  As it said in Carey v. Hume, a libel case, “Although the differences between civil and 
criminal proceedings distinguish Branzburg from the case before us, we cannot ignore the fact 
that the interests asserted by the newsmen in the Branzburg trilogy of cases were not accorded 
determinative weight by five members of the [Supreme] Court.”711  As to the existence of a 
                                                                                                                                                       
privilege and failed to even address Branzburg.  See generally id; see also Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (citing Branzburg and Fifth Circuit precedent for the proposition that the First Amendment provides a 
reporter’s privilege). 
706 Id. at 971.  
707  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
708 Id.  The court also looked askance at the claimed privilege in this case because the information sought was 
nonconfidential.  Id. at 972.  As the court said, “The second important difference between this case and Miller 
relates to confidentiality. . . .  Here . . . the confidentiality issue is absent.”  Id. 
709 Id.  
710 See Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 635-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  




privilege, however, it nonetheless applied a balancing test that had been previously established 
because, as far as it could tell, Branzburg “left intact, insofar as civil litigation is concerned, the 
[balancing] approach taken [previously].”712 
In at least one criminal case, the D.C. Circuit rejected any suggestion that Branzburg left 
open a possibility for a reporter’s privilege in the criminal context.713  Yet, in another, where the 
defendant in a criminal action subpoenaed a reporter, the court explicitly stated that he had 
“failed to carry his burden [to overcome the reporter’s privilege].”714  Thus, it is unclear where 
the court stands as to the application of a reporter’s privilege in criminal contexts or whether it 
views Branzburg as controlling during criminal trials.715 
Finally, the Tenth Circuit has had two opportunities to discuss the reporter’s privilege 
issue in the civil context.716  In the first case, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., the court refused to 
follow Branzburg because it saw it applicable only to the grand jury context: 
The actual problem in [Branzburg] was whether a reporter was free to avoid 
altogether a grand jury subpoena.  The Supreme Court in rejecting [Branzburg’s] 
claim required him to appear and testify before the grand jury, and ruled that the 
grand jury subpoena had to be obeyed.  The actual decision of the Supreme Court 
is not surprising nor is it important in the solution of our problem.717 
 
                                                
712  Id. at 636; Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (also finding that Branzburg did not control in 
civil contexts beyond the Supreme Court’s appraisals of the journalists’ asserted interests); see also Lee v. 
Department of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[O]ur court, among others, has limited the applicability of the 
Branzburg precedent to the circumstances considered by the court in Branzburg-that is, the context of a criminal 
proceeding, or even more specifically, a grand jury subpoena.”); Clyburn v. News World Communications, Inc., 903 
F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
713 See, e.g., Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1050 (D.C. 
1978) (“It is thus clear from Branzburg and related cases that the freedom to gather information guaranteed by the 
First Amendment is the freedom to gather information Subject to the general and incidental burdens that arise from 
good faith enforcement of otherwise valid criminal and civil laws that are not themselves solely directed at curtailing 
the free flow of information.”). 
714  See, e.g., U.S. v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that the defendant in the criminal context did 
not overcome the reporter’s privilege). 
715  The court has found that Branzburg is controlling in the context of grand jury subpoenas, however.  See 
generally In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
716 See Donohue v. Hoey, 109 Fed.Appx. 340 (10th Cir. 2004); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 
(10th Cir. 1977). 




Like the D.C. Circuit, the Tenth Circuit proceeded to adopt a balancing test from a previous case 
for the civil context, which it used to judge the strength of the reporter’s privilege.718 
 The Sixth and Seventh Circuits are the only courts that do not recognize a reporter’s 
privilege as a result of Branzburg’s holding.  Every other circuit, in either the criminal or civil 
context, has recognized the reporter’s privilege in some form.  More specifically, in the civil 
context, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have all 
recognized – at least at one time or another – a reporter’s privilege in spite of Branzburg.  Of 
those courts to consider a reporter’s privilege in the criminal context, the Second, Third, Ninth, 
and D.C. Circuits have found one in at least one instance.719  The First Circuit has specifically 
rejected the idea that a privilege exists in the criminal context, citing Branzburg for support for 
its conclusion.720  This confusing breakdown shows just how splintered courts are when it comes 
to agreeing on the meaning of Branzburg, the only controlling precedent they can rely on.  In 
most instances, courts either distinguish Branzburg by focusing on that case’s special attention to 
the grand jury context or argue that the civil context provides a situation that is different enough 
to bring the discussion of a reporter’s privilege outside of the four corners of the Branzburg 
opinion.  As Judge Tatel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia cogently 
summarized courts’ treatment Branzburg, “Given Branzburg’s internal confusion and the 
‘obvious First Amendment problems’ involved in ‘[c]ompelling a reporter to disclose the identity 
                                                
718 Id. at 438.  
719 The Fourth Circuit refused to find a privilege in the criminal context, but that case concerned only non-
confidential information.  See, e.g., In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850.  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has specifically rebuffed a 
request to find a privilege in the criminal context when the information is non-confidential.  U.S. v. Smith, 135 F.3d 
963 (5th Cir. 1998).  It is possible that these courts may come out differently if confidential information were at 
stake.  Language in both McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003) and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 
F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987) suggests that these circuits will not find a privilege in the criminal context.  Neither the 
Eighth Circuit nor the Tenth have not had an opportunity to answer whether there is a privilege in the criminal 
context. 





of a confidential source,’  it is hardly surprising that lower courts have . . . ‘chipped away at the 
holding of Branzburg,’ finding constitutional protections for reporters . . . .”721 
RQ 2: How, if at all, have courts of appeals enumerated tests for deciding whether a 
reporter’s privilege exists or made determinations essentially on an ad hoc basis? 
 
 All of the courts of appeals that have recognized a reporter’s privilege have adopted a test 
to determine whether a reporter must disclose either the identity of his source or his work 
product.  In most instances, the courts describe these tests as balancing tests where a reporter’s 
interest or the public’s interest in newsworthy information is blanaced against the party who is 
seeking information from the reporter.722  As one court explained, “[T]he district court must 
balance the defendant’s need for the material against the interests underlying the privilege to 
make this determination.”723  Despite this assertion, no courts have incorporated into their 
reporter’s privilege tests a factor that considers the value of the information at issue.724 
The First Circuit, for example, has adopted a multi-step process for determining whether 
a recognized privilege should be overcome.725  First, the court applies a burden to each of the 
parties: “The plaintiff must establish relevance of the desired information and the defendant has 
the burden of establishing need for preserving confidentiality.”726  For the plaintiff to meet his 
burden, he must show that the evidence sought from the reporter is necessary to his case.727  That 
                                                
721 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J., concurring) (citation 
omitted).  
722 See, e.g.. U.S. v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980).  
723 Id. at 148. 
724 At least one court, in dicta, has dabbled with the idea however.  See The New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 
459 F.3d 160, 172 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Where . . . reporting involves the uncovering of government corruption or 
misconduct in the use of investigative powers, courts can easily find appropriate means of protecting the journalists 
involved and their sources.”).  Another court considered a similar type of balancing, but would not have balanced 
the importance of the information.  See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998).  Instead, it 
balanced the subpoenaing party’s interests against the likelihood that the newsgather’s interests would be inhibited 
in the future.  Id. at 716-17. 
725 See Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980). 
726 Id. at 597.  




evidence must be more than “remotely relevant.”728  As to the reporter, the court must access the 
degree confidentiality required.729  As the court explained, “Not all information as to sources is 
equally deserving of confidentiality.”730  This inquiry, however, is not directed at the 
newsworthiness of the information but how the reporter received the information.731  After these 
burdens are met, the court can refuse to order production of the information or require production 
and institute procedures to protect the produced information.732 
 In United States v. LaRouche Campaign, for example, NBC asserted that confidentiality 
was important for several reasons.733  First, NBC asserted that the “disclosure of outtakes in this 
case will increase the chances of harassment of the interviewee-witness by the LaRouche 
organization.”734  Second, NBC argued that there was “the threat of administrative and judicial 
intrusion” into the newsgathering and editorial process.735  Third, it argued that requiring a 
journalist to testify would make the journalists look like “an investigative arm of the judicial 
system.”736  Fourth, it would sew disincentive to “compile and preserve nonbroadcast 
material.”737  Finally, the disclosure would place burdens on journalists’ time and resources in 
responding to subpoenas.738  Notably, all of these interests related to confidential sources 
generally and not the specific information at issue in this case. 
                                                
728 Id.  
729 Id.  
730 Id. (“An unsolicited letter may be received with no mention of an interest in anonymity; such a letter may 
casually mention the wish for confidential treatment; it may specifically condition use on the according of such 
treatment; or it may defer communication of any substance until a commitment to confidentiality is received.  Oral 
communications could also range from the cavalierly volunteered to the carefully bargained-for undertaking.”).  
731 Id.  
732 Id. at 598 (listing alternatives to full disclosure). 
733 See U.S. v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (1st Cir. 1988)  
734 Id. at 1181. 
735  Id. at 1182. 
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 Against these interests, the court examined the plaintiff’s need for the information.739  
That need, the court said, was especially strong, because “[a]t stake on the defendants’ side of 
the equation are their constitutional rights to a fair trial under the Fifth Amendment and to 
compulsory process and effective confrontation . . . of adverse witnesses under the Sixth 
Amendment.”740  According to the court, “No one or all of NBC’s asserted First Amendment 
interests can be said to outweigh these very considerable interests of the defendants.”741 
 The Second Circuit has adopted a different balancing test.  In its first case explicitly 
adopting a test, the court explained that a lower court can only compel a reporter’s testimony 
“upon a clear and specific showing that the information is: highly material and relevant, 
necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable from other available 
sources.”742  Thus, in United States v. Burke, where the defendant sought work product from a 
journalist to rebut the testimony of one witness, the court found that the magazine company 
could not be forced to produce documents to impeach the witness because the witness had 
already been impeached in other ways.743  Said differently, the evidence was not “critical” to his 
defense because the purpose the information would serve had already been achieved.744  Thus, 
the reporter’s privilege prevented the reporter from having to testify. 
 The Third Circuit has adopted Justice Powell’s view that each case must be judged based 
on its own facts.745  In such instances, the court found that lower courts should “strik[e] the 
delicate balance between the assertion of the privilege on the one hand and the interest of either 
                                                
739 Id. 
740 Id. 
741 Id. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690–91 (1972)).  For another instance where the court has 
applied this test see Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998). 
742 In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982).  
743 U.S. v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1983).  
744 Id. at 78.  
745 Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715-16 (3d Cir. 1979) (explaining Justice Powell’s proposed Ad 




criminal or civil litigants seeking the information[,] the materiality, relevance and necessity of 
the information sought [on the other].”746  More specifically, the party “seeking the information 
must show ‘that his only practical access to crucial information necessary for the development of 
the case is through the newsman’s sources.’”747  The party seeking the information can make 
such a showing by proving that there is no alternative route to the information and that that 
information “go[es] to the heart of the (claim).”748  Notably, the balance to be struck is against 
the “assertion of the privilege” and not the type or importance of the information disclosed as a 
result of the confidential relationship. 
 In Fox v. Township of Jackson, the Third Circuit applied this test to find that the 
subpoenaing party had not met its burden.749  In Fox, the plaintiff who sought information from a 
reporter did not meet the burden, according to the court, because “information contained in the 
article was not specific enough to lead the reader to believe the journalist possessed any relevant 
and unique information . . . [that] r[o]se to the level of an admission [from the defendant].”750  
There was no inquiry into how that weak interest in the information would stand up to the value 
of the information. 
 Although the status of the reporter’s privilege in the Fourth Circuit is unclear, where the 
court has recognized a privilege, it has adopted a balancing test similar to the Third Circuit’s.751  
The test asks “(1) whether the information is relevant, (2) whether the information can be 
                                                
746 Id. at 716.  
747 Id. at 717.  
748 Id.  The court has suggested that a less vigorous test is needed when the information sought is not the 
identity of sources.  U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Under the circumstances of this case it is not 
necessary to fashion a test other than Riley to decide these questions. . . .  We need not develop a precise test for the 
peculiar circumstances presented here, although we will venture the view that the defendants probably should be 
required to prove less to obtain the reporter’s version of a conversation already voluntarily disclosed by the self-
confessed source than to obtain the identity of the source itself.”). 
749 Fox v. Township of Jackson, 64 Fed.Appx. 338, 341 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The moving party must demonstrate: 
(1) he has made an effort to obtain the information from other sources; (2) the only access to the information is 
through the journalist and his sources; and (3) the information sought is crucial to the claim.”).  
750 Id.  




obtained by alternative means, and (3) whether there is a compelling interest in the 
information.”752  In addition to the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have also 
adopted this test.753  The test is quite simple to apply and, often, rises and falls on whether the 
party requesting the subpoena has exhausted all reasonable alternatives to discovering the 
information it seeks from the reporter.  For example, in LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 
Inc., the court found that the plaintiff could not subpoena the defendant because the plaintiff “did 
not exhaust all his non-party depositions before making the motion, and he failed to demonstrate 
to the court unsuccessful, independent attempts to gain the requested information.”754 
 In Shoen v. Shoen, a defamation case, the Ninth Circuit approached the situation 
differently than the other courts of appeals by setting out its own threshold requirement that must 
be met to overcome the reporter’s privilege.755  According to the court, which cited the Second 
and Third Circuits case law for support, “At a minimum, this [threshold] requires a showing that 
the information sought is not obtainable from another source.”756  In that case, the plaintiffs did 
not overcome this threshold because the information that they sought – information about what 
their defendant father told the reporter – was not first sought from the father himself.757   
 Two years later, in the same defamation case that came back to the Ninth Circuit after the 
plaintiffs exhausted their alternative avenues to the information, the court adopted a new multi-
part test.758  In that case, the court found that a party wishing to overcome a privilege must show 
that the information is: “(1) unavailable despite exhaustion of all reasonable alternative sources; 
                                                
752 Id. at 1139.   
753 Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 
1986); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980).  
754 LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139.  For other applications of the test see Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282 
(4th Cir. 2000) and Church of Scientology Intern. v. Daniels, 992 F.2d 1329, 1335 (4th Cir. 1993).  
755 Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).  
756 Id. at 1296.  
757 Id.   




(2) noncumulative; and (3) clearly relevant to an important issue in the case.”759  After reviewing 
the facts, the court again found that the privilege had not been overcome because the statements 
given to the author came after the allegedly defamatory statements were made, making them 
irrelevant as a matter of state law.760  Thus, they were not “clearly relevant” to the case.761 
 The Tenth and D.C. Circuits have adopted similar tests.762  In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., the Tenth Circuit adopted a test from the Second Circuit’s pre-Branzburg case, Garland v. 
Torre: “1. Whether the party seeking information has independently attempted to obtain the 
information elsewhere and has been unsuccessful[;] 2. Whether the information goes to the heart 
of the matter[;] 3. Whether the information is of certain relevance[; and] 4. The type of 
controversy.”763  Thus, in United States v. Ahn, where a defendant sought to compel reporters to 
name their sources in an action to withdraw his guilty plea, the court refused to compel the 
reporter to produce the information because it was not “relevant to determining [his] guilt or 
innocence.”764 
 In sum, courts use various iterations of a single “balancing” test whereby courts ask, 
among other things, whether the information sought is available via other avenues, is relevant, or 
is necessary to the maintenance of the party’s claim or defense.  The normal process goes 
something like this: courts first acknowledge that a reporter’s privilege exists; next, courts place 
the “balancing” test in front of the party seeking the information; and once the party checks off 
the two or three hurdles standing between him and the information sought, courts will compel the 
                                                
759 Id. at 416.  
760 Id. at 417.  
761  Id. 
762 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974). 
763 See Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 438; see also Clyburn v. News World Commc’ns, Inc., 903 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (applying parts of the Garland test); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same). 




reporter to testify or produce work product.765  This approach, however, does not actually 
balance the competing interests.  Indeed, none of the tests reviewed above consider in the 
balance the weight of the First Amendment interest as determined by the newsworthiness of the 
information the source disclosed or how that weight should be measured in light of First 
Amendment theory.  Instead, they only place a burden on the party seeking the subpoena to 
meet.  If, in fact, these cases really concern fundamental issues about freedom of speech as some 
courts suggest,766 it is unclear why those fundamental issues are not entertained in the balancing 
tests adopted by the courts of appeals. 
RQ 3: How, if at all, have courts of appeals relied on the leading First Amendment theories 
when deciding whether a reporter’s privilege exists or how broad the scope of the privilege 
is? 
 
The vast majority of reporter’s privilege cases discuss the First Amendment.  Those 
courts of appeals recognizing a privilege spend more time discussing how its decisions are 
informed by First Amendment theory.767  (At the same time, some courts recognizing a reporter’s 
privilege spend little time discussing such theories.768)  These courts do not neatly separate out 
the different theories.  Instead, they often speak of them interchangeably.769  Even the courts that 
do discuss the First Amendment, however, speak only in general terms about First Amendment 
                                                
765 See, e.g., U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980).  
766 Baker v. F and F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing a reporter’s privilege as part of “our 
constitutional way of life”).  
767 See generally, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 
(3d Cir. 1979).  
768 In Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980), for example, the court 
found that there was a First Amendment reporter’s privilege in civil cases.  Nonetheless, it failed to discuss in any 
real detail why that must be the case.  See also U.S. v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986) (recognizing a 
privilege but not discussing First Amendment theory); LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134 
(4th Cir. 1986) (same); In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (same); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975) (same). 
769 See generally, e.g., Baker v. F and F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing the marketplace of ideas, 




theory.770  They do not discuss how First Amendment theory might militate in favor of or against 
finding and protecting a reporter’s privilege in a specific case.771  Those courts that strictly 
follow Branzburg or those courts addressing facts indistinguishable from those in Branzburg 
however, do not discuss First Amendment or free speech theory in any real detail – much like the 
Branzburg court did not.772 
Numerous courts have invoked the marketplace of ideas theory.  In Bruno & Stillman, 
Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., where the First Circuit recognized a reporter’s privilege in a civil 
case about product defects, for example, it explained – albeit in a footnote – that “the solicitude 
for First Amendment rights evidenced in [its] opinions reflects concern for the important public 
interest in a free flow of news and commentary.”773  The Second Circuit was more forceful in its 
nod to the marketplace of ideas theory in the civil context: “[There is] a paramount public 
interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press capable of 
participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters, . . . which has always been a 
principal concern of the First Amendment.”774  The Third Circuit was the most explicit in its 
invocation of the marketplace of ideas theory as it related to allegation resulting from a local 
mayor’s race.775  It cited that theory when it found the reporter’s privilege existed: “The strong 
                                                
770 The Third Circuit once called First Amendment values “more abstract concerns.”  U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 
346, 355 (3d Cir. 1980). 
771 This is likely the case because of the courts’ reliance on their various balancing tests that do not take into 
account the First Amendment interests at stake in each individual case.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 
521 (9th Cir. 1976) (failing to even address the First Amendment interests).  But see, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican 
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing how source information about a public official deserved 
greater protection than source information about a private individual); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 
(3d Cir. 1979) (similar).  
772  See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th 
Cir. 1987); Lewis v. U.S., 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975); Lewis v. U.S., 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974). 
773  See generally Bruno & Stillman, Inc., 633 F.2d at 595 n.11. 
774 Baker v. F and F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972). 
775 Riley, 612 F.2d at 715; see also Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000) (“If reporters 
were routinely required to divulge the identities of their sources, the free flow of newsworthy information would be 
restrained and the public’s understanding of important issues and events would be hampered in ways inconsistent 




public policy which supports the unfettered communication to the public of information, 
comment and opinion and the Constitutional dimension of that policy, expressly recognized in 
Branzburg v. Hayes, lead us to conclude that journalists have a . . . privilege.”776 
In general, the cases focusing on the marketplace of ideas theory worried that not 
recognizing a privilege would lead to the often discussed chilling effect, which would prevent 
citizens from exchanging ideas in a free marketplace.777  As the Ninth Circuit explained in a case 
about a murder in a businessman’s family, “Rooted in the First Amendment, the privilege is a 
recognition that society’s interest in protecting the integrity of the newsgathering process, and in 
ensuring the free flow of information to the public.”778  The First Circuit, in trying to define the 
outer boundaries of the reporter’s privilege in a case about antitrust violations, similarly (and 
more elegantly) stated, “Courts afford journalists a measure of protection from discovery 
initiatives in order not to undermine their ability to gather and disseminate information.  
Journalists are the personification of a free press, and to withhold such protection would invite a 
‘chilling effect on speech’ and thus destabilize the First Amendment.”779  Finally, the Third 
Circuit also believed a chilling effect is self-evident: “The interrelationship between 
newsgathering, news dissemination and the need for a journalist to protect his or her source is 
too apparent to require belaboring.”780 
                                                
776 Riley, 612 F.2d at 715. 
777 See, e.g., Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 993 n.10 (8th Cir. 1972) (“[T]o compel a newsman to 
breach a confidential relationship merely because a libel suit has been filed against him would seem inevitably to 
lead to an excessive restraint on the scope of legitimate newsgathering activity.”). 
778 Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(discussing possible chilling effects if a privilege did not exist). 
779 Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998); id. (“Just as a journalist, stripped of 
sources, would write fewer, less incisive articles, an academician, stripped of sources, would be able to provide 
fewer, less cogent analyses.  Such similarities of concern and function militate in favor of a similar level of 
protection for journalists and academic researchers.”); see also U.S. v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 
1988); U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1980) (“More often than not, unless the declarant has faith that 
the recipient will preserve the confidence, he will not bestow it; also more often than not, when the recipient of the 
information conveys it to a third person, he respects the confidence of the original source.”). 




The Second Circuit has also expressed concern for the chilling effect resulting from 
forcing journalists to respond to subpoenas.781  This was true even when the subpoenas sought 
only work product.  In Gonzales v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., a plaintiff, who was suing 
the Louisiana Deputy Sheriff for violating his constitutional rights, subpoenaed NBC, which had 
related footage of the abusive police conduct at issue.782  The court recognized a privilege for the 
work product: 
If the parties to any lawsuit were free to subpoena the press at will, it would likely 
become standard operating procedure for those litigating against an entity that had 
been the subject of press attention to sift through press files in search of 
information supporting their claims.  The resulting wholesale exposure of press 
files to litigant scrutiny would burden the press with heavy costs of subpoena 
compliance, and could otherwise impair its ability to perform its duties-
particularly if potential sources were deterred from speaking to the press, or 
insisted on remaining anonymous, because of the likelihood that they would be 
sucked into litigation.783 
 
Because of these important interests, the court required the plaintiff to overcome a modified form 
of the reporter’s privilege test it had previously established.784 
The D.C. Circuit, among others, has also recognized a chilling effect, but, even so, has 
held that it did not require a finding in favor of journalists asserting a privilege: 
Not every Government action that affects, has an impact on, or indeed inhibits 
First Amendment activity constitutes the kind of “abridgment” condemned by the 
First Amendment. . . .  In recent years, the Supreme Court has found in a number 
of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or “chilling”, 
effect of governmental action that falls short of a direct prohibition against the 
exercise of First Amendment rights.  Yet not every Government action that has an 
inhibiting or constrictive impact on First Amendment activity is said therefore to 
have an impermissible “chilling effect.”785 
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785 Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 




This was essentially the view the Supreme Court laid out in Branzburg and by other circuit cases 
construing subpoenas as mere “incidental burdens” on First Amendment rights.786   
To confuse the matter, however, the D.C. Circuit in other instances has found that a 
chilling effect is a legitimate interest to take into account.787  As the court explained at length in 
Zerilli v. Smith, a civil case about organized crime, protecting sources of information as a First 
Amendment concern is of the utmost importance: 
The First Amendment guarantees a free press primarily because of the important 
role it can play as a vital source of public information.  The press was protected so 
that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.  Without an 
unfettered press, citizens would be far less able to make informed political, social, 
and economic choices.  But the press’ function as a vital source of information is 
weakened whenever the ability of journalists to gather news is impaired. 
Compelling a reporter to disclose the identity of a source may significantly 
interfere with this news gathering ability; journalists frequently depend on 
informants to gather news, and confidentiality is often essential to establishing a 
relationship with an informant.788 
 
In short, the court invoked the marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and checking value 
theories as a reason to protect reporters’ interest in sources who feel comfortable to share 
information only in confidence.789 
In several other instances, courts have also cited self-governance and checking value 
theories to support a finding of a privilege.790  In Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., the first 
                                                
786 See, e.g., In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e hold that the incidental burden on the 
freedom of the press in the circumstances of this case does not require the invalidation of the subpoenas issued to the 
reporters.”); Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1050 (D.C. 1978) 
(same).  
787 Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Because we believe that in this case the First 
Amendment interest in protecting a news reporter’s sources outweighs the interest in compelled disclosure, we 
affirm the District Court’s decision to deny the motion to compel discovery.”).  
788 Id. at 710-11.  
789 See also In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Premised upon the First Amendment, the 
privilege recognizes society's interest in protecting the integrity of the newsgathering process, and in ensuring the 
free flow of information to the public.”); U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 356 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Moreover, there is a 
general expectation in certain sectors of society that information flows more freely from anonymous sources.”). 
790 Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595 n.12 (1st Cir. 1980) (“The issue is the 




Fifth Circuit case to find a reporter’s privilege, the court placed much weight on the plaintiff’s 
status as a public official as a reason to recognize a privilege.791  This was the case because 
compelling the production of confidential source information where the source gives information 
about a public official may dissuade sources to come forward or to only come forward 
anonymously.792  The unavoidable result would make it more difficult for reporters to report on 
the malfeasance of government officials.793   
The Third Circuit, which early on was extremely protective of the reporter’s privilege, 
also invoked the checking value and self-governance theories, among others, to find a reporter’s 
privilege.794  In that case, Riley v. City of Chester, the plaintiff was a former candidate for 
mayor.795  It was under these circumstances that the court thought the privilege was especially 
important: “The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. . . .  The press was protected 
so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.”796 
In United States v. Criden, the Third Circuit gave one of the most full-throated 
endorsements of the checking value and self-governance theories.797  In that case, several 
government officials were charged with multiple violations of federal law in the ABSCAM 
controversy.798  At trial, the defense called one of the reporters who reported on the story to 
                                                                                                                                                       
the First Amendment gives to the press in behalf of the public.” (citing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF 
CONSENT (1975), at 85)); Baker v. F and F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972). 
791  Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980). 
792 Id.  
793 Id.; see also Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Such protection is necessary to 
ensure a free and vital press, without which an open and democratic society would be impossible to maintain.” 
(citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)). 
794  Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 
713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring)). 
795 Id. at 710. 
796 Id.  
797  U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980). 




testify.799  She refused.800  Although the court found that the privilege was overcome under the 
facts of the case, it first explained the importance of reporting on newsworthy matters: 
Our national commitment to the free exchange of information also embodies a 
recognition that the major sources of news are public figures, and that in addition 
to being newsmakers, these sources fashion public policy for government at all 
levels and in all branches.  New ideas must be tested in the crucible of public 
opinion if our representatives are to receive guidance in deciding whether a 
suggested policy will receive public endorsement or opposition.  It is extremely 
important therefore that varying concepts of public policy be defined and 
redefined, tested and retested, by wide public dissemination.  In this respect, the 
communications media not only serve as the vehicle that widely disperses 
information but also constitute an important instrument of democracy that assists 
our officials in fashioning public policy.  Without the protection of the source, the 
cutting edge of this valuable societal instrument would be severely dulled and 
public participation in decision-making severely restricted.  The brute fact of 
human experience is that public officials are far more willing to test new ideas 
under the public microscope through anonymous disclosure than when they are 
required to be identified as the sources.801 
 
In sum, almost every court gives a hat tip to some First Amendment interest.  This 
assertion alone, however, does not capture the true nature of the courts’ treatment of First 
Amendment interests.  It is more accurate to say that every court has invoked the self-
governance, checking, and marketplace of ideas theories when discussing the existence of a 
constitutional reporter’s privilege.  (They do not seem to rely at all on the liberty theory.)  What 
they have not done, however, is suggested which theory’s interests are or should be prevailing or 
how each theory should or should not be applied to the facts of each case.   
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issue.  Id.  As the court explained, “[T]he important social interests in the free flow of information that are protected 
by the reporter’s qualified privilege are particularly compelling in criminal cases.  Reporters are to be encouraged to 




Understanding the Current State of Affairs 
 The research questions were aimed at mapping out the current reporter’s privilege status 
by asking how courts have confronted Branzburg, how courts have applied a privilege, and 
whether courts focus on First Amendment theory in that application.  While courts differ in how 
they confront Branzburg, most have limited Branzburg; courts apply the privilege by requiring 
the subpoenaing party to exhaust its alternatives and prove relevance;802 and courts have little 
tolerance for appraising the value of information in any given case.803 
 As to the first question, there are two main ways courts deal with Branzburg.  First, 
courts distinguish Branzburg by the type of proceeding before them, asserting that Branzburg 
was concerned with the grand jury context or the criminal context.804  Second, courts minimize 
Branzburg by asserting that the opinion was a plurality opinion as opposed to a majority opinion.  
Notably, no court asserted that subsequent jurisprudence has overruled Branzburg’s reasoning.805  
 Once Branzburg is discarded or limited, courts then have to decide how to enforce a 
reporter’s privilege.  Most courts enforce the privilege through multi-part tests that require the 
subpoenaing party to show that they have exhausted alternatives to finding the information, that 
the information sought is relevant to the case, and whether the information is important or critical 
to a case.806  Interestingly, although courts refer to the “important First Amendment values . . . at 
stake” in these cases,807 not a single test from a court of appeals asks how valuable – as measured 
by the First Amendment – the information at stake is. 
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 Finally, if courts take into account the First Amendment interests of the information at 
stake, they do not do so explicitly in most cases.  As such, it is impossible to say if, for example, 
a judge was influenced by the type of information at stake in finding that a privilege did or did 
not exist.  As noted, however, some courts are explicit about the context in which a case comes 
before them, explaining that the reporter’s privilege is especially important when it relates to 
public officials and the government.808  
  
                                                




CHAPTER 7.  DISCUSSION 
The Problem: A Lack of Theory, Predictability, and Consistency 
The findings of this thesis support prior assertions that: “Quite simply, Branzburg 
jurisprudence is a mess.”809  As has been shown, most courts fail to really deal with Branzburg 
when they find a reporter’s privilege.  Some, however, attempt to by suggesting that concerns 
special to the grand jury context cannot dictate the result outside of that context.  Or, when courts 
deviate from Branzburg’s holding, they do so without addressing the opinion’s main thrust that 
“newsmen are not exempt from the normal duty of appearing before a grand jury and answering 
questions relevant to a criminal investigation.”810  At that time, the Court could have just as 
easily said that journalists are not exempt from appearing and responding to questions as a result 
of a subpoena.  Said differently, the thrust of Branzburg seemed just as concerned with not 
giving journalists greater First Amendment freedoms than average non-journalist Americans.  
Courts finding a privilege in the criminal context are also willfully blind to the Court’s dicta 
“that reporters, like other citizens, [must] respond to relevant questions put to them in the course 
of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.”811  From this perspective, courts that find a 
reporter’s privilege in civil and criminal cases may, as Judge Posner said, be “skating on thin 
ice.”812 
Other courts attempt to get around Branzburg by arguing that it really is just a plurality 
opinion.  They argue that Justice Powell’s concurring opinion trumped the Court’s majority 
opinion.  But, alas, these courts are ignoring the inescapable fact that Justice Powell’s concurring 
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opinion cannot create a privilege, because – like it or not – Justice Powell did sign onto the 
majority opinion in full.813  Again, this does not suffice to get courts around Branzburg. 
This entire situation is made all the more difficult by various courts of appeals issuing 
conflicting opinions.  In one instance, a court will hold that there is a reporter’s privilege.814  A 
few years later, however, the same court will come back and find a reporter’s privilege does 
exist.815  This result seems all the more unappealing and, in fact, inequitable, when it becomes 
apparent that courts are willing to find a privilege when the government is not the party 
requesting the subpoena but when it is that party, all of the sudden, a reporter’s privilege does 
not exist.816 
Making matters even worse, when courts of appeals find that a reporter’s privilege exists, 
they fail to actually undertake a balancing of the competing interests at stake.  Indeed, as shown 
by the results to the second research question, the balance undertaken in these instances is not a 
true balancing.  Instead, the balancing tests are more one-sided hurdles that a party seeking 
information from a journalist must clear.817  Absent a few outliers dealing with confidential 
source information relating to a public official,818 most all of the courts of appeals simply first 
recognize that a privilege attaches.819  After a court recognizes that this privilege attaches, it goes 
on to appraise the need of the party seeking the information, whether the information is relevant 
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814 U.S. v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
815 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also id. at 1164 
(Tatel, J., concurring) (“We ourselves have affirmed the denial of a criminal defense subpoena on grounds that the 
defendant ‘failed to carry his burden’ of ‘demonstrat[ing] that the reporters’ qualified privilege should be 
overcome.’” (quoting U.S. v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26, 37 (D.C.Cir. 2000)). 
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817 See, e.g., In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982); Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
818 See, e.g., U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 356 (3d Cir. 1980) (describing First Amendment theory in the 
context of information about public officials); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding 
that the information in the news story “concern[ed] a candidate for high public office in a hotly contested 
campaign”).  




to the case, and whether the party has sufficiently exhausted its other avenues to the 
information.820  A showing on these three factors will be the key to open the locked reporter’s 
privilege door without reference to what is behind that door.  Simply, courts exhibit an extreme 
aversion to examining the quality or importance of the information that is behind the reporter’s 
privilege door.821  Thus, no matter what is behind that door – whether it reveals the largest 
government scandal to date or outs a CIA agent for no real reason – receives the same protection 
under the courts of appeals’ balancing tests.822 
This finding foreshadows the results of the third and final research question that asked 
how the courts of appeals rely on First Amendment theory in reporter’s privilege cases.  
Certainly, many of the courts of appeals that find a privilege rely on the various theories 
undergirding the First Amendment: the marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and checking 
value theories.823  (Notably, not a single case in this sample discussed the liberty theory of the 
freedom of speech, although some did reference the fourth estate, which is close to Edwin 
Baker’s view of the theory’s relationship to the press.824)  These mentions, however, ring rather 
hollow.  In most, but not all cases, courts talk in lofty terms about First Amendment theory and 
its importance to the development of the American politic.  Courts do not though like to discuss 
                                                
820 Id. at 77-78.  
821 As one judge concurring in the Judith Miller case explained, “While [another concurring opinion] makes 
the centerpiece of [the] test the balancing of ‘the public interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm the 
leak caused, against the public interest in newsgathering, measured by the leaked information's value,’ this court (in 
the civil context), the United States Department of Justice and the lone district court that has recognized a federal 
common-law reporter’s privilege in the grand jury context have declined to consider either of these factors in 
deciding whether to recognize a reporter’s exemption from compulsory process.”  In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith 
Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Henderson, J., concurring). 
822 For more examples of the balancing tests see, e.g., LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 
1134 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding a failure to show that alternative sources were exhausted) and Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 
412 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the information sought was not relevant).  
823 See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725-26 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing the First 
Amendment in relation to exacting scrutiny on public figures); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 
1979) (same); Baker v. F and F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing the marketplace of ideas theory); 
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 993 n.10 (8th Cir. 1972) (same). 




these theories in the context of the cases before them.  This is no doubt a result of the courts’ 
“balancing” tests, where the courts are loathe to inquire into the type of information at issue.825  
Indeed, if courts did undertake such an inquiry, they may have more of a moment to discuss First 
Amendment theory as it relates to their cases.826   
Only a few opinions actually attempt to undertake this sort of information cost/benefit 
analysis.827  And, even these opinions undertake such an analysis by looking to whom the 
information is about, rather than what First Amendment value the information has in and of 
itself.828  Indeed, a situation is imaginable where even information about a private individual may 
have public importance.  But, where courts only look to the status of the person as a public 
official, they run the risk of shortchanging the public of valuable information based solely on the 
identity of the person about whom the information concerns.829  More to the point, the courts that 
do give a nod to the type of information at issue nonetheless go on to apply the same type of 
balancing test, making it unclear how the value of the information actually works into the 
calculus – if at all.830  As a result, what the courts of appeals themselves style as cases of First 
Amendment importance are rarely treated as such by balancing the value of the information 
against the subpoenaing party’s need for the information. 
These results demonstrate a state of affairs that has created a nearly impenetrable area of 
constitutional law that is nigh impossible to make any sense of.  Even more unfortunate, 
everyone knows that this is the case.  As previously explained, “The mixed success of media 
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litigants and the lack of conclusive rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court have yielded a body of 
law that is conflicted in both its outcomes and its rationales.”831  In spite of this accurate 
summation of the reporter’s privilege case law, no courts attempt to address either the differing 
outcomes or the conflicting rationales.   
This hands-off approach to the current problem is so enmeshed in the case law that it has 
even been given a name by one former journalist and academic: “benign indeterminacy.”832  As 
that journalist explained, “In a perfect First Amendment world, . . . activities as important as 
newsgathering and dissemination might have more legal and constitutional protection, but given 
the legal landscape, the limbo of the status quo is preferable to legal certainties that could be 
even less favorable to newsgathering.”833  Essentially, the argument is this: in general, most 
reporters do not go to jail, although some do; newsgathering has not been irreparably damaged 
by this fact; chancing an effort at changing the law at the Supreme Court, for example, could 
destroy all of the privileges in the courts of appeals, sending even more journalists to jail; and 
therefore, journalists should not try to advocate for a one off legal solution lest they lose the 
current middle ground.  Therefore, the journalist concluded, “It may be that press freedom 
flourishes better in this disorderly state of indeterminacy than it would in a courtroom filled with 
ringing rhetoric about the First Amendment.”834 
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832 See generally Freivogel, supra note 597. 
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834 Id. at 119.  This section addresses Branzburg’s main rationale that generally applicable laws only indirectly 
interfere with speech.  It does not deal with Branzburg’s secondary rationale that a privilege should not be created 
because creating such a privilege would require courts to define who qualifies as a journalist.  This section does not 
focus on this issue because the courts of appeals have dealt with this issue without much difficulty at all, extending 
the privilege to documentarians, book authors, and academics.   
As the Ninth Circuit explained, “The purpose of the journalist’s privilege . . . [is] not solely to protect 
newspaper or television reporters, but to protect the activity of ‘investigative reporting’ more generally. . . .  [I]t 
makes no difference whether ‘[t]he intended manner of dissemination [was] by newspaper, magazine, book, public 
or private broadcast medium, [or] handbill’ because ‘[t]he press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort 
of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.’”  Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 




First, it must be said that this argument is not a specious one – it is a practical one.  For 
the most part, journalists do not end up in jail.  And, for the most part, the flow of news has not 
completely shriveled in the shadow of a possible future prosecution or civil suit.  Unfortunately, 
the argument proves nothing and assumes – for the most part – that the messy status quo tips in 
favor of the journalist.  The results in this thesis, however, suggest that – for the most part – 
journalists who do get subpoenaed are going to lose (at least at the court of appeals level) if they 
try to fight the subpoena.  In a sense then, this argument may be as optimistic as it is hopeful.  
Moreover, it assumes that the supposed beneficial situation will remain tipped in favor of 
journalists.  This, also, is unlikely, as even if one concedes that the status quo benefits 
journalists, which is far from apparent, such consistency ten years out is impossible to predict.  
For that reason, it is necessary to confront the problem head on. 
One Potential Solution: Clarify where Interference with Speech is Direct versus Indirect 
and Adopt an Actual Balancing Test 
 
 The Supreme Court’s newsgathering jurisprudence has created a false dichotomy which 
Branzburg, in part, is responsible for spawning: generally applicable laws that only indirectly 
interfere with speech do not violate the First Amendment, while laws that hold reporter’s liable 
for information they publish do directly interfere with speech and violate the First Amendment.  
In finding that reporters must respond to subpoenas, the Court explained that Branzburg 
“involve[d] no intrusions upon speech or . . . on what the press may publish . . . ,” as the only 
alleged interference of speech was a generally applicable subpoena seeking the identity of a 
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source.835  Indeed, “[c]itizens generally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury 
subpoenas.”836   
The problem with this approach is that the Court has found in other circumstances that 
even generally applicable laws can and do implicate the First Amendment.837  The Court has 
found generally applicable laws to run up against the First Amendment when they attempt to 
exact costs on the speaker as a result of the speech.838  Certainly, where plaintiffs in Bartnicki 
tried to hold journalists liable for allegedly violating generally applicable state and federal 
eavesdropping laws as a result of the publication of a recorded cellphone call, the Court found 
that the First Amendment was implicated.839  The fact that subpoenas are generally applicable 
laws, like the eavesdropping laws in Bartnicki, then, cannot be the determinative factor in 
deciding whether First Amendment rights are implicated by subpoenas.  Rather, courts must go 
beyond asking whether the subpoenas are generally applicable laws and look at the relation of 
the allegedly unconstitutional action to the speech.840 
 Courts are still grappling to explain how exactly subpoenas interfere with speech.  In 
United States v. Criden, for example, the Third Circuit found that enforcement of a subpoena 
would directly interfere with speech because, “[m]ore often than not, unless the declarant has 
faith that the recipient will preserve the confidence, he will not bestow it.”841  On the other hand, 
other courts have doubted this conclusion in some circumstances.842  Still others have accepted 
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838 Id.  
839 Id.  
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to turn over unbroadcast footage from a non-confidential source would cause a chilling effect); see also Branzburg, 




this conclusion but failed to find that it amounts to a violation of the First Amendment.843  Thus, 
it is clear that relying on the chilling effect argument is unlikely to work magic in courts’ quests 
to decide whether subpoenas against journalists interfere with speech in such a way as to 
implicate the First Amendment. 
 A new paradigm is necessary: subpoenas interfere with speech because they are adverse 
to the speaker and are the direct result of the speech itself – in these cases, the publication of 
news.844  In other circumstances, the Court has already impliedly reached the conclusion that the 
First Amendment is implicated when the government or a private party burdens speech because 
of either the content of the speech or its character.845  The Court could not have concluded that 
this was the case in 1972 when the Branzburg opinion was handed down, however, because it 
would not begin to establish this rule until three years after Branzburg.846  With the benefit of 
hindsight, this appears to be the only bright line way to determine whether subpoenas issued 
against journalists actually directly interfere with the First Amendment.847 
                                                
843 See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003).; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 
397 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Wolf and amici also argue that the district court’s order will have a chilling effect on Wolf’s 
ability to gather news because groups will perceive him as being an investigative arm of the law.  This argument has 
also been rejected by the Supreme Court.” (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 699-700 (1972)). 
844 Cf. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (“[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful 
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of 
the information . . . .”).  This is perhaps the only honest way left to distinguish or minimize Branzburg.  Indeed, 
simply appealing to the chilling effect and arguing that the Court got it wrong does not suffice.  Certainly, whether 
right or wrong, the Court rejected the idea that the First Amendment mandates a reporter’s privilege as a result of the 
chilling effect.  See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695 (“Accepting the fact, however, that an undetermined number of 
informants not themselves implicated in crime will nevertheless, for whatever reason, refuse to talk to newsmen if 
they fear identification by a reporter in an official investigation, we cannot accept the argument that the public 
interest in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over the 
public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes . . . .”). 
845 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).  As will be 
shown, the argument is not made that subpoenas can only be enforced where a need of the highest order is shown, as 
required in the above-cited cases.  Simply, it is suggested that the principle discussed in Bartnicki and Cox illustrate 
that, in fact, there is a direct interference with speech as a result of subpoenas issued against journalists. 
846 Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 471.   
847 But see Langley & Levine, supra note 408, at 46.  (“[I]t is difficult to draw a meaningful distinction 





 Take an example: in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Supreme Court addressed 
whether a state law that allowed subsequent penalties for publishing the name of a rape victim 
was permissible under the First Amendment.848  According to the Court, the question was 
whether, under the First Amendment, “the [government] may impose sanctions on the accurate 
publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records.”849  The Court held that it 
could not because allowing such sanctions would directly interfere with the press’s 
“responsibility . . . to report the operations of government” by exacting penalties on reporters for 
the information they have published.850  In short, the Court found that targeting publication with 
some sort of sanction implicated the First Amendment because that action resulted because of 
speech and could have the effect of disrupting the press’s role in informing the electorate.851  
Twenty-five years later, the Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper would reaffirm this view.852 
The logic of cases that run from Cox to Bartnicki graft easily onto subpoena cases.  This 
is so because subpoenas exact a burden on reporters853 (like the punishment in Cox and 
                                                
848 Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 491.  
849 Id. at 496-97. 
850 Id. at 492; see also id. at 491-92 (“In the first place, in a society in which each individual has but limited 
time and resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon 
the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations.  Great responsibility is accordingly placed 
upon the news media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of government, and official records and 
documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations.  Without the information provided by 
the press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on 
the administration of government generally.  With respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the 
press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the 
administration of justice.”). 
851 Some might argue that the application of the rationales of these cases is inappropriate because these cases 
directly prohibited publication in the first place by making it illegal to publish, for example, the name of a rape 
victim.  Notably, however, the Court based its rationale on whether the government or a private party could punish a 
journalists after publication – not on whether the law’s prohibition against publishing certain information was, in the 
first place, unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (“Simply put, the issue here is 
this: ‘Where the punished publisher of information has obtained the information . . . , may the government punish 
the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?’ (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
852 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514.  
853 Quantifying these burdens is not an easy task.  A few examples are in order, however.  First, a reporter 
pursuit of his trade depends on his ability to assure is confidential sources that he will keep their confidences.  
Without this ability, a reporter’s ability to seek his desired professional will either be limited or altogether destroyed 




Bartnicki) and are a direct reaction to and result from publication itself (just as it was in Cox and 
Bartnicki).  Had a reporter chosen not to publish certain information about the government or a 
private party, the government or the private party would not have reason or cause to issue the 
subpoena to the reporter in the first place.  That is, the resulting burdens of a subpoena occur 
solely because of the reporter’s speech, which, if anything, make the subpoena a direct 
interference with speech.854  As the Supreme Court recently explained in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, “[W]e [have] recognized that [when] the generally applicable law 
was directed at [the speaker] because of what his speech communicated . . . [, we must] . . . 
                                                                                                                                                       
note 408, at 26 n.80 (“A large portion of the stock-in-trade of any Washington journalist is a collection of sources, 
which is simply another name for contacts.” (quoting JUDY WOODRUFF, “THIS IS JUDY WOODRUFF AT THE WHITE 
HOUSE” 102 (1982))); Mot. to Quash, supra note 4, at Ex. 14 at 6 (Affidavit of Scott Armstrong) (“Were Mr. Risen 
to comply [with the subpoena], in my opinion, the damage would significantly undermine the confidence of a wide 
variety of confidential sources across many U.S. government agencies and institutions, as well as any 
knowledgeable individual sources not associated with the U.S. government.”).  If the reporter decides not to identify 
his source or turn over the requested work product, then the reporter will be left to suffer the consequences of that 
choice.  Those consequences come in the form of criminal or civil contempt findings, which are no doubt 
burdensome.  In short, the reporter is being forced into the ultimate catch-22: identify your sources and damage your 
own reputation and professional caché or do not identify your sources and land in jail or face stiff fines.  As Justice 
Stewart observed in Branzburg, “In the event of a subpoena, . . . the newsman will know that he must choose 
between being punished for contempt if he refuses to testify, or violating his profession’s ethics and impairing his 
resourcefulness as a reporter if he discloses confidential information.”  Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 731-32 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (internal footnote omitted). 
 These two burdens lead to another burden: the reporter’s refusal to use confidential sources in the future 
lest the reporter be drug in front of a grand jury.  See, e.g., Ron Bellamy, Idaho Editor Urges Press to Stand Up for 
Its Rights, THE REGISTER GUARD, Feb. 19, 1978, at 13A (quoting journalist, who was subpoenaed over confidential 
source and sentenced to thirty days in jail for refusing to identify that source, saying that journalists should not “be 
so eager to flag anonymous sources,” because doing so can lead to protracted litigation); see also Caldero v. Tribune 
Publ’g Co., 562 P.2d 791 (Id. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977).  Perhaps perceiving this, at least one court of 
appeals broadly interpreted the Supreme Court’s precedent holding that the government and third parties may not 
punish reporters for the publication of newsworthy information.  In handing down its own decision in Bartnicki 
before it made its way up to the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit broadly construed the Court’s newsgathering 
liability line of cases as standing for the proposition that “attempts to punish or deter the press’s publication of 
truthful information [are] unconstitutional.”  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added), aff’d, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514.  This broad interpretation, which finds that First Amendment protections kick 
in even when an action merely deters future speech, correctly extrapolates from the Court’s jurisprudence the 
underlying rationale – actions targeting the communication of newsworthy information are subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny when they have the potential to deter speech.  Id. 
854 The suggested approach would likely not change the outcome in Pell.  Indeed, in Pell the issue was 
whether the government was required to provide the journalist with access to information that the public did not 
have access to.  Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974).  Here, it is not a question of whether the government 
has to provide journalists access to information, but whether the government can take actions that directly interfere 
with a journalist attempting to disseminate information that he or she already has of his or her own accord.  On the 
other hand, it may change the outcome in Zurcher, where the search and seizure resulted directly from the 




appl[y] more rigorous scrutiny.”855  Therefore, under Cox and similar cases, subpoenas directly 
interfere with speech and, as such, must pass First Amendment scrutiny.856 
Of course, one might argue that the effect of subpoenas on the press is not as exacting as 
the penalties entertained in cases like Cox, and, therefore, the First Amendment is not implicated.  
This, however, is a distinction without a difference and weighs only on the inquiry into the 
strength of the First Amendment interests at stake – not the existence of an interest in the first 
place.857  The real question when deciding whether the First Amendment is implicated under 
cases like Cox is whether the government or a private party’s action adverse to a speaker occurs 
because of the speech itself and burdens that speech.858   
Finding that the First Amendment applies to subpoenas issued to reporters only answers 
one part of the question; it does not answer the other part: how much protection the First 
                                                
855 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010).  
856 This argument is different than Monica Langley and Lee Levine’s.  See supra notes 509-519 and 
accompanying text.  Langley and Levine implicitly argued that subpoenas implicated the First Amendment because 
they amounted to punishment for publication.  See Langley & Levine, supra note 408, at 47.  As they put it, “In the 
grand jury context, for example, a journalist who is held in contempt and jailed for refusing to testify about the 
source of his published report exposing governmental corruption is, in equal doses, effectively receiving punishment 
based on both the content of his published work and his newsgathering techniques.”  Id. at 40.  As noted, however, 
whether the First Amendment is implicated under the Court’s opinions is more a question of whether the 
government’s actions result from or target publication, rather than whether they, in fact, “punish” the journalist for 
the publication itself. 
 A closer analogy to the test suggested here is laid out by Marcus Asner.  According to Asner, the First 
Amendment is implicated based on “whether it is the particular reporter’s knowledge of the source’s identity or the 
publication of the source’s information that bothered the government enough to compel disclosure of the source’s 
identity.”  See Asner, supra note 507, at 624.  The difference between Asner’s view and the one offered here is the 
view put forward here would find any subpoena issued because of the publication of news would, at least, trigger the 
First Amendment.  While this test is more sweeping than Asner’s, it is unclear exactly how Asner’s test would be 
employed in reality.  Certainly, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a court to delve in the minds of 
government officials to find out whether the officials issued the subpoena because of a legitimate law enforcement 
need or to indirectly punish the journalist for disclosing government secrets. 
 Finally, this conclusion, as has been shown, is not undercut by the Branzburg Court’s assertion that 
subpoenas are not direct interferences with speech because they are laws of general applicability, which has not been 
a determinative factor in past cases.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83 (1972). 
857 See Langley & Levine, supra note 408, at 47 (“It is a well-respected and widely accepted tenet of First 
Amendment theory that within the realm of political expression, the degree of constitutional protection can and 
should vary with the nature of the restraint at issue.”).   
858 Said more generally, “[T]he First Amendment’s application to a civil or criminal sanction is not determined 
solely by whether that action is viewed ‘as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction.’”  Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 




Amendment requires.  It is suggested that the First Amendment requires courts to balance the 
specific First Amendment interests at stake in each case against the subpoenaing party’s 
interests.859  Because the concern with the direct interference with the press exists primarily out 
of a conviction that that interference prevents the press from “inform[ing] citizens about the 
public business,” the weight of the First Amendment interest in non-disclosure should be tied to 
the informative value of the speech at issue.860  As Judge Tatel put it in his concurring opinion In 
re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller when he advocated for a similar test, “[T]he approach in 
every case must be to strike the proper balance between the public’s interest in the free 
dissemination of ideas and information and the public’s interest in effective law enforcement and 
the fair administration of justice.” 861  More specifically, Judge Tatel argued that “courts . . . must 
consider not only the government’s need for the information and exhaustion of alternative 
sources, but also the . . . public interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm the leak 
caused, against the public interest in newsgathering, measured by the leaked information’s 
                                                
859 Essentially, this thesis is arguing for an ad hoc balancing test that does not establish a presumption in favor 
of one party’s interests to the other’s but asks, simply, whose interest should prevail.  Justice Breyer explained this 
type of inquiry in another First Amendment case:  
In determining whether a statute violates the First Amendment, this Court has often found it 
appropriate to examine the fit between statutory ends and means.  In doing so, it has examined 
speech-related harms, justifications, and potential alternatives.  In particular, it has taken account 
of the seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the nature and 
importance of the provision’s countervailing objectives, the extent to which the provision will tend 
to achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so.  
Ultimately the Court has had to determine whether the statute works speech-related harm that is 
out of proportion to its justifications. 
U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
860 Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 496.  As explained, in the context of political speech, the amount of First 
Amendment protection is tied to the type of restraint.  See Langley & Levine, supra note 408, at 47.  Thus, where 
the restraint is a prohibition of publication (that is, the restraint prevents speech at the center of the reporting 
spectrum based on the content of the information), the government carries the most heavy burden and a must rebut 
the presumption of unconstitutionality.  New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).  Not all restraints, 
however, are created equal – and some come to the table less constitutionally infirm than others.  Compare, e.g., 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) with Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 
109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989).  Because subpoenas against journalists are not so severe as to 
censor the publication of information, the First Amendment scrutiny should not be as severe either.  As such, a true 
balancing test is proposed; as will be seen, this test does not require a “compelling” interest from the government to 
tip the scale in favor of the government.   
861  Id. at 1174.  Judge Tatel was discussing a common law privilege, which provided a way around 




value.”862  This is similar to the viewpoint advocated for by Monica Langley and Lee Levine 
fifteen years earlier, except Langley and Levine would have called the privilege a constitutional 
one, while Judge Tatel spoke of a federal common law privilege.863  These are true “balancing” 
tests that weigh the particular interest of the First Amendment against either the government or 
private party’s interest in the disclosure of source identity or work product.   
To be clear, to weigh the value of information, courts should use First Amendment theory 
as a scale – and not just as fodder for broad sweeping statements about the importance of 
information generally.  The weight of all four theories should be assessed in each case.864  The 
marketplace of ideas theory places an emphasis on information injected into the social 
conversation – especially when that information contradicts widely accepted ideas.865  The 
liberty theory’s “fourth estate” theory protects “a limited institutional realm of private production 
and distribution of information, opinion, and vision, of fact and fancy.”866 The checking value, 
from which the liberty theory borrows to some extent, is also primarily concerned with “the 
particular problem of misconduct by government officials.”867  Finally, the self-governance 
theory places a premium on “ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired 
by the people.”868 
A few general principles regarding information value can be distilled from the overlap of 
these rules.  First, information about government malfeasance is perhaps the most important type 
of information under these theories.  Arguably, the marketplace of ideas and the liberty theory 
                                                
862 Id. at 1175.  
863 See supra note 408 and accompanying text.  It is different from Judge Tatel’s approach, however, in that 
Langley and Levine would have put a thumb on the reporter interest side of the scale by requiring the government to 
show that its interests were compelling.  See Langley & Levine, supra note 408, at 48. 
864 The liberty theory would be accounted for in the checking value theory.  See supra note  
865 See MILL, supra note 167, at 68. 
866 BAKER, supra note 284, at 233-34 (emphasis added). 
867 Blasi, supra note 180, at 648   




would protect confidential source information about government malfeasance, because not doing 
so would – for all of the wrong reasons – allow government to interfere with the independence of 
the press, which is sacrosanct under these theories.  More to the point, the checking value and 
self-governance theories militate strongly in favor of protecting the reporter-source relationship 
when the information is information about government malfeasance, because, under these 
theories, the main purpose of the First Amendment was not just to keep government out of the 
business of telling reporters what to report but to ensure that reporters have the autonomy to 
uncover government abuses.869 Thus, where information is about government abuse or, less 
scandalously, about government performance in general, these theories should weigh especially 
heavy in any First Amendment calculus.870 
When the information, however, does not have anything to do with government 
malfeasance or the government generally, the application of the checking value and the self-
governance theories become much less obvious.  In a case about corporate environmental abuses, 
for example, it is unclear how, if at all, the self-governance theory would influence a potential 
outcome.  The liberty theory and the marketplace of ideas theory would still apply though – 
likely with similar weight as they do in the governmental information cases.  Indeed, the 
marketplace of ideas theory is much more broad than the theories related to self-governance and 
seeks to protect any information that is injected in the marketplace and has the potential to 
                                                
869 Id. 
870 See, e.g., U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980); cf. Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 
U.S. 697, 722 (1931) (“Charges of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of official malfeasance, unquestionably 
create a public scandal, but the theory of the constitutional guaranty is that even a more serious public evil would be 
caused by authority to prevent publication.  ‘To prohibit the intent to excite those unfavorable sentiments against 
those who administer the Government, is equivalent to a prohibition of the actual excitement of them; and to 
prohibit the actual excitement of them is equivalent to a prohibition of discussions having that tendency and effect; 
which, again, is equivalent to a protection of those who administer the Government, if they should at any time 





improve society’s standing by upsetting falsehoods.871  If information would give the consumer a 
greater awareness of his or her relationship to a corporation vis-à-vis the corporation’s past 
actions, for example, the marketplace of ideas theory would be extremely protective of that 
information.872  The liberty theory would also protect non-governmental source information for 
the sake of protecting press autonomy because “maintaining the integrity of the press promotes a 
better society and makes our liberty more secure.”873  Indeed, the liberty theory like the 
marketplace of ideas theory would seem to require the same amount of protection in most cases. 
On the other hand, in the case of information that was disclosed for disclosure’s sake or 
the disclosure of valueless information, nearly all of the theories would provide relatively little 
protection.  Simply, not all information is created equal under these First Amendment theories.874  
The classic example of valueless speech is child pornography; as the Supreme Court explained in 
that context, “[It is] unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sexual acts . . . would 
often constitute an important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or 
educational work.”875  Speech need not be completely valueless, however, to merit less First 
Amendment protection.  Disclosure for the sake of disclosure would likely not merit a great deal 
of First Amendment protection, because it does not enrich the marketplace of ideas or provide 
citizens with information that they need to make informed decisions about their government.876  
This is exactly why Geneva Olverholser cautioned reporters who were advocating for Robert 
                                                
871 As the court has recognized of the marketplace of ideas theory in the commercial context, “[T]he particular 
consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his 
interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976). 
872 Cf. id.  
873  BAKER, supra note 284, at 244. 
874 See Kitrosser, supra note 409 (“In short, . . . classified information carries a very different constitutional 
status than virtually any other type of information or speech about government or public policy.”); see also supra 
note 409.  
875 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1982). 




Novak and Judith Miller.877  Indeed, the revelation in those reporters’ articles (that Valerie Plame 
was a covert CIA agent) were made to “get back at” Plame’s husband for his comments about 
Iraq’s connections to weapons of mass destruction and had no real public informational value.878 
On the other side of the equation are the competing interests.879  Depending on the 
identity of the party issuing the subpoena (whether the government or a private party), the 
competing interests may vary.  When the government subpoenas a reporter who has information 
about the commission of the crime, the government and the public would have an interest in 
effective law enforcement.880  The same can be said for grand jury investigations.881  Where the 
reporter has information about national security, the government and the public might have an 
interest both in effective law enforcement and in protecting national security.882  When the party 
subpoenaing the reporter is a private party, that party may have an interest in supporting his civil 
claim, like, for example, a defamation claim.883  If that private party is a defendant in a criminal 
trial, that defendant has an interest in a fair trial and a compulsory process.884 
                                                
877 Id.  
878 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., concurring) (“The 
leak of Plame’s apparent employment . . . had marginal news value.  To be sure, insofar as Plame’s CIA relationship 
may have helped explain her husband's selection for the Niger trip, that information could bear on her husband's 
credibility. . . .  Compared to the damage of undermining covert intelligence-gathering, however, this slight news 
value cannot, in my view, justify privileging the leaker’s identity.”); see also Olverholser, supra note 558 (arguing 
that the information was disclosed to be retributive and not for the sake of informing the public). 
879 See supra notes 535-545 and accompanying text. 
880 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (“Fair and effective law enforcement aimed at 
providing security for the person and property of the individual is a fundamental function of government . . . .”). 
881 Id.  
882 See, e.g., C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) (“The Government has a  compelling interest in 
protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so 
essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service.” (quoting Snepp v. U.S., 444 U.S. 507, 512 
(1980) (per curiam)). 
883 Clyburn v. News World Communications, Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (discussing the plaintiff 
public figure’s need for information in a defamation action); see also Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper 
Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595 (1st Cir. 1980) (“Although the discovery needs of a non-public figure plaintiff are generally 
less than those of a grand jury or a public figure, this is not always true.  Such a plaintiff may be seeking punitive 
damages and thus held to the actual malice burden of proof.  Also, it can be argued that if a plaintiff is not even a 
limited public figure, the public interest in keeping open the flow of information to the press usually diminishes.”). 
884 U.S. v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988) (“At stake on the defendants' side of the 




Just as with a reporter’s interests in protecting his source, not every situation will demand 
the same amount of deference to an asserted governmental interest.  Where the interest is in 
national security, for example, the government may have less of an interest in forcing a journalist 
to reveal the source of relatively trifling information that causes little to no harm to government 
interests than information that could seriously undermine national security.885  Similarly, a 
private party would have less of an interest in forcing a journalist to reveal information that does 
little to help prove the elements of his or her case.886  Moreover, both parties would have little 
interest in confidential source information or reporter work product where that evidence would 
be cumulative of evidence the parties already have.887 
Taking the First Amendment inquiry together with the competing interests inquiry, a 
process emerges to decide whether a First Amendment privilege exists under circumstances of 
any given case.  First, a court must ask whether the subpoena was issued against the journalist 
because of his speech.  If yes, then a court must balance the competing interests.  This approach 
is a “down in the weeds” approach and requires the court to identify the type of information 
published by the reporter.888  Once the type of information is identified, a court, using First 
                                                                                                                                                       
effective confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses under the Sixth Amendment.”); see also, e.g., 
U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 1980) (“The Court has placed particular emphasis on the production of 
evidence in criminal trials.  It has grounded this need for evidence on both the confrontation and compulsory process 
clauses of the sixth amendment and on the due process clause of the fifth amendment.  To protect these 
constitutionally-founded rights, courts must assure that all relevant and admissible evidence is produced.”).   
885 See Freivogel, supra note 597, at 112-14.  
886 See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that “[a] final First 
Amendment consideration, in a case involving a public figure, is that it will often be possible to establish malice or 
lack of malice without disclosure of the identity of the informant”). 
887 See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 417 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding evidence held by a reporter to be 
cumulative where it would weigh on a question already demonstrated by other evidence). 
888 The information being analyzed here is the information that has already been made public in, for example, 
news reports.  That is, courts should ask whether the confidential source’s information disclosed by the reporter was 
valuable information.  Information that was not published normally should not be considered in this calculus, as this 
information is not benefitting the public since it has never been released to the public – nor was it the reason for the 
subpoena in the first place.  Information that has never been released to the public has significantly less First 
Amendment value from the standpoint of the marketplace of ideas, self-governance, and checking value theories.  
Indeed, such information cannot spur social or political change if it is secreted.  At bottom, the concern here is 




Amendment theory, must investigate how valuable the information is to the public.  That value 
judgment should then be weighed against the competing interests.  Just as with the First 
Amendment interests, the court should identify the interests and then determine the weight of 
those interests by appealing to the constitutional or common law that informs those interests. 
Application of One Potential Solution: Risen, the Government, and Newsworthiness 
As an initial matter, it is outside the scope of this thesis to catalog every conceivable First 
Amendment interest that may be at stake in James Risen’s case.  But, a cursory appraisal of this 
case is in order.  It is known that Operation Merlin occurred eight years before Risen ever 
published a word about the botched attempt to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program.889  Risen 
agreed with the government not to publish the information when the government alleged that the 
release of the information might damage U.S. interests.890  It was not until several years later that 
Risen published the information.  According to Risen, he finally decided to publish the 
information “only after [he] realized that U.S. intelligence on Iran’s supposed weapons of mass 
destruction was so flawed, and that the information [he] had was so important, that this was a 
story that the public had to know about before yet another war was launched.”891  Risen went on 
to say, “The story was so old that it could not harm national security, and in fact [he] believe[d 
he had] performed a vitally important public service by exposing the reckless and badly 
mismanaged nature of intelligence on Iran’s efforts to obtain [WMDs].”892 
Having identified the information at stake, it is next necessary to examine the First 
Amendment value of that information.  First, the release of this information no doubt acted as a 
                                                                                                                                                       
Where that result of any single newsgathering process is democratically valuable information, interference with that 
process should be met with a healthy dose of doubt. 
889 See supra note 21-23.  
890 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.  
891 Risen Declaration at 8, U.S. v. Sterling, No. 10-cr-485 (E.D. Va. June 21, 2011) (stating that “Merlin was 
deeply flawed and mismanaged from the start”).  




check on the government, which is of the utmost importance under the checking value and self-
governance theories.893  The information here yielded apparent government ineptitude.894  This 
information is especially important when one takes into account the historical follies of U.S. 
intelligence and WMDs: 
[J]ust as President Bush and his aides were making the case in 2004 and 2005 that 
Iran was moving rapidly to develop nuclear weapons, the American intelligence 
community found itself unable to provide the evidence to back up the 
administration's public arguments. On the heels of the CIA’s failure to provide 
accurate pre-war intelligence on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction, the 
agency was once again clueless in the Middle East.895  
 
Another journalist explained the leak, writing, “Such tales of incompetence coming after the 
fiasco over Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, will raise fresh doubts about the accuracy of 
Western intelligence reports that claim Iran is bent on building nuclear weapons.”896  Obviously 
then this type of information would qualify under the self-governance theory as information 
deserving of protection as this information would inform the citizenry as to the actions of its 
government and allow it to react accordingly.897   
Because the information also discloses incompetence on the part of government officials, 
the information would also be deserving of near full protection under the checking value theory, 
assuming that its disclosure would outweigh the detriments attached to the disclosure.898  
Similarly, it would also deserve a good deal of weight under the liberty theory’s fourth estate 
theory, which like the checking value theory, is also focused on preventing government abuses 
and holds the across-the-board position that any government interference with the press 
                                                
893 Compare note 14 with note 23.  
894 See supra note 18 and 892 and accompanying text.  
895 James Risen, George Bush insists that Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons.  So why, six 
years ago, did the CIA give the Iranians blueprints to build a bomb?, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2006), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2006/jan/05/energy.g2; see also  
896  Anton La Guardia Diplomatic & Alec Russell, CIA bungling ‘may have put nuclear weapons into Iranian 
hands,’ THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 5, 2006, at 19. 
897 See supra notes 199-210 and accompanying text. 




necessarily inhibits the press’s ability to watch the government.899  All of these interests can be 
captured by one scholar’s explanation of the value of national security speech: 
National security information generally can be extremely high value speech, and 
its disclosure to the public often promotes a deliberative democracy.  
Furthermore, to permit the government to restrict any speech that involves 
national security would give the government too much power to hide its actions 
from public scrutiny.  As the Fourth Circuit has said, “[h]istory teaches us how 
easily the spectre of a threat to ‘national security’ may be used to justify a wide 
variety of repressive government actions.”900 
 
The Operation Merlin disclosure also contributes to the marketplace of ideas in several 
ways.  First, it increased the amount of information in the public sphere.901  Second, more 
importantly, it introduced a different narrative into the public sphere that was not being heard 
prior.902  The marketplace of ideas theory is based, in part, on the idea that information is a 
benefit to society, because it requires the continual testing of what the public knows and how 
strongly it believes what it knows is an accurate depiction of the state of things in the world.903  
Not only was the information disclosed by the source in Operation Merlin a different narrative 
but it also ran up against the official narrative, making it especially valuable under the 
marketplace of ideas competition paradigm. 
On the other side of the equation is the government’s asserted interest in nondisclosure.  
According to the government, the disclosure of the information in Risen’s book “could cause 
exceptionally grave damage to national security.”904  The government, however, did not produce 
                                                
899 See supra notes 393-398 and accompanying text. 
900 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security 
Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 278 (2008). 
901 See supra notes 260-270. 
902 This proposition cannot be contested as the information was classified and undisclosed at the time Risen 
disclosed it.  
903  See supra note 288. 




any evidence that such “grave damage” has, in fact, occurred.905  This may be unsurprising, as, in 
the past, “government officials have exaggerated the damage to national security caused by the 
publication of national security secrets.”906  Where no actual damage has occurred or where the 
only asserted damage is the leak itself, the government’s interest is, if anything, limited to the 
enforcement of criminal law relating to the leak itself.907  Moreover, according to the district 
court, the information that the government sought was merely cumulative; as the district court 
explained, “[T]he government already had strong evidence against Sterling and . . . Risen’s 
testimony would simply amount to the icing on the cake.”908 
Weighing the interests at stake, without any actual showing of damage caused to U.S. 
interests and taking into account the importance of information to the public, it would seem that 
the First Amendment scale would tip in favor of Risen.  This is not to dismiss the interests in the 
government in this case, but rather to recognize that where the government’s interest is limited to 
prosecuting the leaker himself, the leak has not caused actual harm to national security, and the 
evidence the government seeks from the reporter in the leaker’s case is cumulative, its interest is 
not compelling.  That relatively weak interest cannot outweigh the important value of the speech 
                                                
905 Cf. New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (finding against the government despite its 
conclusory assertion of a national security interest). 
906 See Freivogel, supra note 597, at 112. 
907 See Langley & Levine, supra note 408, at 48 n.197 (“It is submitted, however, that at least in the context of 
news reports about the government and its operations, the government’s own interest in law enforcement does not 
constitute a compelling justification for subordinating the First Amendment values at stake.” (citing Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1986) (finding that law enforcement interests alone was not cause alone to 
close the courtroom); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) (“The normal method of deterring 
unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it.”); In re Petroleum 
Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1982); (“The necessity for confidentiality, essential to 
fulfillment of the pivotal function of reporters to collect information for public dissemination, cannot be overcome 
simply by suggesting – with no basis to support the assertion-that the reporter may unknowingly have been used by 
those sources in their illegal activities.”). 




at issue.909  Indeed, when the interests are so unbalanced, it is appropriate to find in favor of the 
First Amendment; as Justice Black said in the Pentagon Papers case, “The word ‘security’ is a 
broad, vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law 
embodied in the First Amendment.”910 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are numerous limitations in this thesis.  As an initial matter, it lumped all types of 
reporter’s privilege cases into a same category.  It did not distinguish between reporter’s 
privileges asserted in the cases of subpoenas for work product or for the identities of sources.  
Moreover, it collected both civil and criminal cases, which arguably amounts to comparing 
apples and oranges.  Both of these limitations, however, were purposeful ones.  To date, there 
had been no omnibus study looking at how all courts of appeals’ decisions attempted to deal with 
Branzburg in whatever context.  Moreover, because the underlying rationale – the First 
Amendment – is called into question whether the cases are civil or criminal or seeking work 
product or source identities, there is no apparent reason why such cases should not be considered 
together. 
Perhaps the most damning limitation of this thesis is the lack of data gathered on the use 
of the reporter’s privilege in the district courts.  This thesis did not collect such data.  Although 
numerous reporter’s privilege cases are decided at the district court level, the sheer amount of 
such data rendered it outside of the scope of this thesis.  It should be noted that these opinions are 
less important as they do not carry binding weight.911 
                                                
909  On the other hand, if, for example, the government demonstrated that some harm occurred from the 
publication of Risen’s book – like compromising a covert agent, then, of course, the balance would be much closer 
and would likely tip in favor of the government.  This is not that case, however. 
910 See New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).  




This thesis attempted to show the contradictions among and within the courts of appeals 
when it comes to determining what exactly Branzburg means.  As explained in the Results and in 
the case summaries in Appendix D, the contradictions are many.  The contradictions stem from 
Branzburg itself.  This thesis attempted to move the discussion beyond Branzburg by dispelling 
Branzburg’s logic and illustrating that subsequent case law has redefined when the First 
Amendment is implicated.  Future research should continue on this path of independence from 
Branzburg.  A first step to doing so may be a study of reporter’s privilege cases at the district 
court level.  A second step may be defining, with greater precision, the exact point at which 
indirect interference becomes direct interference with speech.  A third step may be a more 
thorough analysis of how First Amendment theories inform what exactly the word “newsworthy” 
means. 
Alternatively, future research could take a few different approaches.  For example, it may 
be illuminating to view reporter’s privilege jurisprudence from a political perspective.  Is a 
reporter’s privilege more likely to be found when Republican or Democratic appointees are 
sitting?  A majority of states have passed reporter’s shield laws since Branzburg was decided.  
By comparing those statutes with federal case law, some interrelationships between the two may 
help to explain the privilege from a policy perspective. 
Summing Up 
This chapter began by acknowledging and discarding as untenable the courts of appeals’ 
approaches to distinguishing Branzburg.  These approaches were discarded because they ignored 
certain portions of the Branzburg opinion itself or incorrectly described Branzburg as only a 
plurality opinion.  It also explained, perhaps as a result of these less-than-neat attempts to get 




found that once a privilege is established, courts of appeals do not attempt to appeal to First 
Amendment interests, and, instead, place only procedural hurdles in front of the party wishing to 
subpoena the reporter.  Thus, whether the information is important does not enter into a court’s 
analysis aimed at deciding whether a privilege is overcome.  It concludes that this status quo is 
both untenable and confusing.  As a result, it argues that past scholarship finding this climate 
advantageous to journalists was too optimistic.  As such, it argues that a new approach should be 
developed. 
Conscientious of not suggesting fixes based on rationales that the Supreme Court rejected 
in Branzburg, the chapter argues for the natural progression of a strain of newsgathering liability 
cases to capture instances where journalists are served subpoenas.  It does so by first explaining 
that the Court’s approach in Branzburg (that a law of general applicability that only indirectly 
weighs on speech does not implicate the First Amendment) is fundamentally flawed as a result of 
inconsistent and contradictory application of the principle.  In search of a new rule, it then asserts 
that a subpoena issued against a journalist as a result of a journalist’s publication is an action 
adverse to speech that triggers at least some degree of First Amendment protection under the 
Court’s jurisprudence subsequent to Branzburg. 
Having found that the First Amendment is implicated under the Court’s jurisprudence, it 
was next argued that, unlike the courts of appeals’ current approach to balancing interests with a 
procedural hurdle, courts should undertake a true balancing that compares competing interests.  
That is, courts should identify the information that the reporter published and, using First 
Amendment theory, weigh the importance of that information by asking whether it fulfilled 





In the case of Risen, it concluded that the lack of an actual harm and the cumulative 
nature of the information sought were outweighed by the value of the information at stake.  That 
information, which is about government officials and their actions, is valued by all of the 
theories.  Indeed, it lies at the center of at least three theories – and arguably four.  As a result of 





CHAPTER 8.  CONCLUSION 
Outside the grand jury context, Branzburg has done little to inform a discussion of the 
reporter’s privilege and has become the Court’s Gordian Knot.912  Courts of appeals have been 
unable to consistently explain Branzburg or describe its influence outside of the grand jury 
context.  Even those in agreement that a reporter’s privilege does exist under Branzburg cannot 
agree on the rationale for that conclusion.  Exacerbating these problems is academia’s proclivity 
for attempting to (mis)construe what Branzburg said or put forward, just in different words, 
arguments that Branzburg rejected.  This quagmire, although viewed by some to be a good thing, 
is untenable in the long run, and, therefore, must be confronted head on. 
As such, this thesis has taken a different approach than most prior scholarship.  It has 
argued that decisions subsequent to Branzburg fundamentally changed the formula for deciding 
when First Amendment interests are implicated.  More specifically, it has asserted that where the 
government or a private party targets speech as a result of the speech itself and burdens that 
speech, the First Amendment is implicated; whether speech is targeted is determined not by the 
strength of the attack on the speech, but rather ask only whether the government or a private 
party’s actions targeted a journalist’s speech because of the speech itself.  For example, if the 
government subpoenas a reporter for information after the publication of certain information, 
that action alone triggers the First Amendment because the government has acted because of the 
speech itself. 
Once the First Amendment has been triggered, First Amendment interests must be 
calibrated to determine the strength of the reporter’s privilege to keep information confidential.  
                                                
912 Cf. As one former Supreme Court clerk said in another similarly split First Amendment Case, 
“Fragmentation and division are one thing in constitutional jurisprudence; hopeless splintering [among the members 
of the Court] is quite another, and creates consequence ranging from uncertainty to chaos.”  Robert M. O’Neil, A 




In cases where the information lies at the core of the First Amendment, the reporter’s privilege 
should be at its pinnacle.  On the other hand, if the information was published only for 
publication’s sake or has little informative value, the First Amendment interests in the 
information become substantially weaker. 
There is little doubt that the solution offered here is not a perfect one.  Indeed, it requires 
courts to judge whether some disclosure of information was “newsworthy enough” to deserve 
strong First Amendment protection.  This approach will likely lead to varying results based on 
what some judges view to be newsworthy and what some judges do not view as newsworthy.  In 
other instances, however, judges already assess the “newsworthiness” of a situation.913  And, in 
any event, any inconsistency stemming from this approach will occur because of the individual 
factual circumstances of different cases and not because court’s cannot even agree on the legal 
question of whether a reporter’s privilege exists in the first place.  This type of variation is much 
less problematic than the current divergence among courts that results from their inability to 
agree about the legal question itself. 
There is no point to wringing Branzburg for another drop of questionable support for a 
reporter’s privilege.  Instead, courts should recognize that the Supreme Court’s subsequent case 
law has, over four decades, fundamentally eroded the basis of the Branzburg decision that “these 
[reporter’s privilege] cases involve no intrusions upon speech.”914  Once that is recognized, the 
real endeavor – the application of the First Amendment to the facts of each case – can finally be 
undertaken with solicitude for the values underlying the First Amendment – a solicitude that is 
achieved by first identifying the information at stake and then asking whether that information is 
                                                
913 See, e.g., Lluberes v. Uncommon Productions, LLC, 663 F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 2011); Silvester v. Am. Broad. 
Companies, Inc., 839 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1988); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 
1296-97 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing newsworthiness in the context of deciding whether a person is a limited 
purpose public figure). 




important information vis-à-vis the value underlying widely accepted First Amendment theory.  
Once that judgment is made, the First Amendment interests must be weighed against the 
countervailing interests to determine which should prevail.  This should be the job of the courts 
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First Circuit Case Summaries 
Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980) 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Interlocutory appeal. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identities. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Remand. 
 
The Boston Globe published an article about a well-to-do boat manufacturer.  In the 
article, the Globe stated that there were “some thirteen defects observed in one or more of the 
five named boats built by the company.”  After a series of articles, the Globe’s ombudsman 
wrote an article explaining that the subject was “news” and was also “fairly written, but noting 
matters that had come to light that were more favorable to the company and concluding that 
definitive answers were yet to be awaited.” 
 
During discovery, the Globe produced “some 1500 pages in 66 file folders” about the 
report, but withheld “the names of and some information from three sources who were said to 
have given information in the expectation that their identity would be kept in confidence.” 
 
The lower court “relied on Garland v. Torre and adopted its prudential guidelines 
predicating disclosure of a confidential source on criticality of the information sought to 
plaintiff’s claim, non-availability of the information from other sources, and non-frivolousness of 
plaintiff’s cause of action.”  Under these factors, the court required the reporter to identify the 
three remaining unnamed sources. 
 
First, the court found that there was not enough evidence to find that the boat 
manufacturer was a public figure under New York Times v. Sullivan. 
 
Moving onto the confidentiality issue, the court first noted that the confidential sources 
were just a few sources among many.  Next, the court explained that “[n]o specific reasons for 
the basis of the confidentiality claim shielding these two sources appear[ed] in the record.” 
 
The Globe framed its argument as such:  
 
The Globe asserts a conditional privilege on its part to refuse to disclose a 
reporter’s confidential source until the party seeking disclosure establishes 
generally that the public interest in disclosure is compelling enough to override 




showing specifically that (1) the information sought is critical to plaintiff’s claim 
and (2) the information is not available from other sources. 
 
Turning to its analysis, the court first explicitly emphasized that the Supreme Court in 
Branzburg v. Hayes left open whether a reporter’s privilege existed in a defamation case where 
the plaintiff was a private figure.  As the court framed Branzburg, it only “denied such a 
privilege to a reporter called as a grand jury witness in a criminal investigation.”  The importance 
of the grand jury militated against a privilege in that instance. 
 
Addressing the Court’s opinion in Hebert v. Lando, the Court explained that “the Court 
noted the substantial burden upon a public figure to prove ‘the ingredients of malice’ with 
‘convincing clarity.’”  Thus, the Court allowed the plaintiff to pry into the editorial process. 
 
Distinguishing both of these cases, the court explained, “[D]espite this refusal to give 
doctrinal recognition to any automatic, categorical, across-the-board privileges, in neither case 
did the Court suggest the opposite, that the interests underlying the asserted privileges were a 
priori and by definition beyond the pale of any protection.”   
 
The court relied heavily on Justice Powell’s opinions both in Hebert and in Branzburg to 
conclude that “in both cases the First Amendment concerns articulated by the parties asserting 
privileges were in fact taken into consideration.”  It was only “in the contexts of those cases” that 
the Court found those concerns outweighed by countervailing considerations.  The court then 
curiously explained:   
 
Whether or not the process of taking First Amendment concerns into 
consideration can be said to represent recognition by the Court of a “conditional”, 
or “limited” privilege is, we think, largely a question of semantics.  The important 
point for purposes of the present appeal is that courts faced with enforcing 
requests for the discovery of materials used in the preparation of journalistic 
reports should be aware of the possibility that the unlimited or unthinking 
allowance of such requests will impinge upon First Amendment rights. 
 
According to the court, the interests were self-governance ones.  Quoting Alexander 
Bickel, the court noted, “The issue is the public’s right to know.  That right is the reporter’s by 
virtue of the proxy which the freedom of the press clause of the First Amendment gives to the 
press on behalf of the public.”  The court also quoted Justice Powell, who explained that the 
Court’s opinions “reflect[] a concern for the important public interest in a free flow of news and 
commentary.” 
 
The court then adopted the rule that “[i]n determining what, if any, limits should 
accordingly be placed upon the granting of such requests, courts must balance the potential harm 
to the free flow of information that might result against the asserted need for the requested 
information.”  The court explained that it was justified in this view, because “[T]he [Supreme] 
Court is, if anything, more hospitable to this approach than ever . . . .  The Court’s [Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia] reference to a ‘right to gather information’ that ‘without some 




inescapably to point to the kind of constitutionally sensitized balancing process stressed by Mr. 
Justice Powell in both Branzburg and Herbert.” 
 
In the court’s opinion, then, it was its duty to apply its normal discovery rules “with a 
heightened sensitivity to any First Amendment implication that might result from the compelled 
disclosure of sources.”  Under this modified discovery, “The plaintiff must establish relevance of 
the desired information and the defendant has the burden of establishing need for preserving 
confidentiality.” 
 
The court then attended to several pertinent elements.  It concluded that the current claim 
was not frivolous and further concluded that “the desired information appears more than 
remotely relevant.”  As such, the court was left to address “the extent to which there [was] a need 
for confidentiality.”  According to the court, “Not all information as to sources is equally 
deserving of confidentiality.”  That is, some assertions of privilege may be somewhat offhand, 
while others “may specifically condition use on the according of [confidentiality].”  Because the 
record was incomplete, the court ordered a remand: 
 
If the claimed confidentiality seems unsupported, unlikely, or speculative, the 
court may order discovery. If it is in doubt, it may defer resolution of the 
confidentiality issue and turn to the relevance issue. It may, for example, conduct 
an in camera inspection of reporters’ notes. If such notes did not create an 
inference of negligence or suggest leads for developing such evidence, it could 
refuse disclosure. The court might also conclude that disclosure of the sources’ 
names would be most unlikely to lead to relevant evidence.   
 
The court continued: 
 
While obviously the discretion of the trial judge has wide scope, it is a discretion 
informed by an awareness of First Amendment values and the precedential effect 
which decision in any one case would be likely to have. Given the sensitivity of 
inquiry in this delicate area, detailed findings of fact and explanation of the 
decision would be appropriate. 
 
Finally, it concluded that each case required a case-by-case analysis: 
 
It is difficult ... to accept that a reporter’s First Amendment protection should be 
tailored to the whim, to the irrational anxiety, the arbitrary edict, the ideological 
fixation of one or another news source; difficult to accept such a veto over the 
reporter in the pursuit of his profession, or the government in the discharge of its 






U.S. v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988) 
 
Type of Proceeding:   Criminal – Fraud and Conspiracy. 
Stage of Proceeding:   Appeal from pretrial contempt ruling. 
Party Requesting Subpoena:  Defendant. 
Type of Information Sought:  Work product. 
Confidentiality:   No. 
State of Publication:   Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed:  Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?   No. 
 
Lyndon LaRouche was under investigation for mail and wire fraud.  As a result of that 
trial, the district court ordered NBC to turn over the outtakes from a one-hour-and-forty minute 
interview at the behest of one of the defendants.  NBC had only broadcast a minute of the 
interview. 
 
First, the court found that even though the evidence was likely only going to be used to 
impeach a witness, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the requested 
information was relevant. 
 
Next, the court was cognizant of its prior statement that First Amendment concerns 
depended on the facts of each specific case.  According to the court, “This is because disclosure 
of such confidential material would clearly jeopardize the ability of journalists and the media to 
gather information and, therefore, have a chilling effect on speech.” 
 
Turning to the facts of this case, the court first stated that “the identification of First 
Amendment interests is a more elusive task” when “there is no confidential source or 
information at stake.”  According to NBC, there were five separate concerns in this case: 
 
[1] [D]isclosure of outtakes in this case will increase the chances of harassment of 
the interviewee-witness by the LaRouche organization[;] [2] “the threat of 
administrative and judicial intrusion” into the newsgathering and editorial 
process; [3] the disadvantage of a journalist appearing to be “an investigative arm 
of the judicial system” or a research tool of government or of a private party; [4] 
the disincentive to “compile and preserve nonbroadcast material”; [5] and the 
burden on journalists’ time and resources in responding to subpoenas. 
 
The court rejected the first interest, because it believed that interest related to 
confidentiality, which was not promised in this case.  Indeed, the interview subject did appear on 
TV, however briefly. 
 
As to the other concerns, the court found that there was “some merit” to them.  Indeed, it 
“discern[ed] a lurking and subtle threat to journalists and their employers if disclosure of 
outtakes, notes, and other unused information, even if nonconfidential, becomes routine and 
casually, if not cavalierly, compelled.”  At the same time though, it did not believe that 





In fact, it emphasized, citing Justice Powell in Branzburg v. Hayes, that it “certainly . . . 
[did] not hold . . . that state and federal authorities are free to annex the news media as an 
investigative arm of the government.” 
 
The court next considered the defendant’s interests: “At stake on the defendants’ side of 
the equation are their constitutional rights to a fair trial under the Fifth Amendment and to 
compulsory process and effective confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses 
under the Sixth Amendment.”  Citing Branzburg, the court concluded, “[n]o one or all of NBC’s 
asserted First Amendment interests can be said to outweigh these very considerable interests of 
the defendants.” 
 
Although the court refused to overturn the lower court’s order to compel, it stated that its 
decision was limited: 
 
Contrary to NBC’s argument, allowing the production for in camera inspection 
ordered by the district court does not foreshadow allowance of a subpoena in the 
ordinary run of cases.  The factors narrowing our holding are that this is a 
criminal case; the materials sought concern a major witness who was closely 
connected with the defendants in activities that are the subject of their indictment; 
the witness is predictably—from his past testimony—hostile; and the material 





Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Rule 45. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from trial verdict. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Academic investigators. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
Microsoft was under investigation for anti-trust violations.  In connection with that 
investigation, Microsoft made a “motion to compel production of research materials compiled by 
two academic investigators.”  The district court denied its request. 
 
As Microsoft was preparing for its anti-trust trial, it “learned about a forthcoming book . . 
. and obtained a copy of the manuscript.”  The book investigated the “‘browser war’ waged 
between Microsoft and Netscape.”  For the book, the investigators “interviewed over 40 current 
and former Netscape employees.” 
 
Confidentiality was promised.  First, the authors “signed a nondisclosure agreement with 
Netscape.”  Second, the authors “requested and received permission from interview subjects to 
record their discussions, and, in return, promised that each interviewee would be shown any 
quotes attributed to him upon completion of the manuscript, so that he would have a chance . . . 
to object to quotations selected by the authors for publication.” 
 
After receiving the subpoenas, the authors did provide some material.  They did not, 
however, provide any of the “notes, tapes, or transcripts.”  Nonetheless, the district court refused 
to compel the authors to produce the information. 
 
On appeal, Microsoft asserted that “the district court underestimated its need for the 
subpoenaed information.”  It also argued that it could not discover the information except 
through the authors.  On the other hand, the authors argued that turning the information over 
“would endanger the values of academic freedom safeguarded by the First Amendment and 
jeopardize the future information-gathering activities of academic researchers.” 
 
As an initial matter, the court addressed whether the authors’ status as academics as 
opposed to journalists changed the analysis.  The court rejected this assertion out of hand.  As 
“information gatherers,” the academics here were not that different from journalists – except in 
name.  The court elaborated: 
 
Whether the creator of the materials is a member of the media or of the academy, 
the courts will make a measure of protection available to him as long as he 
intended “at the inception of the newsgathering process” to use the fruits of his 





 Moving on to the merits of the privilege, the court explained that “[c]ourts afford 
journalists a measure of protection from discovery initiatives in order not to undermine their 
ability to gather and disseminate information.”  This was the case, because they “are the 
personification of a free press, and to withhold such protection would invite a ‘chilling effect on 
speech,’ . . . and thus destabilize the First Amendment.” 
 
The court next explained, “[l]eaving confidential sources to one side,” it was unsettled 
whether the privilege extended to “information [that] cannot fairly be characterized as 
confidential.”  It did, however, noted that, it had previously explained that “a lurking and subtle 
threat to journalists and their employers if disclosure of outtakes, notes, and other unused 
information, even if nonconfidential, becomes routine and casually, if not cavalierly, compelled.”  
Despite this discussion, the court refused to decide the issue because it accepted the lower court’s 
finding that the information was confidential.  It did nevertheless note that there were degrees of 
confidentiality where a high degree of confidentiality would require greater protection. 
 
Having found the necessary prerequisites, the court again “decline[d] to spend [its] 
energies on semantics” and explained that courts should balance “a myriad of factors . . . 
uniquely drawn out of the factual circumstances of the particular case.”  This occurs after the 
requesting party made a “prima facie showing . . . of need and relevance.” 
 
Turning to the present case, the court found that Microsoft carried its prima facie 
showing.  Turning to the author’s interests, the court found that the interests there were many: 
 
Scholars studying management practices depend upon the voluntary revelations of 
industry insiders to develop the factual infrastructure upon which theoretical 
conclusions and practical predictions may rest. These insiders often lack 
enthusiasm for divulging their management styles and business strategies to 
academics, who may in turn reveal that information to the public. Yet, 
pathbreaking work in management science requires gathering data from those 
companies and individuals operating in the most highly competitive fields of 
industry, and it is in these cutting-edge areas that the respondents concentrate 
their efforts. Their time-tested interview protocol, including the execution of a 
nondisclosure agreement with the corporate entity being studied and the 
furnishing of personal assurances of confidentiality to the persons being 
interviewed, gives chary corporate executives a sense of security that greatly 
facilitates the achievement of agreements to cooperate. Thus, in the Bruno & 
Stillman taxonomy, the interviews are “carefully bargained-for” communications 
which deserve significant protection. 
 
Weighing the interests, the court concluded that “allowing Microsoft to obtain the notes, 
tapes, and transcripts it covets would hamstring not only the respondents’ future research efforts 
but also those of other similarly situated scholars.”  According to the court, this chilling effect 
was “of concern in and of itself.”  More to the point, “compelling the disclosure of such research 
materials would infrigidate the free flow of information to the public, thus denigrating a 





The court concluded by noting that “concern for the unwanted burden thrust upon non-








In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to obstruct justice. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from pretrial contempt ruling. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Special Prosecutor. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
A grand jury was impaneled in a criminal case.  In an effort “to safeguard the on-going 
grand jury investigation . . . and to avoid pretrial publicity that could prejudice the defendants’ 
right to a fair trial,” the court “entered a protective order prohibiting counsel . . . from disclosing 
the contents of audio and video surveillance tapes that had been made by law enforcement.”  
Only the court and the parties’ attorneys had access to the tapes. 
 
Despite the order, a television reporter obtained one of the tapes and aired it.  Thereafter, 
the district court gave a special prosecutor powers to investigate the leak.  The prosecutor 
interviewed fourteen people and, believing that he had no other choice, “sought and received the 
issuance of a subpoena by the court requiring [the reporter] to appear for a deposition.”  The 
reporter invoked his privilege upon questioning.  The district court later charged the reporter 
with civil contempt and “gave him until noon the following day to purge himself of the contempt 
order by answering the questions posed by the special prosecutor, and ordered him to pay a sum 
of $1,000 a day for each day thereafter until he complied.” 
 
After discarding an unrelated argument, the court turned to the First Amendment 
argument.  It began by explaining that “[i]n Branzburg, the Supreme Court flatly rejected any 
notion of a general-purpose reporter’s privilege for confidential sources, whether by virtue of the 
First Amendment or of a newly hewn common law privilege.”  The court then explained that 
“Justice Powell, who wrote separately but joined in the majority opinion as the necessary fifth 
vote, also rejected any general-purpose privilege.” 
 
According to the court, even though there was no grand jury here, Branzburg still 
applied.  The court went on to explain, “What Branzburg left open was the prospect that in 
certain situations-e.g., a showing of bad faith purpose to harass-First Amendment protections 
might be invoked by the reporter.” 
 
Turning to its past case law, the court summarized its cases as requiring “‘heightened 
sensitivity’ to First Amendment concerns and invite a ‘balancing’ of considerations (at least in 
situations distinct from Branzburg).”  Nonetheless, the court rejected these cases’ applicability in 
this instance. 
 





In re Request, 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Foreign criminal investigation. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from dismissal. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Commissioner. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Researcher. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
Boston College (“BC”) was subpoenaed by an Assistant United States Attorney acting as 
a “commissioner.”  The attorney was appointed to “effectuate a request from law enforcement 
authorities in the United Kingdom” under a U.S. statute and a treaty between the United States 
and the United Kingdom.   
 
The attorney sought “oral history recordings and associated documentation from 
interviews BC researchers had conducted with two former members of the Irish Republican 
Army.”  The college released the records relating to one of the two members because that 
member had died and, therefore, no longer had a “confidentiality interest[].”  The college made a 
motion to quash the second subpoena, however.  Another “set of subpoenas issued [later] . . . 
sought any information related to the [death of an alleged British informer of the IRA] contained 
in any other interview materials held by BC.”  The college made motions to quash this subpoena 
and the remaining first subpoena.  The district court denied the college’s motions. 
 
Thereafter, the researchers – apart from the college – filed an action in the district court 
to prevent the execution of the subpoenas.  It is this separate action that the court’s opinion 
actually concerns.  The district court dismissed the researchers’ case. 
 
Turning to the researchers’ motions to quash, the court affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the researchers’ case.  According to the court, it was “required to do [so] by 
Branzburg v. Hayes”: “Our analysis is controlled by Branzburg, which held that the fact that 
disclosure of the materials sought by a subpoena in criminal proceedings would result in the 
breaking of a promise of confidentiality by reporters is not by itself a legally cognizable First 
Amendment or common law injury.” 
 
The court then noted that, in its view, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., University of 
Pennsylvania v. EEOC, and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily all affirmed the Court’s “basic principles” 
enunciated in Branzburg. 
 
According to the court, Branzburg explained that “the strong interests in law enforcement 
precluded the creation of a special rule granting reporters a privilege [that] other citizens [did] 





The court distinguished between its past criminal cases where it upheld orders holding 
journalists in contempt, and its civil cases where it did not because “the government and public’s 
strong interest in investigation of crime was not an issue.” 
 
The court further refused to find that the absence of a grand jury in this case could 
distinguish Branzburg.  Instead, it looked to the law enforcement interest: “The law enforcement 
interest here—a criminal investigation by a foreign sovereign advanced through treaty 
obligations—is arguably even stronger than the government’s interest in Branzburg itself.” 
 
Next, the court also rejected any suggestion that a chilling effect required a finding that 
the researchers should not be compelled to hand over the information sought, because 








 Second Circuit Case Summaries 
Baker v. F and F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Denial of constitutional rights. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Discovery. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Editor. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
A group of African Americans brought a lawsuit alleging “that defendants sold homes at 
excessive prices by engaging in racially discriminatory practices.”  During discovery, the 
plaintiffs deposed the editor of the Columbia Journalism Review who had written an article 
about similar practices and also used a confidential source who was given a fake name.  Unlike 
many reporters, “it was apparent that [the editor] was highly sympathetic to appellants’ cause 
and was anxious to cooperate.” 
 
Although the editor offered to “verify” the information in his article, he refused to 
identify the source in his article and invoked his First Amendment right to “gather information.”  
Thereafter, the plaintiffs sought to compel him to testify.  The district court denied the motion.  
The plaintiffs appealed. 
 
Pointing to the recently decided opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, the court began by 
explaining that “[a]lthough it is safe to conclude . . . that federal law does not recognize an 
absolute or conditional journalist’s testimonial ‘privilege’, neither does federal law require 
disclosure of confidential sources in each and every case, both civil and criminal, in which the 
issue is raised.”   
 
Because Branzburg had not been decided when the question was at the district court, the 
district court judge relied on several state laws regarding privileges: 
 
New York and Illinois State law, while not conclusive in an action of this kind, 
reflect a paramount public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive 
and independent press capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over 
controversial matters, an interest which has always been a principal concern of the 
First Amendment. 
 
The court further explained that “[c]ompelled disclosure of confidential sources 
unquestionably threatens a journalist’s ability to secure information that is made available to him 
only on a confidential basis-and the district court so found.”  As such, requiring a journalist to 





And, of course, on the other side of the equation was the public’s important interest in criminal 
justice.  According to the court, this interest was not, however, determinative: 
 
While we recognize that there are cases-few in number to be sure-where First 
Amendment rights must yield, we are still mindful of the preferred position which 
the First Amendment occupies in the pantheon of freedoms. Accordingly, though 
a journalist’s right to protect confidential sources may not take precedence over 
that rare overriding and compelling interest, we are of the view that there are 
circumstances, at the very least in civil cases, in which the public interest in non-
disclosure of a journalist’s confidential sources outweighs the public and private 
interest in compelled testimony. The case before us is one where the First 
Amendment protection does not yield. 
 
Moving to the plaintiffs’ arguments, the court first found that neither Garland v. Torre 
nor Branzburg v. Hayes were controlling.  Garland did not control because the information the 
source sought in this case was not shown to be “necessary, much less critical, to the maintenance 
of their civil rights action.”  Branzburg, according to the court, was “only of tangential relevance 
to this [civil] case.”  As far as the court could tell, “The [Supreme] Court in Branzburg . . . 
applied traditional First Amendment doctrine . . . and found . . . an overriding interest in the 
investigation of crime by the grand jury which ‘[secure[d]] the safety of the person and property 
of the citizen’” that outweighed the First Amendment rights.  The court also emphasized Justice 
Powell’s concurring opinion and found that “even in criminal proceedings” a court should weigh 
the interests.  In sum, “the Court’s concern with the integrity of the grand jury as an investigating 
arm of the criminal justice system distinguishes Branzburg from the case presently before us.” 
 
The court ended its affirmance with an appeal to the First Amendment’s underlying 
values: 
 
It is axiomatic, and a principle fundamental to our constitutional way of life, that 
where the press remains free so too will a people remain free. Freedom of the 
press may be stifled by direct or, more subtly, by indirect restraints. Happily, the 
First Amendment tolerates neither, absent a concern so compelling as to override 
the precious rights of freedom of speech and the press. We find no such 





In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Antitrust. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from contempt judgment. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Several plaintiff states. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identities and work product. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Publishing company. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
Several states brought an antitrust action against several oil companies for allegedly 
conspiring “to fix the prices of refined oil products.”  The states “[b]eliev[ed] that the conspiracy 
may have been facilitated by communications to and from trade publications, the States on May 
1, 1980 caused a subpoena duces tecum to be served upon Platt’s Oilgram Price Service, a 
division of McGraw-Hill, Inc.”  McGraw-Hill refused to produce the requested documents, 
arguing that it did not have to under the First Amendment.  The district court ordered McGraw-
Hill to comply with the subpoena, and McGraw-Hill appealed after being held in contempt. 
 
The court began by noting that 
 
[t]he law in this Circuit is clear that to protect the important interests of reporters 
and the public in preserving the confidentiality of journalists’ sources, disclosure 
may be ordered only upon a clear and specific showing that the information is: [1] 
highly material and relevant, [2] necessary or critical to the maintenance of the 
claim, and [3] not obtainable from other available sources. 
 
It also emphasized Branzburg v. Hayes’ narrow holding, citing Justice Powell’s 
concurrence, which, as the majority-making concurrence, was “particularly important in 
understanding the decision.”  Specifically, the court cited Justice Powell explaining that “if the 
newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to 
the subject of the investigation . . . he will have access to the court on a motion to quash.” 
 
Moving to the facts of this case, the court found that the confidential sources’ identities 
“bear[ed] at most a tenuous and speculative relationship to [the] antitrust claims.”  Although the 
states argued that the companies communicated the prices by taking advantage of reporters, the 
court found that such a claim was not found in the states’ original pleading: “This critical 
omission is compounded by the complete failure of the States to present any evidence indicating 
that the involvement of [McGraw-Hill] in fact occurred.” 
 
In reversing the lower court’s contempt motion, the court emphasized, “The necessity for 
confidentiality, essential to fulfillment of the pivotal function of reporters to collect information 
for public dissemination, cannot be overcome simply by suggesting-with no basis to support the 
assertion-that the reporter may unknowingly have been used by those sources in their illegal 





The court also found it important that the states did not seek the information from 
alternative sources.  Although “hundreds of depositions have already been taken, there is no 
indication that anyone was asked the simple question “Have you ever communicated pricing 
information to [McGraw-Hill publications]?” 
 
Lastly, the court rejected the idea that the importance of antitrust laws automatically 
vitiate the privilege: “Although it is true that the Sherman Act represents Congress’s strong 







U.S. v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Racketeering. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Post-trial appeal. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendants. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Magazine company. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
A college basketball player agreed to fix games for money in connection with a scheme 
intended to maximize gambling earnings.  After the scheme was tested and failed, the backers of 
the scheme sought to have more players involved to ensure the system would work.  While the 
scheme worked for some time, the head of the scheme was eventually arrested on other charges 
and revealed the inner-workings of the exploit in exchange for leniency.  Everyone involved was 
convicted. 
 
On appeal from their convictions for their role in the point-shaving scheme, the 
defendants argued that Sport Illustrated, which published an article by one of the main organizers 
of the scheme and a reporter, should have been required to respond to its subpoena which sought 
“production of virtually every document and tape in the possession of SI that in any way related 
to the . . . article.”  The district court had granted Sports Illustrated’s motion to quash as the 
defendants had an opportunity to question the main organizer on the stand.  More specifically, 
“The court noted that the only important evidentiary purpose served by production of these 
documents, i.e., impeaching the credibility of [the main organizer], did not defeat [the Sports 
Illustrated reporter’s] First Amendment privilege.”  This was the case, because the main 
organizer was already “thoroughly impeached at trial.” 
 
Citing Baker v. F & F Investment, the court began by noting that the privilege in the civil 
context was “well settled”:  “This demanding burden has been imposed by the courts to ‘reflect a 
paramount public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press 
capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters, an interest which 
has always been a principal concern of the First Amendment.’” 
 
Then, the court importantly held that it did not view the criminal context any differently 
than it viewed the civil context with respect to the reporter’s privilege.  “We see no legally-
principled reason for drawing a distinction between civil and criminal cases when considering 
whether the reporter’s interest in confidentiality should yield to the moving party’s need for 
probative evidence.”  Although the criminal defendant’s interests may be greater in a criminal 
case, that was not enough: “[T]he important social interests in the free flow of information that 
are protected by the reporter’s qualified privilege are particularly compelling in criminal cases.  
Reporters are to be encouraged to investigate and expose, free from unnecessary government 





As the court had recognized previously without a written opinion, “[W]hat is required is a 
case by case evaluation and balancing of the legitimate competing interests of the newsman’s 
claim to First Amendment protection from forced disclosure of his confidential sources, as 
against the defendant’s claim to a fair trial which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” 
 
Turning to those interests in this case, the court found that the “appellant ha[d] 
completely failed to make the clear and specific showing that these documents were necessary . . 
. to the maintenance of his defense.”  This was especially the case where the main purpose of the 





von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987). 
  
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Racketeering, among other things. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from contempt order. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiffs. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Book author. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
The book author was an “intimate friend” of the patriarch of the von Bulow family.  von 
Bulow was, at one time, tried for the murder of his wife multiple times, but was never convicted.  
As part of the suit by Martha von Bulow and her children, the plaintiffs here, the plaintiffs 
subpoenaed the author.  They asked for the author “to testify and to produce certain documents at 
her deposition.”  Included in those documents was “‘any book being written’ about the von 
Bulow matter.” 
 
The author did turn over to the court several documents and notes.  She refused, however, 
to turn over her draft of her book.  The district court held a show cause hearing to discuss 
whether the author should be held in contempt.  The author argued that she was protected by “the 
journalist’s privilege along with ‘any other privilege that exists under the sun.’”  To bolster her 
claim, she produced several press passes and “asserted that she ‘was acting as a writer’ for the 
German magazine Stern, that she had ‘drafted’ an article about von Bulow that had appeared in 
Stern, and that she had supplied a German editor with a ‘long’ article on von Bulow.” 
 
Noting the misrepresentations of her claims – some of which were not true – the district 
court found that the author was not actually “involved actively in the gathering and 
dissemination of news.”  Nonetheless, the court did negotiate a “confidentiality order” to protect 
the author’s interest in the unpublished manuscript.  When the author still did not produce the 
manuscript, it held the author in contempt. 
 
Turning to the law, the court, as usual, emphasized that “testimonial exclusionary 
privileges are not favored.”  With that understanding, it framed the question as “whether one 
who gathers information initially for a purpose other than traditional journalistic endeavors and 
who later decides to author a book using such information may then invoke the First Amendment 
to shield the production of the information and the manuscript.” 
 
Beginning its analysis, the court reiterated its previously created test: 
 
First, the process of newsgathering is a protected right under the First 
Amendment, albeit a qualified one. This qualified right, which results in the 
journalist’s privilege, emanates from the strong public policy supporting the 
unfettered communication of information by the journalist to the public. Second, 
whether a person is a journalist, and thus protected by the privilege, must be 




process. Third, an individual successfully may assert the journalist’s privilege if 
he is involved in activities traditionally associated with the gathering and 
dissemination of news, even though he may not ordinarily be a member of the 
institutionalized press. Fourth, the relationship between the journalist and his 
source may be confidential or nonconfidential for purposes of the privilege. Fifth, 
unpublished resource material likewise may be protected. 
 
Next, the court briefly discussed Branzburg v. Hayes, explaining that the Supreme Court 
“held that a journalist does not have an absolute privilege under the First Amendment to refuse to 
appear and testify before a grand jury to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the 
commission of crime.”  Despite this, the court was quick to add that “a qualified privilege may 
be proper in some circumstances because newsgathering was not without First Amendment 
protection.” 
 
Moving to its own case law, it interpreted Baker v. F & F Investment to hold “that the 
public interest in non-disclosure of a journalist’s confidential sources outweighed the public and 
private interest in compelled testimony.”  The court so held because of the concern for the free 
flow of information gathered during investigative reporting.   
 
Based on this, the court explained that “[t]his rationale suggests that the critical question 
in determining if a person falls within the class of persons protected by the journalist’s privilege 
is whether the person, at the inception of the investigatory process, had the intent to disseminate 
to the public the information obtained through the investigation.”  Indeed, “[a] person who 
gathers information for personal reasons, unrelated to dissemination of information to the public, 
will not be deterred from undertaking his search simply by rules which permit discovery of that 
information in a later civil proceeding.”  Simply, the rationale of Baker required that the person 
invoking the privilege intended to engage in newsgathering from the outset. 
 
The court next reviewed several cases from other circuits and the New York shield law, 
which it found all supported the proposition that “the individual claiming the privilege must 
demonstrate, through competent evidence, the intent to use material-sought, gathered or 
received-to disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception of 
the newsgathering process.” 
 
Thus, what was important, the court thought, was the function that the person claiming 
the privilege was serving; “[t]he intended manner of dissemination may be by newspaper, 
magazine, book, public or private broadcast medium, handbill or the like, for ‘[t]he press in its 
historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of 
information and opinion.’” 
 
Turning to the facts of this case, the court did not find the investigative reports possessed 
by the author were privileged because she admitted that they were not complied in the first 
instance for reportage.  The same could be said for the notes sought. 
 
As to the manuscript, the court also found it discoverable because the book was simply 




manuscript was not public information, the court found that the later attempt to protect those 
memories from being divulged by placing them in book form was futile.  Despite the assertions 
from the author that some confidential sources were used in that manuscript, the court did not 
believe that she presented enough evidence to prove the point.  The court concluded, “Since [the 
author] gathered information initially for purposes other than to disseminate information to the 
public, we decline to serve as a judicial seamstress to alter the protective cloak of the First 





United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Contempt. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from contempt order. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff and defendant. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished and published.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporters and broadcasters. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
A lawyer violated a court order that prohibited the dissemination of information to the 
media when that information concerned pending criminal cases, if the information could 
compromise the trial.  When a lawyer violated this order, the judge appointed a special 
prosecutor to investigate.  As part of that investigation, both the government and the defendant 
issued subpoenas to the media parties who interviewed the defendant.  After receiving the 
subpoenas, the reporters and broadcasters made a motion to quash the subpoenas, asserting their 
First Amendment rights.  The trial judge agreed to limit the subpoenas but refused to quash the 
subpoenas in their entirety.  The reporters still refused to comply and were held in contempt. 
 
The court began by reviewing its “guiding precedent[,]” United States v. Burke.  In that 
case, the court had quashed a subpoena in a criminal matter.  Turning to Branzburg v. Hayes, the 
court noted that it only made “indirect” reference to that case in Burke.  It also found that 
Branzburg “explicitly declined to create a reporter’s privilege ‘by interpreting the First 
Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.’”  On the 
other hand, the court did note that Justice Powell’s opinion seemed to add a gloss to the majority: 
 
Justice Powell concurred in the majority opinion, but also wrote a separate 
concurring opinion in which he emphasized that reporters would have judicial 
protection against grand jury investigations that were “not being conducted in 
good faith,” sought “information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship 
to the subject of the investigation,” or called for the disclosure of “confidential 
source relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement.” 
 
The court went on to explain that “[w]hatever the doctrinal considerations, we must 
certainly follow Branzburg when fact patterns parallel to Branzburg are presented for our 
decision.”  That was this case because the reporter in Branzburg had refused to testify as to the 
criminal conduct that he witnessed, just as the reporters were doing here.  Therefore, Branzburg 
required that the reporters testify. 
 
Moreover, the information was also being sought by the source himself: “Cutler is clearly 
entitled to examine the Reporters regarding the context, background, and content of those 
statements, and to scrutinize their relevant unpublished notes . . . , as well as the Outtakes in the 
possession of the TV Stations, to defend against the charge that his statements were criminally 
contemptuous.”  Indeed, where the source himself wants the information revealed, the privilege 




Gonzales v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Denial of constitutional rights. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from contempt order. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiffs. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Broadcaster. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
The plaintiff brought a civil suit against the Louisiana Deputy Sheriff for a violation of 
his Fourth Amendment rights.  Relatedly, NBC investigated and aired a broadcast about abuses 
within Louisiana police departments.  As part of the investigation, NBC outfitted a car with 
video cameras and travelled Louisiana in hopes that the police would pull the car over.  The car 
was eventually pulled over despite the reporters not violating the law; “[t]he actual video images 
broadcast in the report, however, showed only a few brief clips of the car in motion, as well as 
footage of [the officer] pulling over the vehicle and examining the currency compartment of a 
passenger’s wallet.”  The officer in the video was the same officer who pulled over the plaintiff. 
 
As part of his lawsuit, Gonzales subpoenaed NBC asking for “the original, unedited 
camera footage” from the broadcast.  The officer also served NBC with a subpoena.  NBC 
refused to comply with the subpoenas, asserting its privilege.  When NBC refused to comply 
after the district court granted the motions to compel, it was held in contempt. 
 
The court began by reviewing its precedent in Baker v. F & F Investment.  There, the 
court explained that the court recognized a privilege “grounded . . . in a broader concern for the 
potential harm to the ‘paramount public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and 
independent press capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial 
matters.’”  It characterized a subsequent case, In re Petroleum Products, as reinforcing the idea 
that a reporter’s privilege was necessary “to protect the important interests of reporters and the 
public in preserving the confidentiality of journalists’ sources, disclosure may be ordered only.” 
 
Although the court’s prior cases had focused on confidential information, the court also 
recognized that “subsequent decisions of this court have repeatedly stated that the privilege also 
extends to nonconfidential materials, and have enforced the privilege in that context.”  Citing 
United States v. Burke, the court noted, “It was clear that the privileged materials included (and 
indeed may have consisted entirely of) information not received by the publisher in confidence, 
as the ‘source’ of the information was the author of the article.”   
 
After summarizing these cases and others, the court concluded that it had never 
“expressed in detail the reasons for applying the journalists’ privilege to nonconfidential 
materials.”  These cases did, however, “impl[y] that there were also broader concerns 
undergirding the qualified privilege for journalists.”  These concerns included “the ‘pivotal 




interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press capable of 
participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters.’”   
 
The court found the protection of even nonconfidential information important: 
 
If the parties to any lawsuit were free to subpoena the press at will, it would likely 
become standard operating procedure for those litigating against an entity that had 
been the subject of press attention to sift through press files in search of 
information supporting their claims.  The resulting wholesale exposure of press 
files to litigant scrutiny would burden the press with heavy costs of subpoena 
compliance, and could otherwise impair its ability to perform its duties-
particularly if potential sources were deterred from speaking to the press, or 
insisted on remaining anonymous, because of the likelihood that they would be 
sucked into litigation.  Incentives would also arise for press entities to clean out 
files containing potentially valuable information lest they incur substantial costs 
in the event of future subpoenas.  And permitting litigants unrestricted, court-
enforced access to journalistic resources would risk the symbolic harm of making 
journalists appear to be an investigative arm of the judicial system, the 
government, or private parties. 
 
Nonetheless, the court still noted that the privilege for nonconfidential information was 
not as strong for the privilege for confidential information.  As such, the court fashioned a 
narrower test for the protections of nonconfidential information: 
 
Where a civil litigant seeks nonconfidential materials from a nonparty press 
entity, the litigant is entitled to the requested discovery notwithstanding a valid 
assertion of the journalists’ privilege if he can show that the materials at issue [1] 
are of likely relevance to a significant issue in the case, and [2] are not reasonably 
obtainable from other available sources. 
 






U.S. v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal  – Conspiracy to remove aircraft parts. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from district court verdict. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Book author. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
Two individuals, one with access to the collected debris from a plane crash, collaborated 
to have the individual remove some of the debris.  The results of the other individual’s 
investigation, including information he learned from the removed debris, ended up in a book.  A 
newspaper noted that the book author, “through a confidential source, had obtained samples of 
residue from the wreckage.” 
 
A grand jury was convened.  The United States “offered to enter into a non-prosecution 
agreement with [the book author] in exchange for the disclosure of his confidential source.”  He 
declined to name his source.  Eventually the government discovered who the individual on the 
inside was and that individual agreed to testify against the book author – as well as the book 
author’s wife, who was also implicated. 
 
On appeal, the book author argued that the prosecution against him and his wife was 
vindictive and motivated by the book author’s refusal to disclose his source.  More specifically, 
the author argued that the court “should adopt a balancing test weighing ‘the governmental 
interest served by prosecution’ against ‘the detrimental impact of permitting such a prosecution 
to be used as a means of coercing disclosure of a journalist’s source.’” 
 
The court refused to do so: “Baker [v. F & F Investments] (and its progeny) involved the 
power of a court to supervise its own compulsory discovery processes, whereas the case here 
involves the power of a prosecutor to decide when and on what terms to bring charges against a 
defendant.”  In this context, the court found “that no journalist’s privilege is applicable.” 
 
Indeed, the court deferred to the prosecutor’s discretion: “In our system, so long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by 
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand 
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”  Moreover, “the First Amendment erects no 
absolute bar against government attempts to coerce disclosure of a confidential news source, nor 
does it invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of 
civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.” 
 
The court concluded, “[T]he defendants have not shown that the prosecution was leveled 
with actual vindictiveness . . . .  To the contrary, the prosecution acted forthrightly in . . . offering 
[the defendants] immunity if they would identify the person . . . who violated a federal criminal 




The New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal  – Disclosure of classified material. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from grant of motion for declaratory judgment. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Government. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporters. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
Two New York Times reporters discovered that the government planned to search two 
organizations in connection with the 9/11 attacks.  When the government found out that the 
Times reporters new of the impending searches, it convened a grand jury.  As part of that grand 
jury, it sought the phone records of the reporters.  The reporters refused, and the government 
threatened to obtain the records from third parties.  As a result, the reporters sought a judgment 
from a district court.  The district court held that the government defeated the reporter’s 
privilege. 
 
First, the court found that even though the telephone records it sought were possessed by 
a third party the reporters could assert the privilege.  Next, it noted that the phone records did not 
simply reveal phone numbers, but rather were “a first step of an inquiry into the identity of the 
reporters’ source(s).”  The court also explained that while the government only sought the 
identity of the sources in relation to the current story, the production of the phone records would 
nonetheless reveal “the reporters’ sources on matters not relevant to the investigation at hand.”   
 
Turning to the legal analysis relating to the common law privilege, the court found that it 
was unnecessary to determine whether a privilege existed because even if it did, the privilege 
would be a qualified one that would be overcome in this case.  In short, the court gave credence 
to the argument that “[t]he government has a compelling interest in maintaining the secrecy of 
imminent asset freezes or searches lest the targets be informed and spirit away those assets or 
incriminating evidence.”  More specifically, the court found that both the need to keep law 
enforcement activities secret, but “also . . . [the] informing the targets of those [activities] . . . 
may constitute a serious obstruction of justice.” 
 
Moreover, the court found that the information sought was critical to the government’s 
case.  Indeed, “as the recipients of the disclosures, [the reporters] are the only witnesses . . . 
available to identify the conversations in question and to describe the circumstances of the 
leaks.”  The reporters were not benign either.  Indeed, they themselves were the ones who called 
the organizations to ask for a comment about the impending raids.  As a result, “[t]here [was] 
simply no substitute for the evidence they have.” 
 
The court also found that the sources who may appear in the phone records who were not 
part of the current situation could be protected by simple redaction of those phone numbers.  As 
such, the court concluded, “There is therefore a clear showing of a compelling governmental 




knowledge, and a clear showing of need.”  The court was quick to add, however, that its decision 
applied only to the facts of this case and that while it believed that the government’s assertion 
that it had exhausted all other alternatives to achieve the information was enough here, it “in no 
way suggest[ed] that such a showing would be adequate in a case involving less compelling 
facts.” 
 
The court seemed especially concerned with the reporters conduct in the case: contacting 
the targets of the search: “We see no danger to a free press in so holding.  Learning of imminent 
law enforcement asset freezes/searches and informing targets of them is not an activity essential, 
or even common, to journalism.” 
 
Turning to the First Amendment argument, the court declined to revisit its prior cases as 
none involved facts similar to this case.  Instead, it simply held that because Branzburg v. Hayes 





Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil and Criminal. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from grant of motion for declaratory judgment. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiffs. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Documentary Filmmaker. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
Joseph Berlinger was a documentary filmmaker who made a documentary about 
environmental abuses by large oil companies.  The film detailed litigation relating to the abuses 
taking place in Ecuador.  As part of the litigation, which included both a civil suit and a criminal 
suit against certain officials, the district court order Berlinger to turn over his raw film sought by 
the plaintiffs in an Ecuadorian suit against an oil company sought.  For “three years[] Berlinger 
shadowed the plaintiffs’ lawyers and filmed ‘the events and people surrounding the trial,’ 
compiling six hundred hours of raw footage.” 
 
The court began its discussion by explaining that the qualified privilege Berlinger was 
claiming was “intended to protect the public’s interest in being informed by ‘a vigorous, 
aggressive and independent press.”  That privilege “is at its highest when the information sought 
to be protected was acquired by the journalist through a promise of confidentiality.”  Of course, 
the privilege also exists even when the information sought to be protected is nonconfidential, 
although this information is not protected as strenuously as confidential information: 
 
We have observed, even where there was no issue of betrayal of a promised 
confidence, that “wholesale exposure of press files to litigant scrutiny would 
burden the press with heavy costs of subpoena compliance, and could otherwise 
impair its ability to perform its duties—particularly if potential sources were 
deterred from speaking to the press, or insisted on remaining anonymous, because 
of the likelihood that they would be sucked into litigation.”  We have noted, 
furthermore, that unrestricted litigant access to press files would create socially 
wasteful incentives for press entities “to clean out files containing potentially 
valuable information lest they incur substantial costs” of subpoena compliance, 
and would risk “the symbolic harm of making journalists appear to be an 
investigative arm of the judicial system, the government, or private parties.” 
 
Next, the court discussed who could claim the privilege:  
 
For determining the existence, or in any event the strength, of the press privilege, 
all forms of intention to publish or disseminate information are not on equal 
footing. While freedom of speech and of the press belongs to virtually anyone 
who intends to publish anything (with a few narrow exceptions), all those who 
intend to publish do not share an equal entitlement to the press privilege from 




have been commissioned to publish in order to serve the objectives of others who 
have a stake in the subject of the reporting are not acting as an independent press. 
Those who do not retain independence as to what they will publish but are 
subservient to the objectives of others who have a stake in what will be published 
have either a weaker privilege or none at all. 
 
This was the crux of the matter for the court.  As the court said, “An undertaking to 
publish matter in order to promote the interests of another, regardless of justification, does not 
serve the same public interest [as objective, independent reporting], regardless of whether the 
resultant work may prove to be one of high quality.”  Because the film was essentially requested 
to be filmed on behalf of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit in Ecuador, the filmmaker was not 





U.S. v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Securities fraud. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from grant of motion for declaratory judgment. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
The defendant was charged with securities fraud when he backdated stock options.  
During his trial, the government subpoenaed a reporter who had written an article about the 
defendant’s alleged involvement in the backdated scheme as the article quoted the defendant.  
According to the government, the statements made by the defendant to the reporter “were made 
in furtherance of the conspiracy, showed his consciousness of guilt, and demonstrated his 
knowledge of the stock option process at [the company].”   
 
The reporter made a motion to quash the subpoena.  Although the district court did not 
grant the reporter’s motion, it did “tightly limit” the testimony the reporter would have to give.  
At trial, the court only allowed both the government and the defendant to ask the reporter 
specific questions.  On appeal, the defendant argued that that approach was improper, because it 
violated his Confrontation Clause rights. 
 
The court began by explaining that the law of the circuit was that reporters did have a 
privilege – at least in civil cases.  Next, the court recognized that the information at stake was not 
obtained under confidentiality.  Indeed, “not only was [the reporter] not protecting any 
confidential material or source, he sought to withhold evidence that his source[, the defendant,] 
desired be disclosed.”  As a result, the privilege, the court found, was less forceful.  In such a 
case, the party seeking the information only had to show that “the materials at issue are of likely 
relevance to a significant issue in the case[] and are not reasonably obtainable from other 
available sources.”  It further held that this test was the same in both criminal and civil cases no 
matter who sought the subpoena. 
 
Turning to the facts of the case, the court found that the district court did not err in 
limiting the government’s questioning of the reporter.  As to the same actions directed against 
the defendant, however, the court found that the court did err.  This was the case, because it 
impermissibly limited the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights: 
 
The only privilege [the reporter] possessed in this case was the qualified Gonzales 
privilege, and the question before the district court during cross-examination was 
the same as on direct examination, namely, whether the answers defense counsel 
sought were of “likely relevance to a significant issue in the case, [and] not 





Third Circuit Case Summaries 
Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Denial of constitutional rights. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from contempt. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identities. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?:  Yes. 
 
An action was filed in federal court arguing that several city officials violated the 
constitutional rights of the plaintiff-candidate for office.  According to the plaintiff, the city 
officials kept him under surveillance and investigated his “performance of duties as a [city] 
policeman.”  The plaintiff also testified that “there were leaks to the press with respect to internal 
investigations conducted by the Police Department after he had become a candidate for mayor, 
that the newspaper articles . . . contained some inaccurate information, [and that he never 
authorized . . . [the] release [of] such information.” 
 
At a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff called a reporter to 
testify.  When the plaintiff asked for the source of her information, the reporter refused to answer 
the question, asserting a First Amendment interest.  As a result, the court held the reporter in 
contempt.   
 
Thereafter, the plaintiff also questioned the police department’s inspector, but he did not 
ask the inspector the names of “any of the other persons who had access to the files regarding 
[the] investigations.”  The plaintiff also questioned another reporter who named her sources, 
although those sources were named in her article as well.  The plaintiff also called the mayor to 
testify, and the mayor admitted to talking with reporters.  Another witness, who was also a 
reporter, also testified that the mayor was his source and that such was noted in his article.  
Finally, another reporter called to testify explained that he also used the mayor for his source. 
 
After this testimony, the defendants asked the judge to dismiss the motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  The judge refused to do so, however, without first hearing from the 
reporter who refused to testify.  The circuit court reversed the lower court and, thereafter, issued 
this opinion. 
 
The court began by explaining that under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, it could 
recognize a privilege as part of federal common law.  Turning to Branzburg v. Hayes, the court 
found that the Supreme Court “acknowledged the existence of First Amendment protection for 
‘newsgathering.’”   The court agreed: 
 
The interrelationship between newsgathering, news dissemination and the need 




A journalist’s inability to protect the confidentiality of sources s/he must use will 
jeopardize the journalist’s ability to obtain information on a confidential basis. 
 
According to the court, this state of affairs would “seriously erode the essential role 
played by the press in the dissemination of information and matters of interest and concern to the 
public.”  Moreover, “[t]he roll of ‘an untrammeled press as a vital source of public information,’ 
was one of the primary bases for its First Amendment protection.”  As far as the court could see, 
“the press was to serve the governed, not the governors[, and t]he press was protected so that it 
could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.” 
 
Taking this into account, the court found that Branzburg limitation was not controlling in 
this case, because this case had nothing to do with “appear[ing] and testify[ing] before a grand 
jury to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime.”  
 
Having distinguished Branzburg, the court held that “[t]he strong public policy which 
supports the unfettered communication to the public of information, comment and opinion and 
the Constitutional dimension of that policy . . . lead us to conclude that journalists have a federal 
common law privilege, albeit qualified.” 
 
The court also found support for such a holding in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
holding that “important information, tips and leads will dry up and the public will often be 
deprived of the knowledge of dereliction of public duty. . . , unless newsmen are able to Fully 
and completely protect the sources of their information.” 
 
Despite these concerns, the court also found that often compelling interests on the other 
side of the calculus would be present.  These interests would require a court to make an “Ad 
hoc” determination as to which interests should prevail. 
 
Turning to this case, the court explained, “When a privilege is grounded in constitutional 
policy, a ‘demonstrated, specific need for evidence’ must be shown before it can be overcome.”  
As such, the court held that it must “balance on one hand the policies which give rise to the 
privilege and their applicability to the facts . . . against the need for the evidence.” 
 
First, the court explained what this case was not: 
 
[1] This is not a case where the reporter witnessed events which are the subject of 
grand jury investigations into criminal conduct.  [2] This is not a situation where 
the reporter is alleged to possess evidence relevant to a criminal investigation.  [3] 
This case does not place in apposition the journalist’s privilege and the 
constitutional right of a criminal defendant to be afforded every reasonable 
opportunity to develop and uncover exculpatory information.  [4] This is not a 
case where a reporter waived the privilege by filing suit to vindicate his own 
rights.  [5] Nor is this a situation in which the journalist and/or publisher are 
defendants in a suit brought for damages caused by publications alleged to have 





On the contrary, the case before the court was “simply a situation where a journalist has 
been called as a witness to a civil suit in which neither she nor her employer has any personal 
interest.”  The articles here were “concededly written by [the reporter] in the course of her 
newspaper employment on matters of public interest concerning a candidate for high public 
office in a hotly contested campaign.” 
 
As a result of these important interests, “All courts which have considered this issue have 
agreed that the federal common law privilege of news writers shall not be breached without a 
strong showing by those seeking to elicit the information that there is no other source for the 
information requested.”  According to the court then, the plaintiff was required to show that his 
interest in vindicating his own rights was “dependent upon the information sought.”  The 
plaintiff could do this by showing both “relevance and [the] necessity of the information sought.”  
Moreover, the plaintiff would also be required to show that he pursued other sources for the 
information he sought such that “his only practical access to crucial information necessary for 
the development of the case is through the newsman’s sources.” 
 
The court reversed the lower court, because its “findings only contain[ed] a general 
assertion of necessity[, and its] . . . conclusory statements fall far short of the type of specific 
findings” necessary.  Indeed, there were other avenues to the information, including asking the 
mayor directly if he was the source of the information in the reporter’s article.  Moreover, the 
article “referred to investigations completed long before the election campaign began” – a time 
before the plaintiff ever alleged harassment.  Thus, for the most part, they were not relevant.  The 
court concluded: 
 
Because of the importance to the public of the underlying rights protected by the 
federal common law news writer’s privilege and because of the “fundamental and 
necessary interdependence of the Court and the press” recently referred to by 
Justice Brennan, trial courts should be cautious to avoid an unnecessary 
confrontation between the courts and the press. Although there may be cases in 





U.S. v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Conspiracy and fraud. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from contempt. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendant. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  Yes, but waived by sources. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Broadcaster. 
Subpoena quashed?  In part. 
 
Mike Wallace and 60 Minutes aired a report about a restaurant chain.  Evidently as a 
result of the story, a grand jury indicted some of the restaurant’s management for conspiracy and 
fraud.  Before the trial, the defendants subpoenaed CBS, the producer of 60 Minutes, asking for 
all investigative notes relating to the aired report. 
 
Due to timing issues, the court ordered CBS to produce “all verbatim or substantially 
verbatim statements in CBS’s possession made by persons named in the witness list” for in 
camera inspection.  The court stated that it would not “release . . . any of these statements to the 
defendants before trial.”  Instead, “it would entertain a motion by the defendants for disclosure of 
such statements after each witness in question testified.” 
 
After the court’s ruling, but before CBS responded, “the defendants served CBS with a 
second subpoena[, which] sought production directly to the defendants of all verbatim or 
substantially verbatim statements relating or referring to [the restaurant] made by roughly 100 
names persons.”  At another hearing, the court refused to enforce this subpoena as is but 
modified it, as it did the first one. 
 
When CBS refused to comply with the court’s modified requests, it was held in contempt.  
CBS argued that the contempt finding was inappropriate, because the material sought “is 
protected by a qualified [F]irst [A]mendment privilege not to disclose unpublished information 
and that the district court did not give proper weight to this privilege when it ordered production 
for in camera review.” 
 
Turning to the facts of this case, the court first noted an important difference between the 
two subpoenas.  The first subpoena was limited to statements made by to-be witness, while the 
second referred to all statements by “franchisees and potential franchisees.”  Thus, the court 
explained that “statements made by nonwitnesses have no value as possible prior inconsistent 
statements to impeach trial testimony.”  Therefore, there was no need for these statements; “the 
defendants’ broad request, which was only slightly limited by the district court, was based solely 
on the mere hope that some exculpatory material might turn up.”  As such, this second subpoena 
“should have been quashed.” 
 
Turning to the second subpoena, which made it past the initial relevance inquiry, the 
court stated, “[W]e have held that journalists have a federal common-law qualified privilege,” 




in part, on the strong public policy supporting the unfettered communication to the public of 
information and opinion, a policy [it] found . . . in the [F]irst [A]mendment.”   
 
The defendants argued that Riley should not control this case, because this was a criminal 
case.  The court found otherwise, holding the Riley was “persuasive authority.”  It thought so, 
because “the interests of the press that form the foundation for the privilege are not diminished 
because the nature of the underlying proceeding out of which the request for the information 
arises is a criminal trial.”  Indeed, “CBS’s interest in protecting confidential sources, preventing 
intrusion into the editorial process, and avoiding the possibility of self-censorship created by 
compelled disclosure of sources and unpublished notes does not change because a case is civil or 
criminal.” 
 
Moreover, the court found that the defendants’ argument that “their constitutional 
interests in a criminal trial preclude the existence of a journalists’ privilege in criminal cases” 
would impermissibly suggest that those “interests always prevail” over free speech and free press 
concerns.  Finding this conclusion unacceptable, the court cited to the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, where the court rejected a similar argument: 
 
The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between 
First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the 
other. . . . (I)f the authors of these guarantees, fully aware of the potential conflicts 
between them, were unwilling or unable to resolve the issue by assigning to one 
priority over the other, it is not for us to rewrite the Constitution by undertaking 
what they declined to do. 
 
This did not mean, however, that those interests did not matter.  Instead of “affecting the 
existence of the qualified privilege, we think that these rights are important factors that must be 
considered in deciding whether, in the circumstances of an individual case, the privilege must 
yield to the defendant’s need for the information.” 
 
Next, the court noted that in Riley, the court was dealing with confidential sources.  Here, 
however, the government received confidentiality waivers from the witnesses.  Therefore, there 
was no confidentiality issue.  Even though confidentiality was not at issue, CBS still argued that 
the privilege “protect[ed] unpublished material held by it.”   
 
The court agreed in part, finding that “the privilege can[not] be limited solely to 
protection of sources”: “The compelled production of a reporter’s resource materials can 
constitute a significant intrusion into the newsgathering and editorial processes.”   
 
Next, the court also found that the waiver obtained by the government did not constitute a 
waiver of the reporter’s privilege.  This was the case, because “[t]he privilege belong[ed] to 
CBS, not the potential witnesses, and it may be waived only by its holder.”  The court concluded, 
“[W]e hold that journalists possess a qualified privilege not to divulge confidential sources and 





Because the district court did not make a balancing decision and only required CBS to 
produce the document in camera, the issue before the court did not relate to the eventual or 
potential balancing that would take place.   
 
Turning to the facts of the case specifically, the court noted that the defendants did meet 
“their burden of establishing that the district court ordered [sic] produced for in camera review is 
not available from another, unprivileged source.”  Indeed, the requested material was verbatim 
statements, which would not be available from other sources due to the characteristics of a 
verbatim statement made to a single person.  Moreover, the statements were relevant, as they 
related to witnesses at trial.  Thus, the court held that “the part of the district court’s production 
order requiring CBS to produce the witnesses’ statements for in camera review was consistent 
with the privilege.”  
 
The court did not hold, however, “whether any additional showing must be made by the 






U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Anti-Racketeering, among other things. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Motion to Dismiss. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendant 
Type of Information Sought: Whether a conversation occurred with a source. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
On his motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that the prosecution “released sensational 
and prejudicial information to the news media with intent to create an atmosphere inimical to the 
rights of the defendants.”  The defendants were implicated in an FBI investigation, ABSCAM, 
which related, in part, to corruption of state and federal officials.  One investigator testified that 
he had phoned a reporter about the investigations.  At trial, the defense subpoenaed the reporter 
to testify about that conversation, and the reporter refused to answer a question about her own 
investigation into the corruption scandal.  Thereafter, the court held the reporter in contempt.   
 
As an initial matter, the Department of Justice argued that the unanswered question 
“[w]as wholly immaterial to the proceedings below because it could not have produced the kind 
of evidence of prejudice either in the grand jury or the petit jury that would justify dismissal of 
the indictment.”  The court rejected this argument.   
 
Moving on, the court thought the question was whether the defendants should “be 
allowed to develop a full record to support their allegations of outrageous prosecutorial 
misconduct.”  More specifically, the case “highlights a tension between the first amendment and 
the fifth and sixth amendments.”   
 
As to the First Amendment, the court explained that:  
 
All the specific rights and privileges granted to the press have been established by 
means of judicial interpretations of naked constitutional text, and every court 
formulation of a specific nuance of the Constitution’s text has been accompanied 
by stated reasons.  The reasons for the courts’ pronouncements are as important as 
the pronouncements themselves. 
 
Summarizing those pronouncements, the court pointed to the free exchange of ideas and 
vibrant public debate about government affairs.  The court added, “This characterization is 
justified not because of the journalist’s role as a private citizen employed by a private enterprise, 
but because reporters are viewed ‘as surrogates for the public.’”  The court also thought that a 
chilling effect would likely occur if sources realized that “the recipient [would not] preserve the 
confidence.”  Moreover, the keeping of confidence “protect[s] the source from retribution.” 
 





Our national commitment to the free exchange of information also embodies a 
recognition that the major sources of news are public figures, and that in addition 
to being newsmakers, these sources fashion public policy for government at all 
levels and in all branches.  New ideas must be tested in the crucible of public 
opinion if our representatives are to receive guidance in deciding whether a 
suggested policy will receive public endorsement or opposition. 
 
Said slightly differently, the news media “not only serve as the vehicle that widely 
disperses information but also constitute an important instrument of democracy that assists our 
officials in fashioning public policy.  Without the protection of the source, the cutting edge of 
this valuable societal instrument would be severely dulled.”   
 
The court concluded its discussion with a comment about the scope of the privilege: 
 
These extremely impressive pragmatic reasons, as well as conceptually abstract a 
priori principles, underlie the precept that a journalist does in fact possess a 
privilege that is deeply rooted in the first amendment.  When no countervailing 
constitutional concerns are at stake, it can be said that the privilege is absolute; 
when constitutional precepts collide, the absolute gives way to the qualified and a 
balancing process comes into play to determine its limits. 
 
Moving to the test, the court reiterated its view that the competing concerns must be 
weighed against each other.  As to the defendant’s need, the court explained, “The Court has 
placed particular emphasis on the production of evidence in criminal trials . . . , grounded [in the] 
need for evidence on both the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of the sixth 
amendment and the due process clause of the fifth.”   
 
Applying the test from Riley, the court found that the “defendants ha[d] established a 
record sufficient to demonstrate their entitlement to the limited information sought.”  The court 
contemplated adopting a more lenient test since no confidential information was at stake but 
ultimately concluded that that was unnecessary, because the defendants’ showing met that 





In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Mail and wire fraud. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Grand Jury. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Grand Jury. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Author. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
Antoni Gronowicz, an author of a book about the Pope, was subpoenaed as part of an 
investigation into violations of the law by Gronowicz.  Gronowicz’s book was a fraud; 
Gronowicz was subpoenaed as part of an investigation into allegations of mail and wire fraud.  
After being subpoenaed, he argued that, as an author, he had a common law privilege not to have 
to produce the documents sought by the grand jury. 
 
The court began by noting that this case was different from prior cases, because no 
previous case “recognized a press privilege to be absolutely free from inquiry into the legality of 
the reporter’s own activities, even those reflected in a publication.”  The court did note, however, 
that the Supreme Court “has held that authors may be accountable for culpable falsehoods.” 
 
Under these circumstances, “[i]f the author of a culpable falsehood had a common law 
privilege such as Gronowicz contends for, simply because the alleged falsehood had been 
published, it would be extremely difficult to hold that author accountable.”  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Herbert v. Lando, where it held that a libel plaintiff could discover 
information about the reporter’s editorial process, made it even more unlikely that a privilege 
should be sustained in a case like this. 
 
Moving to the context of this case, the court explained that “post-publication 
punishment” did have a chilling effect on speech; indeed, that was its very purpose.  Moreover, 
the court found that post-publication punishment was constitutional, because it is accompanied 
by strict “scienter requirements.”  Thus, the application of the mail fraud statute, with its scienter 





Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Products liability, among other things. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Discovery. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendant. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
No significant discussion of the reporter’s privilege was had.  The subpoena was 





In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Unfair trade practices and copyright infringement. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Discovery. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identities. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Video commentator for defendant. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
Two pro-wrestling production companies were in a business dispute.  One company sued 
the other for a variety of things, including “unfair trade practices and copyright infringement.”  
During discovery, one company subpoenaed a video commentator who worked for the other 
company.  According to the court, “[t]hese commentaries promote upcoming WCW wrestling 
events and pay-per-view television programs, announce the results of wrestling matches and 
discuss wrestlers’ personal lives and careers.”  As part of these commentaries, the video 
commentator argued that he relied on confidential sources, but “admit[ted] . . . that his 
announcements are as much entertainment as journalism.”  When asked about some information 
in his commentaries, he invoked the reporter’s privilege and the subpoenaing party filed a 
motion to compel.  The district court denied the motion to compel. 
 
According to the court, “The issue [was] whether [the video commentator] ha[d] status as 
a journalist to invoke the protections of the privilege.”  At the outset, the court noted that 
privileges should not be granted lightly and should be narrowly tailored.  It also noted, however, 
that it had recognized a reporter’s privilege in both criminal and civil case; “[p]remised upon the 
First Amendment, the privilege recognizes society’s interest in protecting the integrity of the 
newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of information to the public.” 
 
Moving to the question before it, the court noted that “only one other court of appeals has 
fashioned a test to answer the question of who has status to invoke a journalistic privilege.”  
Citing the Second Circuit’s opinion in von Bulow v. von Bulow, the court explained first that 
journalists are protected, because of “the strong public policy supporting the unfettered 
communication of information by a journalist to the public.”  Moreover, that court “required a 
true journalist, at the beginning of the news-gathering process, to have the intention of 
disseminating her information to the public.”  Finally, it also required that “an individual may 
successfully claim the journalist’s privilege if she is involved in activities traditionally associated 
with the gathering and dissemination of news.”  In short, the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence 
found that “the purpose of the journalist’s privilege was not solely to protect newspaper or 
television reporters, but to protect the activity of ‘investigative reporting.’” 
 
The court adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning: the test “emphasizes the intent behind 
the newsgathering process rather than the mode of dissemination, [and] it is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that the ‘press’ includes all publications that contribute to the free 





Turning to the facts of the case, that court found that the district court construed the 
activities at issue too broadly and, therefore, impermissibly labeled them “newsgathering.”  As 
the court explained, “By [the reporter’s] own admission, he is an entertainer, not a reporter, 





Fox v. Township of Jackson, 64 Fed.Appx. 338 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Denial of constitutional rights, among other things. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Trial. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Information about news article. 
Confidentiality:  Unclear. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished.  
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
A township refused to renew a contract with an employee, and the employee brought suit 
alleging that the township and certain township employees fired him because of his political 
affiliations.  The jury found against the plaintiff.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued, among other 
things, that the trial court erred by not compelling a newspaper reporter to testify. 
 
A reporter had written an article about the township’s politics as they related to the 
plaintiff.  The plaintiff subpoenaed the reporter who wrote the article and the reporter made a 
motion to quash the subpoena.  The trial court granted the motion. 
 
Turning to the privilege, the court first explained that the common law privilege 
“recognizes society’s interest in protecting the integrity of the news gathering process, and in 
ensuring the free flow of information to the public.”  According to the court, in the context of a 
civil trial, there is a “heavy burden” for a subpoenaing party to overcome in order to force the 
testimony of a reporter: “The moving party must demonstrate: (1) he has made an effort to obtain 
the information from other sources; (2) the only access to the information is through the 
journalist and his sources; and (3) the information sought is crucial to the claim.” 
 
The court affirmed the trial court, funding that the “information contained in the article 
was not specific enough to lead the reader to believe the journalist possessed any relevant and 
unique information.”  Moreover, the plaintiff never made a showing that the information 





Fourth Circuit Case Summaries 
U.S. v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil - Contempt. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from contempt ruling. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Information about the circumstances of a rally. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
Reporters had attended a union rally where two union members arguably violated a court 
order by advocating the continuation of a strike.  A hearing on the union members’ actions was 
called.  The court held reporters in contempt when he refused to testify.  The reporters refused to 
testify arguing that “if a reporter is compelled to testify to what he has observed or heard while 
present at a rally or meeting of persons assembled to discuss problems peculiar to their interests, 
but also of general concern, then thereafter, in retaliation, the sponsors of the occasion will in all 
probability bar them from later gatherings.”  This result would be “injurious to the rank and file 
people” because they would “los[e] such advantages as might accrue to them from this 
information.” 
 
The court began its analysis by cautioning that its “determination is limited to the 
circumstances of this case.”  Those circumstances included the following: “[1] it does not 
contemplate the contingency of the reporter being the sole or only competent witness to an 
incident . . . [; 2] it is conceded that the reporters had not acquired their knowledge through 
confidential communications[;] . . . [3] the information could have been adduced for the Court 
through the testimony of any of many others.” 
 
Turning to the privilege, the court said that the privilege was not actually a reporter’s 
privilege, but rather it was the public’s privilege.  Thus, it decided to balance “two vital 
considerations”: “protection of the public by exacting the truth versus protection of the public 
through maintenance of free press.”  Because alternative sources of the information needed was 
available through others, the court found that the scales weighed “in favor of . . . avoid[ing] . . . 
unnecessary incurrence of any potential danger of sterilizing the sources of newsworthy items.”  
As such, the court vacated the judgments of contempt. 
 
Judge Winter wrote a concurring opinion.  He first noted that confidentiality was not at 
issue.  Then he explained, “[I]n the balancing of interests suggested by Mr. Justice Powell in his 
concurring opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, the absence of confidentiality and the lack of 
evidence of vindictiveness tip the scale to the conclusion that the district court was correct in 
requiring the reporters to testify.”  He continued:  
 
These absences convert the majority’s conclusion into a broad holding that 




about all events they have observed in their professional capacity if other 
witnesses to the same events are available, despite the avowal that the holding is 
limited to the facts of the case. 
 
Moving to the reporters’ arguments, Judge Winter next rejected their assertions that they 
would “lose [the union members] trust” if made to testify.  He believed that the union members 
“would [not] scorn the journalists for respecting these obligations [to testify].” 
 
Judge Winter also rejected the reporters’ arguments that if they were made to testify they 
would not be admitted to future union activities.  To him, even if that was the case, none of the 
reporters rights “would be violated.” 
 
He also found that the reporters’ attempts to avail themselves of Branzburg’s language 
that stated that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections” were 
unconvincing.  To him, that language had to be read in light of the Court’s prior precedent, like 






U.S. v. Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Contempt. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from contempt ruling. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Information about the circumstances of a rally. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
The court granted a rehearing en banc to determine whether the panel’s prior decision 
supported the conclusion that the reporters did have a privilege not to testify.  In the court’s brief 
opinion, it explained: 
 
On this issue, Chief Judge Haynsworth, Judge Winter, Judge Russell and Judge 
Widener are of the view that they may for the reason sufficiently stated in Judge 
Winter’s dissenting panel opinion. Judge Bryan, Judge Craven and Judge Butzner 
are of the contrary view for the reasons sufficiently stated in Judge Bryan’s 
majority panel opinion. 
 
Thus, “[i]t . . . appear[ed] that a majority of the court conclude[d] that the district court 
properly required the reporters to answer and therefore their convictions for contempt should be 
affirmed.”  Nonetheless, the court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment vacating the contempt 





LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from trial verdict. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identities. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
The plaintiff, Lyndon LaRouche, brought a defamation action against NBC after NBC 
ran two stories suggesting that “LaRouche believe[d] that Jews are responsible for all the evils in 
the world.” 
 
During discovery the plaintiff filed a motion to compel NBC to identify its confidential 
sources.  That motion, however, was denied, because “LaRouche had not exhausted other 
possible sources of . . . information.”  Just before discovery concluded, LaRouche made another 
motion to compel NBC to name its sources.  The court also denied those motions, because 
LaRouche still had not interviewed several persons, including, for example, “Larry Cooper, the 
revealed source of [one] story.”  On appeal, LaRouche argued, among other things, that the 
district court erred by failing to compel NBC to divulge its sources. 
 
Recognizing again that a privilege existed, the court cited Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes for the proposition that “it is necessary for the district court to 
balance the interests involved.”  Next, the Court explained that courts should apply a three-party 
test that balances “(1) whether the information is relevant, (2) whether the information can be 
obtained by alternative means, and (3) whether there is a compelling interest in the information.” 
Because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his alternative sources of information, the court affirmed 





In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Bribery. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from contempt ruling. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporters. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
Reporters interviewed a South Carolina senator after it became apparent from an FBI 
investigation that the senator may have been involved in bribery.  In the interview, the senator 
claimed that he only took legal funds from a lobbyist.  The reporters conceded that the interviews 
were not given under confidentiality and even quoted the senator by name in his article.  The 
senator was later indicted for accepting bribes. 
 
After the indictment, a federal prosecutor subpoenaed the reporters because the 
“information in the newspaper articles . . . was relevant to the question of [the senator’s] intent.”  
The prosecutor only asked the reporters to “testify for no more than five minutes each to confirm 
that [the senator] had in fact made the statements they had reported.”  According to the 
prosecuting attorney, there were no alternative sources of the information.  The reporters refused 
to comply and were held in contempt. 
 
After receiving the subpoenas the reporters made a motion to quash the subpoenas, 
arguing, among other things, that the “First Amendment affords news reporters a qualified 
privilege against being compelled to testify concerning newsgathering.” 
 
The court affirmed the district court’s ruling: 
 
[W]e hold that the incidental burden on the freedom of the press in the 
circumstances of this case does not require the invalidation of the subpoenas 
issued to the reporters, and absent evidence of governmental harassment or bad 
faith, the reporters have no privilege different from that of any other citizen not to 
testify about knowledge relevant to a criminal prosecution. 
 
According to the court, Branzburg held that reporters did not possess a “privilege not to 
testify in criminal prosecutions about relevant evidence known to the reporter, regardless of 
whether the information was obtained during newgathering.”  Turning to Justice Powell’s 
concurrence, the court summarized it as concluding, “[W]hen evidence is presented to question 
the good faith of a request for information from the press, a ‘proper balance’ must be struck 
‘between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony.’” 
 
Next, the court reviewed its own precedent in United States v. Steelhammer and 






In response, the reporters argued that the government did not have a compelling need for 
the testimony, because it “already ha[d] video and audiotape of the defendant accepting a bribe.”  
The court found this unimportant, however, because the reporters did not argue that “their 
testimony would be irrelevant or duplicative.”  Indeed, the government still had an interest in 
“demonstrating [the senator’s] knowledge of his guilt through his attempts to minimize what 
occurred before he became aware that he had been taped.”  The court concluded, “[T]he absence 
of confidentiality or vindictiveness in the facts of this case fatally undermines the reporters’ 
claim to a First Amendment privilege.” 
 
Judge Wilkinson filed a concurring opinion.  He began by explaining that “[g]overnment 
subpoenas of news reporters inevitably involve tensions between the needs of law enforcement 
and those of newsgathering.”  The majority opinion, Judge Wilkinson believed, implied that 
there was no “privilege on the part of reporters in the absence of governmental bad faith.” 
Instead, Judge Wilkinson thought the court’s balancing test from LaRouche v. National 
Broadcasting Co. should have been applied.  According to the Judge: 
 
These reporters were neither parties nor witnesses to any criminal activity.  They 
have been subpoenaed for doing nothing more than effectively covering the news.  
All four reporters have covered for extended periods the scandal which led to this 
trial, yet they are now unable to cover the trial because they reported “false 
exculpatory statements” made by the defendant, Senator Long.  Using the power 
of subpoena to remove reporters with a special background on a story is a 
troubling matter.  It will not enhance the public’s understanding of events, and it 
may restrain the flow of information in a way that ordinary subpoenas do not. 
 
Judge Wilkinson thought subpoenas under these circumstances would be also deprive the 
public of important information: 
 
In an attempt to achieve vindication or to turn public opinion in their favor, those 
suspected of wrongdoing will often seek to get out their side of the story through 
the media. Denials of misconduct, honest and otherwise, will be commonplace. In 
routinely reporting such denials, the press acts in its own way to protect the 
presumption of innocence. Now, however, every reporter who reports a putative 
defendant’s false exculpatory statement is a potential witness at trial. That 
potential increases markedly when the statement was not made at a news 
conference, but to the reporter individually. Reporters facing the prospect of 
becoming prosecution witnesses if they report a false exculpatory statement may 
think twice about conducting exclusive interviews or reporting statements of 
denial that may be open to question. I am troubled by any rule which says that a 
reporter’s exclusive “scoop” of a public figure’s version of events makes that 
same reporter uniquely vulnerable to a government subpoena. The values served 
by an independent press will be diminished if reporters covering a case are 





Nonetheless, Judge Wilkinson also believed that the government had an interest in the 
information the reporters had because that information “serve[d] to rebut the defendant’s claim 
that the monies he received were in the nature of a campaign contribution.” 
 
Placing the interests side by side, the Judge believed that the deference owed to the 
district court tipped the scales in favor of upholding the district courts ruling.  Nonetheless, he 
cautioned that “[[a]n appellate court should encourage the full articulation of the competing 
interests at stake when government seeks to compel the testimony of those whose job it is to 





Church of Scientology Intern. v. Daniels, 992 F.2d 1329 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from motion for summary judgment. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Plaintiff. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
The Church of Scientology ran an advertisement in USA Today impugning the character 
of a drug company.  Thereafter, the vice president of the company issued a statement that, among 
other things, said that “the Church of Scientology is no church.”  The church later filed a 
defamation lawsuit against the vice president, asking for $50,000 in compensatory damages and 
$20 million in punitive damages.  The district court granted the vice president’s motion for 
summary judgment after finding that there was no defamation. 
 
On appeal, the church argued that the magistrate judge erred when it refused to compel 
USA Today to produce “all materials relating to the June editorial board meeting, including 
editors’ notes, tapes, and draft article.”  The magistrate judge refused to compel USA Today, 
because the church “failed to make the required showing for a need for the privilege materials.” 
 
Because the court was only reviewing the magistrate judge’s decision for an abuse of 
discretion, it chose not to overturn the ruling, which it viewed as reasonable.  As the court 
explained, “[T]he consideration that [the defendant] offered to stipulate to the accuracy of the 
quotation that appeared in USA Today makes the relevance of the materials CSI seeks 





Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Environmental Tort. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from motion for summary judgment. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identities. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
The government brought an environmental torts suit against Conoco for allegedly 
contaminating two wells in North Carolina.  A jury awarded the residents who drank off the 
wells compensatory and punitive damages.  After the verdict, “the jury heard additional evidence 
relating to the amount of the punitive damages award.”   
 
The jury never had a chance to make a decision, however.  While deliberating, the parties 
settled for $36 million.  That agreement was meant to remain confidential and was sealed by the 
court. 
 
A reporter eventually found two anonymous sources who revealed the $36 million 
settlement.  Thereafter, he published that number.  After publication, Conoco moved the district 
court to hold the reporter in civil contempt.  The government argued that the court should hold 
the reporter in criminal contempt. 
 
The court convened a hearing on the motions and the reporter refused to identify the 
sources of his information.  First, the court denied the government’s motion.  Second, the court 
refused to find the reporter in civil contempt, finding that “the sources’ identities were not 
relevant to civil contempt proceedings then pending and also that Conoco had failed to exhaust 
all reasonable alternative means for obtaining the sources’ names.” 
 
Nonetheless, Conoco would later refile a motion to compel, “rel[ying] entirely on the 
district court’s own alleged interest in learning the sources’ identities.”  The district court granted 
this third motion, holding that “the sources’ identities were ‘relevant to the case in general’ and 
‘will help this court determine who violated” the sealing order.”  More specifically, the court 
found that it had a “‘compelling’ need to know the sources’ identities in order to enforce its 
order.  It did not find, however, that Conoco did. 
 
This time, the district court found that Conoco had exhausted all of the possible 
alternative avenues to the information sought.  Even though the court ordered the reporter to 
divulge is name, he refused to do so, and the court held him in civil contempt. 
 
The court began with the general proposition “reporters are ‘entitled to some 
constitutional protection of the confidentiality of [their] sources.’”  According to the court, this 
protection was “necessary to ensure a free and vital press, without which an open and democratic 




press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society.”  Emphasizing the 
point, the court explained, “If reporters were routinely required to divulge the identities of their 
sources, the free flow of newsworthy information would be restrained and the public’s 
understanding of important issues and events would be hampered in ways inconsistent with a 
healthy republic.” 
 
The court noted that such a privilege is not absolute, however: “[T]he reporter’s privilege 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Pell and Branzburg is not absolute and will be overcome 
whenever society’s need for the confidential information in question outweighs the intrusion on 
the reporter’s First Amendment interests.”  It went on to characterize Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion as requiring that a “reporter’s claim of privilege should be judged on [a] case-by-case 
basis.” 
 
Turning to its own case law, the court affirmed its use of the three-part test established in 
LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Company.  The court focused first on the “compelling 
interest” prong: “Under other circumstances, enforcement of a validly entered confidentiality 
order might well provide a compelling interest.”  Although, the court was quick to add that “[i]n 
any case, of course, the compelling nature of the interest in enforcing a sealing order would have 
to be balanced against the reporter’s interest in protecting the confidentiality of his sources.”   
 
Despite this, the court, in another opinion, had found that the sealing order was 
inappropriate in this case.  In any sealing case, a district court must consider three elements, and 
the district court failed to do that.  Therefore, the sealing was inappropriate and, as such, there 





Fifth Circuit Case Summaries 
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Interlocutory appeal from denial of motion to compel. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
A union leader sued a reporter and Transamerican Press for libel.  The reporter, through 
Overdrive, a Transamerican publication, accused the leader of “swindle[ing] the pension fund 
out of $1.6 million.” 
 
After the case was filed and discovery was sought, the plaintiff discovered that the source 
for the allegation was a “confidential informant.”  The plaintiff filed several motions to force the 
reporter to name his source, but the district court denied these requests, because the plaintiff “had 
not exhausted the alternative means of proving that Transamerican was reckless.” 
 
Thereafter, the plaintiff gathered evidence that indicated that he “had never borrowed any 
money” as the story suggested.  As such, “the district judge ordered the defendants to produce 
summaries of non-privileged parts of the file used in preparation of the article.”  Evidently, the 
reporter complied with this order. 
 
Later, the plaintiff would again ask the court to compel the reporter to name his source, 
which the judge finally granted, “concluding that the informant’s identity went to the heart of the 
matter.” 
 
First, the court found that the plaintiff was a public figure and, therefore, was required to 
prove actual malice.  Turning to whether the reporter had a First Amendment privilege, the court 
held that “a reporter has a First Amendment privilege which protects the refusal to disclose the 
identity of confidential informants, however, the privilege is not absolute and in a libel case as is 
here presented, the privilege must yield.” 
 
According to the court, Branzburg v. Hayes held that “reporters must disclose the names 
of confidential informants except where the grand jury power was abused.”  In the court’s view 
though, “[t]he policies supporting a First Amendment privilege would appear to be stronger . . . 
where a defamation plaintiff seeks to compel disclosure of the name of a confidential informant.”  
This was the case, because “forced disclosure of journalists’ sources might deter informants from 
giving their stories to newsmen, except anonymously.  This might cause the press to face the 
unwelcome alternatives of not publishing because of the inherent unreliability of anonymous 





In addition to its concerns about forcing journalists to use anonymous sources, the court 
believed that there was “a more apparent interest” in protecting confidential sources in 
defamation cases than in grand jury cases.  As the court explained it: 
 
In Branzburg, the prosecutor had an interest in keeping the informant’s identity 
secret in order to protect him from reprisal.  The government and the press had a 
similar purpose, both were ferreting out wrongdoing and seeking to correct it. In a 
libel case, the plaintiff and the press are on opposite sides.  And a defamed 
plaintiff might relish an opportunity to retaliate against the informant. 
 
What’s more, under the Court’s jurisprudence, the court thought it important that “there 
is a First Amendment policy of free investigation of public figures because their activities are 
matters of public concern.”  Thus, “[t]he First Amendment interest in granting a privilege is 
particularly strong when the article concerns a public figure.” 
 
Finally, the court, noting the high standard of actual malice, explained that “often” a 
reporter could present enough evidence of “prudence [that] would carry the burden in support of 
a motion for summary judgment.” 
 
The court then adopted the Garland v. Torre test.  It noted that the information sought 
was relevant and the plaintiff had already exhausted alternative avenues to the information.  
Thus, the court only addressed whether there was “a compelling interest in the information.”   
The court held that the need was compelling.  It did so, because there was only one source for the 
information printed in the article.  As such, “[t]he only way that Miller [could] establish malice 
and prove his case is to show that Transamerican knew the story was false or that it was reckless 





In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Interlocutory appeal from denial of motion to compel. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
A school official was fired and later brought a defamation action against other school 
officials for allegedly “publicizing false and stigmatizing charges against him.”  Those charges 
were publicized to a newspaper reporter.  The district court found that the name of the source 
was “central to the claim” and “that alternative ways of confirming that hypothesis had been 
exhausted.”  As such, “the district court ordered that the journalist testify in camera and there 
respond to narrowly limited questions directed only to ascertaining whether a school district 
officer was the source of his information.”  The reporter still refused to answer questions, and the 
court held the reporter in contempt.  On appeal, the reporter invoked “the journalist’s qualified 
privilege under the [F]irst [A]mendment not to reveal his confidential sources.”   
 
The court began by noting that in Miller v. Transamerican Press, the court “recognized 
that the [F]irst [A]mendment shields a reporter from being required to disclose the identity of 
persons who have imparted information to him in confidence.”  Under that decision, a qualified 
privilege yield to the plaintiff’s need for the information if:  
 
the party who seeks disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant 
establishes by substantial evidence that [1] the statement attributed to the 
informant was published and is both factually untrue and defamatory; [2] that 
reasonable efforts have been made to learn the identity of the reporter’s informant 
by alternative means; [3] that no other reasonable means is available; and [4] that 
knowledge of the identity of the informant is necessary to proper preparation and 
presentation of the case. 
 
According to the plaintiff, the identities of the confidential sources was important, 
because “he ha[d] the right to exemplary or punitive damages [against the school officials] if the 
publication was malicious.”  The court also found that the plaintiff had exhausted his alternative 
avenues to discovering the information sought.   
 
Having so found, the court set up an in camera hearing, where the “court would first ask 
[the reporter] whether his confidential sources occupied such positions that their publication of 
the charges against [the plaintiff] could be attributed to [the school district leadership].”  If the 
answers were no, then the court would not force the reporter to continue to testify.  If the answer 
was yes, however, then the court was going to require the reporter to name the position that his 




counsel.”  In spite of this “deliberate” solution, the reporter still refused to testify, and the court 
had him jailed.   
 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued “that the act of publishing the information about him 
constitute[d] a denial of substantive due process.”  The court rejected this argument. 
Second, the court addressed the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.  The court also rejected this claim.  The 
court held that “[u]nless [the plaintiff] can set aside the waiver contained in his resignation, he 
cannot establish that he was denied a hearing, and thus he cannot establish the defendants’ 
liability.”  Because he could not even establish a prima facie case under § 1983, he could not 
“recover punitive damages against the individual defendants.”  As such, the court held that, 
“Because [the reporter’s] testimony is necessary only to determine [the plaintiff’s] punitive 
damages claim, it is evident that [the plaintiff] has not yet shown the necessity for it.”  Thus, he 
also did not defeat the reporter’s privilege.   
 
Simply, the court was not going to have the reporter testify to reveal information 
necessary to a damages assessment without first requiring the plaintiff to show he had a chance 
to succeed on the merits of the claim.  In short, the reporter’s testimony was not “necessary” at 
this stage of the litigation. 
 
The court went on to address the reporter’s other claim that even if the plaintiff 
established a case, the reporter should not be required to testify.  The court rejected this 
suggestion.  The court noted that the identity of the source himself was an element of the suit.  
Thus, the reporter was a “percipient witness to a fact at issue.”  As a result, “his testimony is 





U.S. v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Arson. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Interlocutory appeal from denial of motion to compel. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
After a fire destroyed a New Orleans building, federal agents questioned Frank Smith.  
Smith was an employee at the destroyed building.  Shortly after he spoke with federal agents, 
Smith reached out to a local broadcaster and alleged that others burned the building down – not 
him.  Smith also spoke with New Orleans fire officials.  He told the officials that “after the first 
fire occurred, he overheard the manager and assistant manager of the [building] plotting to set 
the second blaze.”  The officials gave that recorded statement to the federal prosecutor.  Smith 
would later repeat the same story to federal officials. 
 
Smith was later arrested for arson.  After he was arrested, the local broadcaster 
broadcasted a small portion of its videotaped interview with Smith.  The station identified Smith.  
After additional evidence suggested that the second fire resulted from faulty wiring, the 
government became increasingly interested in Smith’s story about the other employees plotting 
to set the second fire.   
 
Because the broadcaster refused to hand over the entire tape absent a subpoena, the 
government requested permission to subpoena the station according to the Department of 
Justice’s guidelines.  The Department granted permission, and, “[b]elieving that the videotape 
might contain exculpatory evidence, Smith later joined the government’s subpoena request.” 
 
The broadcaster made a motion to quash the subpoena under the First Amendment.  The 
district court granted the motion and the government appealed. 
 
The court began by explaining that “the [lower] court determined that the government 
was not entitled to the videotape outtakes, as they were cumulative of what the government 
already had in its possession.” 
 
Turning to Branzburg v. Hayes, the court summarized the Supreme Court’s opinion, 
stating, “Although the Court recognized that [responding to the subpoena] would be a burden . . . 
for newsreporters to reveal their sources, it held that the public’s interest in law enforcement 
outweighed the concerns of the press.”  It went on to summarize that the “Court instructed that 
the needs of the press are not to be weighed against the needs of the government in considering 
grand jury subpoenas.” 
 
The court next addressed the effect of Justice Powell’s concurring opinion, and also 




Justice Powell wrote only to “emphasize[] that at a certain point, the First Amendment must 
protect the press from government intrusion.  To Justice Powell, however, that point occurs only 
when the ‘grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith.”   
 
Thus, the court stated that journalists are only protected from subpoenas that are issued in 
bad faith: “A single subpoena issued only after considered decision by the Attorney General of 
the United States to compel production of evidence at a federal trial of a multicount felony 
indictment is no harassment.” 
 
The court next addressed the difference between the privilege asserted here – to protect 
work product – and the one in Branzburg – to protect confidential sources.  The broadcaster 
made several arguments: 
 
[1] It contends that absent a privilege, prosecutors will “ ‘annex’ the news media 
as ‘an investigative arm of government.’”  On this theory, [2] future news-sources 
will be wary of the media’s close connection to the government, so they will 
hesitate before approaching reporters, even for on-the-record interviews. In 
addition, WDSU-TV argues that without a privilege, [3] the media will be 
swamped with criminal discovery requests. Having to respond to these requests 
would hamper the media’s ability to provide the public with newsworthy 
information. [4] As a result, contends WDSU-TV, rather than comply with future 
demands for evidence, the media might instead simply destroy its work product 
once it was printed or aired, thereby depriving itself of valuable archival material. 
[5] Alternatively, WDSU-TV fears that the press might hesitate before reporting 
on important matters that could get it enmeshed in criminal litigation. 
 
The court rejected these concerns, because they were similar to the ones rejected in 
Branzburg.  Moreover, it emphasized that, although responding to subpoenas may be onerous, 
“the Supreme Court has consistently refused to exempt the media from the reach of generally-
applicable laws, simply because those laws might indirectly burden its newsgathering function.” 
 
Next, the court rejected the distinction between the criminal trial at present and the grand 
jury context.  It stated, “Surely the public has as great an interest in convicting criminals as it 
does in indicting them.”  It also pointed to language in Branzburg that explicitly mentioned that 
the rationale applied to criminal trials.  It concluded, “Branzburg will protect the press if the 
government attempts to harass it.  Short of such harassment, the media must bear the same 
burden of producing evidence of criminal wrongdoing as any other citizen.” 
 
Finally, the court rejected the argument that Miller v. Transamerica Press, Inc. 
controlled.  It based this on the fact that Miller was a civil case – Branzburg only “emphasized 
that the public’s interest in effective law enforcement outweighed the press’s entitlement to a 
First Amendment privilege against the disclosure of information.”  Indeed, “the public has much 
less of an interest in the outcome of civil litigation.” 
 
In addition, Miller involved confidentiality while the current case did not: “We have 




Sixth Circuit Case Summaries 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Habeas corpus 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from denial of writ. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Grand Jury. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
A reporter in Detroit had set out intending to capture gang members on camera.  After 
running into gang members, the reported asked to conduct interviews with the members of the 
gang.  Notably, “[a]s a condition of filming, [the reporter] agreed not to broadcast or disclose to 
anyone the portion of the film already taken [earlier that day], in which the faces of gang 
members could be seen[, and] promised to do all future filming in the silhouette.”  Evidently, the 
gang members threatened retribution if the reporter disclosed their identities. 
 
In a separate incident, a detective was investigating a murder.  The detective interviewed 
a gang member who identified the gang member who allegedly shot another police officer, but 
that gang member refused to testify.  Although eyewitnesses alleged that “they could identify the 
[suspect] if provided with photographs,” the detective had no photographs.  The detective 
alleged, however, that he was told that the suspect was at the original filming and, therefore, the 
tape was “the most reliable means for identification.”   
 
Based on that allegation, a grand jury subpoenaed the reporter’s employer.  His employer 
later moved to quash that subpoena.  The trial court denied the motion to quash, ruling that the 
reporter “had no constitutional privilege to refuse to divulge to the grand jury the material 
sought.”  Thereafter, the reporter was found in contempt. 
 
On the petition for habeas corpus, the court refused to accept the reporter’s argument that 
the court, under Justice Powell’s concurring opinion must require the government to show that 
the subpoena was relevant, crucial, and a last resort.  Rejecting this position, the court explained 
that the Branzburg court “specifically dealt with, and rejected, the claim that newsmen are 
entitled to a ‘conditional, not absolute’ privilege – testimonial privilege conditioned upon the 
inability of prosecutors to establish relevancy, unavailability from other sources, and a need so 
compelling as to override invasion of first amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure.” 
Turning to its own analysis, the court relied on Professor Wigmore’s “four fundamental 
conditions” to establishing a privilege: 
 
(1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed; (2) confidentiality must be essential to the maintenance of the 
relationship between the parties; (3) the relationship must be one which, in the 




inure to the relationship by the disclosure of the communications must be greater 
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 
 
According to the court, the reporter-source relationship only met the first fundamental 
condition.  As such, it “decline[d] to join some other circuit courts, to the extent that they have 
stated their contrary belief that those predicates do exist, and have thereupon adopted the 
qualified privilege balancing process urged by the three Branzburg dissenters and rejected by the 
majority.” 
 
In its view, the court believed that those courts failed to understand Justice Powell’s 
opinion.  Although Justice Powell did indicate that some reporter’s privilege cases must be 
judged on a “case-by-case basis,” the court read that language to relate specifically to instances 
where the government brought the subpoena in bad faith.  In this court’s view, what Branzburg 
actually required a court to consider was this: 
 
courts should . . . make certain that the proper balance is struck between freedom 
of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony, by 
determining [1] whether the reporter is being harassed in order to disrupt his 
relationship with confidential news sources, [2] whether the grand jury’s 
investigation is being conducted in good faith, [3] whether the information sought 
bears more than a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the 
investigation, and [4] whether a legitimate law enforcement need will be served 
by forced disclosure of the confidential source relationship. 
 





Seventh Circuit Case Summaries 
McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 
Type of Proceeding: Civil – Order to turn over work product relating to foreign criminal 
investigation. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from denial of writ. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Grand Jury. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Biographers. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
The plaintiff, Michael McKevitt, was “being prosecuted in Ireland for membership in a 
banned organization and directing terrorism.”  As part of his defense, he asked a district court to 
compel reporters “to produce tape recordings that he thinks will be useful to him in the cross-
examination of David Reupert, who according to McKevitt’s motion is the key witness for the 
prosecution.” 
 
The journalists subpoenaed had “a contract to write Rupert’s biography,” and as such, 
had conducted several interviews with him.  Under a statute that allows a district court to compel 
testimony or produce evidence to be used in a foreign trial, the district court granted McKevitt’s 
motion.  The court refused to stay the district court’s grant. 
 
In explaining why it refused to stay the district court’s order, the court began by noting 
that although Branzburg declined to recognize a First Amendment privilege, “Justice Powell, 
whose vote was essential to the 5-4 decision rejecting the claim of privilege, stated in a 
concurring opinion that such a claim should be decided on a case-by-case basis by balancing the 
freedom of the press against the obligation to assist in criminal proceedings.” 
 
The court then admitted, “Since the [four] dissenting Justices would have gone further 
than Justice Powell in recognition of the reporter’s privilege, and preferred his position to that of 
the majority opinion (for they said that his ‘enigmatic concurring opinion gives some hope of a 
more flexible view in the future,’) maybe his opinion should be taken to state the view of the 
majority of the Justices – though this is uncertain, because Justice Powell purported to join 
Justice White’s ‘majority’ opinion.” 
 
The court then noted that a “large number of cases concluded . . . that there is a reporter’s 
privilege.”  The court summarized other circuits’ prior jurisprudence quite succinctly, all things 
considered: 
 
Some of the cases that recognize the privilege, such as Madden, essentially ignore 
Branzburg; some treat the “majority” opinion in Branzburg as actually just a 
plurality opinion, such as Smith; some audaciously declare that Branzburg 




The approaches that these decisions take to the issue of privilege can certainly be 
questioned.  A more important point, however, is that the Constitution is not the 
only source of evidentiary privileges, . . . .  And while the cases we have cited do 
not cite other possible sources of the privilege besides the First Amendment and 
one of them, LaRouche, actually denies, though without explaining why, that 
there might be a federal common law privilege for journalists that was not based 
on the First Amendment, other cases do cut the reporter’s privilege free from the 
First Amendment. 
 
Turning to the present case, the court explained that the United States had an interest in 
helping facilitate the adequacy of foreign criminal trials.  The court found that “it is . . . obvious 
that the newsgathering and reporting activities of the press are inhibited when a reporter cannot 
assure a confidential source of confidentiality.”  The court concluded that “that was Branzburg 
and it is evident from the result in that case that the interest of the press in maintaining 
confidentiality of sources is not absolute.” 
 
Here, nevertheless, the court noted that the source was known and that that source did not 
care whether the tapes of the interviews were released to McKevitt.  Thus, the court found that 
there was “no conceivable interest in confidentiality in the present case.”  
 
As to non-confidential information, it recognized that other courts had found a privilege, 
expressing “concern with harassment, burden, using the press as an investigative arm of 
government, and so forth.”  The court, however, questioned these decisions, because they “were 
rejected by Branzburg even in the context of a confidential source.” 
 
The court next questioned the entire premise of court’s prior opinions: “It seems to use 
that rather than speaking of privilege, courts should simply make sure that a subpoena duces 
tecum directed to the media, like any other subpoena . . . , is reasonable in the circumstances.”   
 
Using this “reasonable[ness]” approach, the court explained that “[w]hen the information 
in the reporter’s possession does not come from a confidential source, it is difficult to see what 
possible bearing the First Amendment could have on the question of compelled disclosure.”   
Indeed, the court stated, the source actually wanted the information released.  The court believed 
that the biographers did not want to release the information because “the biography . . . that they 
are planning to write [would] be less marketable the more information in it that has already been 
made public.” 
 
Because there were no reasonable grounds on which to prevent the disclosure of the 





Eighth Circuit Case Summaries 
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from summary judgment. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Magazine and reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
A Life Magazine article accused the mayor of St. Louis, Cervantes, of having “business 
and personal ties with the gangsters [who] operate in his city.”  As a result of the article, the 
mayor filed a defamation action in federal court, alleging that “4 paragraphs of the article 
contained false statement which were authored, published, and communicated with knowledge of 
their falsity or, alternatively, with reckless disregard as to their truth.” 
 
In discovery, the mayor “deposed the reporter who testified that he gathered information 
which formed the basis for most of the story from informants within the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and within the United States Department of Justice.”  During the deposition, the 
reporter was asked and refused to answer whom his sources in the federal government were. 
The reporter refused to divulge the information for a variety of reasons.  First, “assum[ing] a 
contrary position would be to subject his informants to retaliation or reprisals and physical 
danger.”  Second, “compulsory disclosure of confidential sources would violate the First 
Amendment’s freedom of the press by impeding the dissemination of news which can be 
obtained only if he, as a professional journalist, may effectively guarantee anonymity of the 
source.”  Third, “he, as a professional journalist and as a resident and citizen of the State of New 
York, possesses a statutory reportorial privilege to withhold the source of news coming into his 
possession.” 
 
 Soon after the reporter asserted his privilege, the mayor asked the court to compel the 
reporter to testify.  The defendants, on the other hand, made a motion for summary judgment.  
The district court did not address the motion to compel, because he “entered summary judgment 
for the defendants on the grounds that neither defendant had knowledge of falsity.”  The mayor 
appealed. 
 
 At the appellate court, the mayor argued that “he cannot possibly meet his burden of 
proof if the reporter is allowed to hide behind anonymous news sources.”  More specifically,  
 
[h]is arguments in favor of compulsory disclosure may be summarized as follows: 
[a] disclosure enables the plaintiff to scrutinize the accuracy and balance of the 
defendant’s reporting and editorial processes; [b] through disclosure it is possible 
to derive an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the factual data 




determination of the extent to which independent verification of the published 
materials was secured; and [d] disclosure is the sole means by which a libeled 
plaintiff can effectively test the credibility of the news source, thereby 
determining whether it can be said that the particular source is a perjurer, a well-
known libeler, or a person of such character that, if called as a witness, any jury 
would likely conclude that a publisher relying on such a person’s information 
does so with reckless disregard for truth or falsity. 
 
Because of these concerns, the mayor argued that the district judge was wrong to consider a 
summary judgment motion on the limited facts before him. 
 
The court began its discussion by noting that the mayor’s claims did not “strike [it] as 
frivolous.”  “Especially [was] this so when much of the information supplied by the anonymous 
informants has been obtained from the private files of Government.”  Despite these concerns, the 
court thought the mayor’s “preoccupation with the identity of Life’s news sources” was not 
material to the summary judgment motion.  Instead, the court made clear that the evidence 
already in the record “establish[ed], without room for substantial argument, facts that entitled 
both defendants to judgment as a matter of law.” 
 
 Next, the court addressed prior case law, explaining that it was “aware of the prior cases 
holding that the First Amendment does not grant to reporters a testimonial privilege to withhold 
news sources.”  In a footnote, it cited many of those early cases and Branzburg v. Hayes.  In the 
court’s estimation, Branzburg presented the question of whether the First amendment allows a 
grand jury to compel “professional journalists [to divulge] information about possible law 
violations committed by their news sources.”  It went on to explain that “[i]t was held, over 4 
dissents, that a newsman does not possess a First Amendment privilege to refuse to answer 
relevant and material questions asked during a good-faith grand jury investigation.”  It 
distinguished that holding on the basis of the type of proceeding: “The Court was not faced with 
and, therefore, did not address, the question whether a civil libel suit should command the quite 
different reconciliation of conflicting interests pressed upon us here by the defense.” 
 
 In the context of its opinion, the court went on to note that “to routinely grant motions 
seeking compulsory disclosure of anonymous news sources without first inquiring into the 
substance of a libel allegation would utterly emasculate the fundamental principles that underlay 
the line of cases articulating the constitutional restrictions to be engrafted upon the enforcement 
of State libel laws.”  In a footnote to that statement, the court cited to the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could 
be eviscerated.”  Moreover, the court seemed concerned that the filing of libel suits could be 
used as a form of harassment: “[T]o compel a newsman to breach a confidential relationship 
merely because a libel suit has been filed against him would seem inevitably to lead to an 
excessive restraint on the scope of legitimate newsgathering activity.” 
 
 Turning to the summary judgment motion, the court laid down a rule: “Where there is a 
concrete demonstration that the identity of defense news sources will lead to persuasive evidence 
on the issue of malice, a District Court should not reach the merits of a defense motion for 




examine those sources, whether they be anonymous or known.”  The court explained, “The point 
of principal importance is that there must be a showing of cognizable prejudice before the failure 
to permit examination of anonymous news sources can rise to the level of error.  Mere 
speculation or conjecture about the fruits of such examination simply will not suffice.” 
 
 The court found that the plaintiff made no showing in this case.  Indeed, there was 
significant evidence that the reporter did not violate the actual malice standard: 
 
[T]he record contains substantial evidence indicating that it was over a period of 
many months that Life’s reporter carefully collected and documented the data on 
the basis of which the article was written and published.  In turn, Life’s key 
personnel, including one researcher, four editors and three lawyers, spent 
countless hours corroborating and evaluating this data.  Once suit was instituted, 
the mayor was provided with hundreds of documents utilized in preparation of the 
article.  He then deposed virtually every Life employee who possessed any 
connection whatever with the article’s preparation and publication and, with one 
exception, each affirmed his or her belief in the truth of the article and each gave 
deposition testimony sufficient to raise a strong inference that there was good 
reason for that belief. 
 
Weighed against the plaintiff’s self-serving affidavits, the evidence was too great to overcome – 
even if the mayor had the identity of the sources.  The court concluded: 
 
Where, as here, the published materials, objectively considered in the light of all 
the evidence, must be taken as having been published in good faith, without actual 
malice and on the basis of careful verification efforts, that is, they were published 
in good faith without regard to the identity of the news sources, there is no rule of 
law or policy consideration of which we are aware that counsels compulsory 





Ninth Circuit Case Summaries 
Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Bombing. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Grand jury. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendant. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Published, in part. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: General manager of radio station. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
A radio station general manager received two things.  First, he received a “three-page . . . 
document purportedly issued by an organization calling itself ‘The Weather Underground,’ 
which contained information relative to a recent bombing of a government building.”  It ran a 
story about that document and also provided the original to federal authorities.  Second, he 
“received a tape purportedly issued by ‘The Symbionese Liberation Army’ which contained 
information relative to Patricia Hearst and William and Emily Harris.”  He also ran a story about 
that receipt and provided a copy to law enforcement officers. 
 
The grand jury issued a subpoena against the station’s attorney asking him “to appear 
forthwith and bring . . . the original of the document that the station had received from persons 
claiming to be responsible for the  [Symionese] bombing.”  The attorney for the station appeared 
without producing the requested document.  The attorney also told the assistant United States 
attorney that “he intended to claim a privilege based upon the station’s right to protect the 
sources of news information.” 
 
Thereafter, the grand jury issued a subpoena against the station manager.  “On June 12, 
Mr. Lewis appeared and stated that the document and the tape both existed and that he had 
access to them but that he had purposely refused to bring them before the Grand Jury.”  A week 
later, the manager refused again to produce the items sought or testify.  At that point, he was held 
in contempt. 
 
The court rejected the manager’s First Amendment argument.  It did begin by noting that 
“appellant is not forsaken by the Constitution simply because a Federal Grand Jury would obtain 
information from him.”  And explained that, under Branzburg, the manager could receive 
protection if the subpoena was issued in bad faith, but held that there was no evidence of bad 
faith present.  Moreover, “there was no request by the suppliers of the document and the tape to 
keep the information contained in them private or to withhold the articles themselves from 
examination. Even had there been such, the lesson from Branzburg is that such a request, either 





Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Bombing. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Grand jury. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendant. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: General manager of radio station. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
A radio station general manage received a “communiqué” “from a group claiming 
responsibility for the explosion of a bomb in a Los Angeles hotel on October 5, 1974.”  After 
being held in contempt for refusing to comply with a grand jury subpoena, the manager appealed 
his contempt conviction on, among other things, First Amendment grounds.  The circuit court 
affirmed the lower courts contempt finding. 
 
The court first explained that “[t]he holding of Branzburg v. Hayes is that the first 
amendment does not afford a reporter a privilege to refuse to testify before a federal grand jury 
as to information received in confidence.”  Moreover, the court noted that a reporter will only be 
protected under Branzburg when the government has instituted the proceeding in bad faith.  
Because the “Appellant has shown no basis for relief under these standards,” the manager had no 





Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Habeas corpus. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from denial of habeas corpus. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Court. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identities. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
The plaintiff was a reporter who was found guilty of contempt after he refused to tell the 
court who supplied him with information relating to a murder trial.  More specifically, a state 
trial judge ordered all parties to abstain from “dissemination [of] the contents or nature of 
proposed trial testimony or other evidence” relating to the trial of Charles Manson.  The plaintiff, 
despite the order, received two copies of a transcript of inadmissible testimony.  After the judge 
found out, he summoned the reporter to his chambers to discover the identity of his sources at 
which time the reporter “rejected the invitation of the judge to disclose the name or names of 
those from whom he received copies of the Graham statement.”  The day after the refusal, a Los 
Angeles newspaper carried the leaked material. 
 
One month after the trial against Manson ended, the judge order the plaintiff to appear 
and “show cause why he should not be compelled to disclose the names of the persons who had 
supplied him with copies of the [the evidence].”  At the show cause hearing, the reporter 
“continued to refuse to answer specific questions as to identity, appellant was adjudged to be in 
contempt and ordered incarcerated until he divulged the names.”  The reporter argued that the 
incarceration was illegal, because he had a First Amendment privilege “to refuse to disclose to 
the court the names” of his sources. 
 
The court began by explaining that “[u]ntil very recent times, it was not seriously thought 
by most that this provision of the First Amendment gave any personal right to a newspaper 
reporter to keep confidential his sources of information.”  Indeed, the First Amendment 
historically was thought to only prevent the prior restraint of the government.  Nonetheless, the 
court argued that the recent trend in state legislators, Congress, and the Supreme Court was 
toward a recognition of a privilege: “[T]he Supreme Court of the United States has considered 
the question and appears to have fashioned at least a partial First Amendment shield available to 
newsmen who are subjected to various demands to divulge the source of confidentially secured 
information.”  Moreover, the court argued that Branzburg’s logic “applied to other civil or 
criminal judicial proceedings” beyond the grand jury context. 
 
Without much analysis, the court explained that “Branzburg recognizes some First 
Amendment protection of news sources.”  It then found that the “application of the Branzburg 
holding to non-grand jury cases seems to require that the claimed First Amendment privilege and 





Turning to the facts of the case, the court said that “the First Amendment protection 
announced by Branzburg [had] collided head-on with a compelling judicial interest in disclosure 
of the identity of those persons frustrating a duly entered order of the court.”  The court found 
that the interest in guaranteeing a fair trial outweighed the reporter’s First Amendment interest.  
The court explained: “[T]he purpose of eliminating collaboration between counsel and the press 
is to protect the constitutionally guaranteed right of the defendants in criminal cases to due 
process by means of a fair trial.  . . . If the newsman’s privilege against disclosure of news 
sources is to serve as a bar to disclosure of the names of those who disobey the court order, then 
the court is powerless to enforce this method of eliminating encroachment on the due-process 
right of the defendants.”  Thus, the power of the court to enforce the order was more important 





U.S. v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal - Conspiracy 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from criminal trial. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendant. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Television reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
A reporter received a call from an informant, directing the reporter to the scene of a drug 
arrest that was supposed to take place the next morning.  At trial, the defendants, who were 
arrested on various drug charges, made a motion “to have the court order the newsman to reveal 
the name of his source.”  The lower court denied the motion “but entered a finding of fact that 
the informant was a government agent.” 
 
The circuit court affirmed the lower court’s ruling.  First, it noted that a trial judge “must 
balance the interest of confidentiality of news sources against the needs of the criminal justice 
system to know the identity of the source in determining whether or not to require disclosure.”  
The defendant argued that the name of the source was material, because if the source was from 
inside the DEA, the defendant could show that the DEA knew an arrest was going to take place 
but refused to get a warrant.  The court rejected this argument: “Even with prior knowledge of a 
potential drug exchange somewhere north and west of Phoenix, the government could not have 
possessed adequate specific information about Pretzinger’s truck to obtain a warrant to search 





In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Vandalism, among other things. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Grand jury. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Government. 
Type of Information Sought: Information about an exchange after alleged illegality. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Ph.D. student. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
In 1991, a group known as the Animal Liberation Front broke into Washington State 
University and released test animals and also “spread hydrochloric acid throughout the 
laboratories, causing approximately $100,000 in damages.”  One known member of the 
Liberation Front, Rodney Coronado, was also a house sitter for Richard Scarce, a Ph.D. student 
at the University.  Although Scarce and his family had been on vacation, they arrived back in 
Washington and were picked up at the airport by Coronado.  The next morning, Scarce and 
Coronado, and possibly others, had a conversation about a newspaper article regarding the break 
in.   
 
The government later subpoenaed Scarce to testify about his conversation the morning 
after the newspaper published the article about the break in.  Scarce, who wrote extensively on 
militant animal rights groups, refused to answer the subpoena arguing that he had a “scholar’s 
privilege” that allowed him to decline to answer.  The lower court rejected the claimed privilege, 
and Scarce appeared at the grand jury but “refused to testify concerning the breakfast 
conversation, claiming that this concerned confidential information.”  As a result, he was in 
contempt. 
 
The court of appeals agreed with the government.  As the court framed Scarce’s 
argument, “Scarce asserts that he is privileged by the First Amendment not to disclose to the 
grand jury the identity of his confidential informants or the information they provided him 
because his conversation with those informants was incident to his work as a scholar.”  
Moreover, “Scarce argues that because that work involves the collection and dissemination of 
information to the public, he is entitled to the same privileges afforded members of the 
institutional press under the First Amendment’s Freedom of Press Clause.” 
 
In declining to recognize Scarce’s argument, the court essentially adopted Justice 
Powell’s concurrence.  Justice Powell would have found First Amendment protection “where the 
information sought ‘bear[s] only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the 
investigation,’ or where there is ‘some other reason to believe that [the] testimony implicates 
confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement.’”  Noting that 
Scarce did not argue any of these factors, the court found that he was “not entitled to a First 
Amendment privilege.” 
 
The court also rejected Scarce’s argument that “Branzburg grants a news gatherer a 




the Government demonstrates that its interest in the information sought out-weighs the news 
gatherer’s First Amendment rights.”  Instead, the only time balancing comes into play, the court 
found, was “in the limited circumstances he mentioned, where there is, in effect, an abuse of the 
grand jury function.” 
 
The court distinguished Farr v. Pitchess, on the basis that that “case-unlike Branzburg or 
the present case-did not involve testimony before a grand jury.”  Therefore, the court felt it 
necessary to balance the “conflicting interests raised by that case where the societal interest was 





Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel 
Stage of Proceeding:  Pretrial discovery. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Investigative Author 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
The plaintiffs subpoenaed an author of a set of books that chronicled a fight between 
members of the family that owned U-Haul after he interviewed the founder of U-Haul.  In a civil 
defamation suit, the plaintiffs, the sons of the U-Haul founder, sued their father for statements he 
made regarding his sons’ involvement in the death of a family member.  The subpoena 
demanded that the author produce notes and tape recordings of the interviews he held with the 
alleged defamer, their father.  The district court ordered the author to comply with the subpoena.  
The district court, after the author’s refusal to comply, granted a motion to compel from the 
plaintiffs. 
 
First, the court reviewed its prior jurisprudence.  It noted that in Farr v. Pitchess, it found 
that Branzburg v. Hayes recognized a qualified privilege.  And, it also noted that “[e]ight of the 
other nine circuits that have decided the question read Branzburg the same way.”  The court 
explained that the privilege was an important one for two reasons.  First, it gave credence to 
“society’s interest in protecting the integrity of the newsgathering process.”  Second, it 
“ensur[ed] the free flow of information to the public.” 
 
Turning to the facts of the case, the court first asked whether the privilege applied to an 
author, as opposed to a journalist.  The court adopted the Second Circuit reasoning, finding a 
privilege even for non-traditional journalists.  As the Second Circuit explained,  
 
The purpose of the journalist’s privilege . . . was not solely to protect newspaper 
or television reporters, but to protect the activity of “investigative reporting” more 
generally.  Thus, . . . it makes no difference whether “[t]he intended manner of 
dissemination [was] by newspaper, magazine, book, public or private broadcast 
medium, [or] handbill” because “[t]he press in its historic connotation 
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and 
opinion.” 
 
The Ninth Circuit concluded, “Indeed, it would be unthinkable to have a rule that an 
investigative journalist, such as Bob Woodward, would be protected by the privilege in his 
capacity as a newspaper reporter writing about Watergate, but not as the author of a book on the 
same topic.” 
 
Next, the court addressed whether the lack of confidentiality destroyed the privilege.  It 




which acknowledged that even divulging information gathered from non-confidential sources 
could “constitute a significant intrusion into the newsgathering and editorial processes.  . . . [I]t 
may substantially undercut the public policy favoring the free flow of information that is the 
foundation for the privilege.” 
 
Turning to the scope of the privilege, the court set down the hard and fast rule that a party 
seeking information from a reporter or author must show “that the information sought is not 
obtainable from another source.”  Here, the court found that the plaintiffs did not make this 
showing, because they “failed to take [the father’s] deposition before trying to penetrate the 




Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel 
Stage of Proceeding:  Discovery 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Investigative Author 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
The plaintiffs subpoenaed an author of a set of books that chronicled a fight between 
members of the family that owned U-Haul after he interviewed the founder of U-Haul.  In a civil 
defamation suit, the plaintiffs, the sons of the U-Haul founder, sued their father for statements he 
made regarding his sons’ involvement in the death of a family member.  The subpoena 
demanded that the author produce notes and tape recordings of the interviews he held with the 
alleged defamer, their father.  The district court ordered the author to comply with the subpoena.  
The district court, after the author’s refusal to comply, order the author jailed; that order was 
stayed for review on appeal. 
 
The court began its discussion by reviewing its previous privilege case.  In that case, the 
Court said, “Rooted in the First Amendment, the privilege is a recognition that society’s interest 
in protecting the integrity of the newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of 
information to the public, is an interest ‘of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental 
sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of justice.’”  The court found in that 
case that the privilege covers authors and also extends to nonconfidential sources and 
information.  Having found a privilege, the court explained that the privilege could only be 
overcome if the subpoenaing party could show that “the information sought is not obtainable 
from another source.” 
 
Next, the court turned to defining a test for when the reporter’s privilege could be 
overcome.  The court noted that it “recognized that routine court-compelled disclosure of 
research materials poses a serious threat to the vitality of the newsgathering process.”  The court 
also emphasized that: 
 
[t]he threat of administrative and judicial intrusion into the newsgathering and 
editorial process; the disadvantage of a journalist appearing to be an investigative 
arm of the judicial system or a research tool of government or of a private party; 
the disincentive to compile and preserve non-broadcast material; and the burden 
on journalists’ time and resources in responding to subpoenas. 
 
The court recognized that the information sought is non-confidential, which was “an 
important element in balancing the . . . need for material sought.”  Thereafter it found that 
defamation plaintiff “is entitled to requested discovery notwithstanding a valid assertion of the 




unavailable despite exhaustion of all reasonable alternative sources; (2) noncumulative; and (3) 
clearly relevant to an important issue in the case.” 
 
Applying the test, the court first rejected the argument that the interview materials were 
relevant to the case.  It did so, because all of the alleged twenty-nine libels occurred before the 
interviews even occurred.  It also found that the material was cumulative, because it was sought 





In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 201 Fed.Appx. 430 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Vandalism. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Grand jury. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Government. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Videographer. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
The subpoenaed party took a videotape of protesters lighting a police car on fire.  The 
grand jury, which believed that the tape “might contain evidence of the perpetrators who set the 
fire,” subpoenaed the videographer.  He refused to comply, and the district court held him in 
contempt. 
 
The circuit court affirmed.  It forcefully explained that, under Branzburg, “[r]eporters 
have no First Amendment right to refuse to answer ‘relevant and material questions asked during 
a good-faith grand jury investigation.’”  The only exception to this rule is under the Scarce 
exceptions and includes bad faith, an illegitimate need, or the evidence sought only bearing 
tangentially on the investigation.  The court found none of these exceptions to be met. 
 
In rejecting the videographer’s common law privilege, the court refused to give credit to 
the chilling effect argument, explaining that that “argument has also been rejected by the 
Supreme Court.”  It did not search below the argument to address whether this situation is 





Tenth Circuit Case Summaries 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Denial of constitutional rights 
Stage of Proceeding:  Discovery. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendant. 
Type of Information Sought: Work product. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Documentary Filmmaker. 
Subpoena quashed?  Remanded. 
 
A documentary filmmaker was subpoenaed by the defendant corporation for “all 
documents and writings in connection with his investigation” of the death of Karen Silkwood.  In 
the case, the defendant corporation allegedly “violated [Silkwood’s] constitutional rights by 
conspiring to prevent her from organizing a labor union, by conspiring to prevent her from filing 
complaints against Kerr-McGee under the Atomic Energy Act and by willfully and wantonly 
contaminating her with toxic plutonium radiation.”  The documentary filmmaker was later 
deposed, but only answered questions not relating to his sources.  During the making of the 
documentary, the filmmaker did offer confidentiality to those who asked for it; “[h]e also assured 
those interviewees who requested that their identities be not revealed that he would respect their 
requests.”  The defendant corporation argued on appeal that “they sought first to get facts 
concerning the basis for [the] lawsuit from the representative plaintiffs” to no avail.   
 
The question was “whether a privilege exists in favor of a non-party witness which 
permits him to resist pretrial discovery in order to protect a confidential source of information.”  
First, the court addressed whether a reporter’s privilege extended to a documentary filmmaker.  It 
held, that under the facts of the case, it did.  As the court said, “His mission in this case was to 
carry out investigative reporting for use in the preparation of a documentary film.”  Moreover, 
the “Supreme Court has not limited the privilege to newspaper reporting. It has in fact held that 
the press comprehends different kinds of publications which communicate to the public 
information and opinion.”  And, “the presence of an underlying public interest in this 
communication and particularly in maintaining it free in the public interest” could not be 
ignored.  Finally, the filmmaker also had “a legitimate interest in seeking to protect the fruits of 
his labor.” 
 
The court then dismissed Branzburg outright: “The Supreme Court in rejecting his claim 
required him to appear and testify before the grand jury, and ruled that the grand jury subpoena 
had to be obeyed.  The actual decision of the Supreme Court is not surprising nor is it important 
in the solution of our problem.”  After citing some general language from Branzburg, the court 
explained that “the present privilege is no longer in doubt[, and i]n holding that a reporter must 
respond to a subpoena, the Court is merely saying that he must appear and testify.  He may, 





Having recognized a privilege – without much analysis or reasoning and in a somewhat 
unclear way – the court went on to explain what factors a court should consider when 
determining whether the privilege applies.  Citing Garland v. Torre, the court found the 
following factors important: “1. Whether the party seeking information has independently 
attempted to obtain the information elsewhere and has been unsuccessful.  2. Whether the 
information goes to the heart of the matter.  3. Whether the information is of certain relevance.  
4. The type of controversy.”  Because the record was incomplete, the court remanded the case 





Donohue v. Hoey, 109 Fed.Appx. 340 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Denial of constitutional rights. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from motion for summary judgment. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiffs. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity and other information. 
Confidentiality:  No. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporters. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
Underlying this case is an extremely protracted murder investigation.  Plaintiffs in this 
case argued that the police department’s investigation into the murder of their family member 
was so bad as to violate their constitutional rights.  At one point during the investigation, an AP 
reporter met with police officers who had worked the case.  It was unclear whether the officers 
were the source of the information, but, in any event, it was clear that the reporter had found out 
several embarrassing facts about the family, which could have discredited their complaints 
against the police department’s handling of the case.  As part of the court case, the plaintiff’s 
subpoenaed to reporters who had written about the murder investigation.  The district court 
quashed these subpoenas. 
 
Mainly due to procedural errors, the court affirmed the quashed subpoenas under its prior 





Eleventh Circuit Case Summaries 
U.S. v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Racketeering. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from trial convicting co-defendants. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendants. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporters. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
Eight defendants were convicted of violating federal racketeering statutes.  “Several 
weeks after the verdict in this case was returned, a Miami newspaper reported that the 
government was conducting an investigation into allegations of jury tampering.  The defendants 
moved for a new trial and other relief based on the news report.  The district court denied the 
motions.” 
 
The government, nonetheless, submitted to remanding the case to the district court in 
order to conduct a hearing regarding the tampering.  At the end of the hearing the jurors were 
deposed, and the “court took evidence from FBI agents and a federal prosecutor who 
investigated the jury tampering claim.”  It also took evidence “from several persons identified as 
possible sources of the rumor.”  At the end of the hearing, the court found that the defendants 
failed to show that “any extrinsic matter had tainted the jury’s deliberation.” 
 
On appeal, the defendants argued that “the court improperly refused to compel the 
testimony of two reporters involved in the spread of the jury tampering rumor.”  The defendants 
had subpoenaed two reporters who wrote articles about the potential jury tampering.  One 
reporter invoked the First Amendment reporter privilege; that reporter, however, “did reveal that 
his information originated from . . . one of the acquitted defendants.”  That reporter also cited 
health reasons.  As such, the court ordered the defendants to submit to the reporter 
interrogatories, which the court would compel the reporter to answer.  The defendants failed to 
submit the interrogatories promptly, however, and, as such, the court never forced the reporter to 
answer any questions. 
 
The circuit affirmed this decision.  It found the district court’s actions reasonable as the 
reporter already divulged the information about his source and the defendants failed to timely 
seek any more information from the reporter. 
 
The second reporter also refused to testify based on a reporter’s privilege.  At the trial 
level, the court found that “the [defendants] failed to show that [the reporter’s] information was 
otherwise unavailable and that there was a compelling interest in securing his testimony.”  The 
court found a reporter’s privilege based on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Miller v. 
Transamerican Press, Inc., which as a result of the Fifth Circuit splitting into the Fifth and 





The Eleventh Circuit found that Miller stands for the proposition that “information may 
only be compelled from a reporter claiming privilege if the party requesting the information can 
show that it is highly relevant, necessary to the proper presentation of the case, and unavailable 
from other sources.” 
 
According to the second reporter’s article, “the FBI had received allegations concerning 
possible tampering.”  Because the defendants had the opportunity to question the FBI agents at 
the jury tampering hearing, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the defendants “failed 
to show that [the second reporter] had information that was unavailable from other sources or 
necessary to the proper presentation of the case in light of the fact that the FBI’s information was 





Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from trial court order enforcing subpoena. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendants. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
Alabama football coach Mike Price took a trip to Pensacola, Florida, where he visited a 
strip club.  After Sports Illustrated published an article about the transgression, Price sued for 
defamation.  He also sought to compel Sports Illustrated and a reporter to identify the source for 
the article about his visiting the strip club. 
 
Initially, Price served interrogatories on the defendants asking them to name the source 
for the information about his visiting the strip club.  The defendants refused, asserting protection 
under the Alabama shield law, as well as a First Amendment reporter’s privilege.  After their 
refusal, Price made a motion to compel their cooperation with the interrogatories. 
 
The reporter did, however, give a deposition.  In the deposition, he answered several 
questions as to the timing and process of his reporting, but again refused to name his confidential 
source.  This was the case despite the source’s version of events being called into question by 
subsequent conversations with several employees of the strip club. 
 
“After hearing argument and considering Yaeger’s deposition testimony, the district court 
concluded that Alabama’s shield law did not apply to magazine reporters like Yaeger, and that 
Price had made a sufficient showing to overcome the First Amendment qualified reporter’s 
privilege that the defendants had asserted.”  Therefore, the “court granted Price’s motion to 
compel the defendants to answer Price’s interrogatories seeking the identity of the confidential 
sources.” 
 
On reconsideration, however, the district court certified to the Alabama Supreme Court 
the question of whether a magazine reporter qualifies for the state’s state shield law protection.  
The Alabama Supreme Court, however, declined to answer the question. 
 
As to the first question of whether a magazine reporter was contemplated under the 
Alabama shield law, the court held that it was not.  Therefore, it moved on to address the First 
Amendment privilege question. 
 
Turning to its First Amendment discussion, the Court began by recognizing that it had 
“held that ‘“a reporter has a First Amendment privilege which protects the refusal to disclose the 
identity of confidential informants.’”  It cited to Branzburg and a binding Fifth Circuit case, 
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc. in support of the proposition.  The privilege is a qualified 





[i]t may be pierced if the party seeking the reporter’s confidential source presents: 
“substantial evidence[:] [1] that the challenged statement was published and is 
both factually untrue and defamatory; [2] that reasonable efforts to discover the 
information from alternative sources have been made and that no other reasonable 
source is available; and [3] that knowledge of the identity of the informant is 
necessary to proper preparation and presentation of the case.” 
 
The court next moved into a discussion about Miller.  It noted that the court protected the 
press in that case because it “thought that there was a way to independently verify the truth of the 
libelous allegations in the article.”  Once that other option was exhausted, however, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that “the privilege is not absolute and [that] in a libel case as is here presented, 
the privilege must yield.” 
 
Equating Miller to the present case, the court found that Price had showed that “the 
challenged statement was published and is both factually untrue and defamatory.”  He did this by 
submitted “[h]is own sworn testimony.”   
 
Moving on to the third element, the court found that the “knowledge of the identity of the 
informant is necessary to proper preparation and presentation of the case.”  Indeed, Price would 
have to prove actual malice, which could only be done by deposing the “source for the allegedly 
libelous comments.”  In so finding, the court approvingly cited several cases, which, essentially 
stood for the general proposition that “[w]hen the journalist is a party, and successful assertion of 
the privilege will effectively shield him from liability, the equities weigh somewhat more heavily 
in favor of disclosure.” 
 
Turning to the second factor, the court explained that “Price must show that he has 
already used ‘reasonable efforts to discover the information from alternative sources’ and that no 
other reasonable means for discovering it are available.”  Price failed to do this.  Although he 
had taken a few depositions, he did not depose all of the women who may have been the 
reporter’s source.  More specifically, the reporter admitted that “the confidential source was one 
of the two women who allegedly had sex with Price.”  Further, he “identified four women” who 
may have been the source as a result of their connection with Price’s Florida hotel room.   
 
The court was comfortable with requiring Price to depose the four women, because it felt 
that it was “virtually certain” that the name of the source would be uncovered.  It thought so, 
because the attorney for the defendants told the court that he would correct any false testimony 
that the confidential source gave by denying that she was, in fact, the confidential source. 
 
Moreover, even if the depositions did not reveal the name of the source, the court 
explained that at that point “Price will have exhausted all reasonable efforts to obtain her identity 





D.C. Circuit Case Summaries 
Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel 
Stage of Proceeding:  Interlocutory appeal. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Columnist. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
A columnist writing the “Washington Merry-Go-Round” accused two union officials of 
falsely claiming that the union headquarters were broken into to cover up the destruction of some 
documents.  The complaint argued that the suggestions in the column were defamatory.  The 
parties engaged in “[e]xtensive discovery proceedings.”  The columnist was deposed. 
 
In responding to the complaint, the columnist explained, “Our report was based upon 
information supplied by eyewitnesses, and we will not retract.”  Upon discovering the existence 
of a source or sources, the plaintiff “asked the identity of those sources.”  The columnist refused 
to name the sources, but “he did indicate that there was more than one such informant, and that 
they were [union] employees.”  He also noted that “[h]e was unsure whether he had taken notes 
of the revelations made to him by his informants, and, if so, whether he had preserved them.” 
 
Thereafter, the plaintiff asked the court to compel the testimony of the columnist’s 
sources.  The court first explained that the high standard of proof developed in New York Times 
v. Sullivan applied in this case, because the plaintiff was a public figure. 
 
Interestingly, the court digressed briefly into an examination of the effect of Sullivan on 
the reporter’s privilege.  Picking up on the Supreme Court’s concern in Sullivan that libel suits 
might cause reporter’s to not write certain stories, the court explained: 
 
On the one hand, the Court’s concern that the spectre of potential libel actions 
might have an inhibiting effect on the exercise of press freedom militates against 
compulsory disclosure of sources.  Contrarily, the heavy burden of proof imposed 
upon the plaintiff in such a case will often make discovery of confidential sources 
critical to any hope of carrying that burden.”   
 
Simply, harassment reasons under Sullivan merited the recognition of the privilege, while the 
high burden of proof in Sullivan seemed to argue against the recognition of a rule that could bar 
plaintiffs from ever recovering. 
 
Next, the court turned to a relatively well-known, court of appeals case, Garland v. 




key factor which the Second Circuit identified as allowing it to move confidently to this 
conclusion was that the ‘question asked of (Torre) went to the heart of the plaintiff’s claim.’” 
 
In Garland, then-Judge Stewart adopted a balancing test: “The decisional process with 
respect to the constitutional issue before it, said the court, involved a determination of ‘whether 
the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies 
some impairment of this First Amendment freedom . . . .’”  Thus, the court in Garland did 
recognize that there would be “some impairment” of First Amendment freedoms by requiring 
testimony. 
 
Stewart recognized in his balancing that “freedom of the press is ‘basic to a free society,’ 
the court went on to say that ‘basic too are courts of justice, armed with the power to discover 
truth’, and that the ‘concept that it is the duty of a witness to testify in a court of law has roots 
fully as deep in our history as does the guarantee of a free press.’”  He went on to explain, “If an 
additional First Amendment liberty — the freedom of the press — is here involved, we do not 
hesitate to conclude that it too must give place under the Constitution to a paramount public 
interest in the fair administration of justice.’”  In sum, Stewart recognized the First Amendment 
issues at stake, but thought that the court’s quest for truth was more important. 
 
Turning back to Sullivan, the court suggested that that case may have “so downgraded 
[defamation’s actions] social importance that a plaintiff’s interest in pressing such a claim can 
rarely, if ever, outweigh a newsman’s interest in protecting his sources.”  Perhaps then, 
defamation claims should be viewed as less important than the grand juries at issue in Branzburg 
v. Hayes: “The tenor of the Court’s opinion in Sullivan may be thought to reflect an attitude 
toward libel actions palpably different from its approach to grand jury proceedings in 
Branzburg.” 
 
The court nevertheless rejected the idea that defamation actions were not important.  
Citing to the Court’s continued citations to Garland, the court explained, “This strongly suggests 
the continuing vitality of the latter case, and negates any inference that the Court does not 
consider the interest of the defamed plaintiff an important one.” 
 
As such, the court rejected the idea that it mattered whether a proceeding was a civil one 
or a criminal one: “Branzburg’s lengthy discussion of a newsman’s duty to testify before a grand 
jury undoubtedly has implications with respect to the deference to be accorded a newsman’s 
claim of privilege in other areas as well.”  It went on to note, “Although the differences between 
civil and criminal proceedings distinguish Branzburg from the case before us, we cannot ignore 
the fact that the interests asserted by the newsmen in the Branzburg trilogy of cases were not 
accorded determinative weight by five members of the Court.”  Notably, the court did, however, 
acknowledge in a footnote that there was some difference between civil and criminal cases in 
this context: 
 
Although it is certainly necessary to consider carefully the emphasis in Branzburg 
upon the public interest in the giving of testimony, we do not believe that it 
automatically controls this case.  This is a civil libel suit rather than a grand jury 




private litigant rather than between the press and the Government.  This 
difference is of some importance, since the central thrust of Justice White’s 
opinion for the Court concerns the traditional importance of grand juries and the 
strong public interest in effective enforcement of the criminal law.  Justice White 
also relied on the various procedures available to prosecutors and grand juries to 
protect informants and on careful use by the Government of the power to compel 
testimony.  Private litigants are not similarly charged with the public interest and 
may be more prone to seek wholesale and indiscriminate disclosure. 
 
In an odd turn, however, the court in the next paragraph explained that Branzburg did not 
“seem to disturb the basic balancing approach set forth in Garland”: That approach essentially is 
that the court will look to the facts on a case-by-case basis in the course of weighing the need for 
the testimony in question against the claims of the newsman that the public’s right to know is 
impaired.” 
 
Turning to the facts of this case, the court first noted that the “most important factor” in 
Garland – whether “the information sought appears to go to the heart of appellee’s libel action” 
– weighed in favor of the plaintiff. 
 
Next, the court asked if the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous.”  The court held that it was 
not.  It distinguished the present case from the Eighth Circuit’s case Cervantes v. Time, Inc.  In 
Cervantes, the court held that the Eighth Circuit did not require the reporter to divulge his 
sources, because “regardless of the identity of the confidential sources, the plaintiff would be 
unable to establish malice.”  It continued, “[T]he extensive documentation and uncontroverted 
accuracy of the bulk of the article, combined with the evidence as to the prolonged, careful, and 
comprehensive nature of the defendant’s investigation, made it so unlikely that the plaintiff could 
succeed in his suit that compulsory disclosure of the confidential source was unwarranted.” 
Contrasting the current case with Cervantes, the court found that the present case showed no 
evidence of an extensive investigation similar to that in Cervantes.  Indeed, “[a]side from the 
confirmation of the burglary report, his description of appellee’s actions appears to have been 
based solely on the confidential sources in question.”  As such, the Court concluded, “[T]he facts 
disclosed by the record before us at this time are inadequate to support a conclusion that appellee 
is so unlikely to meet the admittedly heavy Sullivan burden that no purpose would be served by 
disclosure of the identity of the sources.” 
 
Finally, the court turned to whether the information could be obtained from another 
source.  As the court explained, “The values resident in the protection of the confidential sources 
of newsmen certainly point towards compelled disclosure from the newsman himself as normally 
the end, and not the beginning, of the inquiry.”  Here, because the reporter’s own “vague” 
information as to where the information came from was “imprecise,” the court found that the 
plaintiff could not know “where to begin” finding the information from another source.  Thus, 
the court explained: 
 
The courts must always be alert to the possibilities of limiting impingements upon 
press freedom to the minimum; and one way of doing so is to make compelled 




failed, But neither must litgants [sic] be made to carry wide-ranging and onerous 
discovery burdens where the path is as ill-lighted as that emerging from 




Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Interlocutory appeal. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Government. 
Type of Information Sought: Telephone numbers. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Columnist. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
Reporters Committee is a special case.  Here, journalists, among others, brought an action 
against telephone companies arguing that “the First . . . Amendment[] require[s] that prior notice 
be provided to them before defendants turn over their long distance telephone billing records to 
Government law enforcement officials.”  The United States intervened and the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the telephone companies and the United States. 
The telephone records that the government would request from reporters revealed the number 
that reporters would call, but not the content of the conversation that the reporter and the source 
had with each other.  The telephone companies would not release the number information unless 
the government presented “a subpoena or summons, valid on its face, issued under the authority 
of a statute, court, or legislative body.”  They would normally also notify the subscriber reporter 
as soon as the subpoena was requested. 
 
At one point, the journalists sent the telephone companies a letter “demanding assurances 
that their toll-billing records and those of other journalists . . . not be released to government 
investigative agencies without prior notice to the journalists concerned.”   
 
After the telephone companies failed to give those assurances, the journalists filed a 
complaint that “sought a judicial declaration that it was unlawful for defendants to release the 
toll-billing records of journalists to government investigative agencies without prior notification 
to the journalists concerned.” 
 
According to the court, the government had only issued five subpoenas against 
journalists, while the total number of subpoenas issued ran up to 100,000.  Because the 
subpoenas were only issued in the instance of criminal investigations and not civil investigations, 
the court stated that “the central issue . . . [is] whether plaintiffs are entitled to prior notice of 
subpoenas issued in the course of criminal investigations.” 
 
As to the First Amendment, “Plaintiffs contend[ed] that, as journalists, they are entitled 
under the First Amendment to prior notice of toll-call-record subpoenas issued in the course of 
felony investigations.”  They argued this for two reasons. 
 
“The first theory relates to the impact of good faith toll-call-record subpoenas on 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights and the need for judicial balancing before such records are 






Plaintiffs develop this theory as follows: 
(1) The First Amendment guarantees journalists the freedom to gather 
information from clandestine sources. 
  
(2) Because toll-call records may disclose the identity of a clandestine 
source, this freedom is abridged whenever the Government gains access to 
a journalist’s toll records, even where access is gained in the course of a 
Good faith felony investigation. 
  
(3) In order to determine whether this infringement on First Amendment 
rights is justified, the Government’s investigation “interests” must be 
judicially balanced in each case against the journalist’s First Amendment 
“interests”. 
  
(4) A journalist, therefore, must receive prior notice of a toll-record 
subpoena so that he may challenge the subpoena and thus prompt the 
requisite judicial balancing before the records are released. 
 
Second, the journalists argued that the must be notified of a subpoena when that subpoena is 
issued in bad faith. 
 
The court summarized these arguments, explaining, “Common to both theories is the 
proposition that journalists have a right under the First Amendment to gather information from 
clandestine sources.” 
 
The court began its analysis, noting, “[T]he Supreme Court specifically noted in 
Branzburg v. Hayes that First Amendment challenges to Good faith investigative action and First 
Amendment challenges to Bad faith investigative action ‘pose wholly different issues for 
resolution.’” 
 
As to the plaintiffs’ first argument, the court asked first “whether Government access to 
toll-call records in the course of a good faith felony investigation actually “Abridges” a 
“freedom” guaranteed plaintiffs under the First Amendment.” 
 
The court first explained that the government could issue a “grand jury subpoena [to] the 
journalist and compel him to disclose his source.”  This, the court found, would be completely 
acceptable under Branzburg: “According to the Court, the journalist may be Required to testify 
in any and all good faith criminal investigations there is no case-by-case consideration given to a 
claim of privilege.” 
 
The court further explained, “The Court found that the possibility that a source might 
refuse or be reluctant to furnish information to a journalist out of fear that his identity might be 





Building on Branzburg’s holding, the court found that “[i]t is logically inescapable that 
if, as held, journalists have no right to resist such subpoenas [to testify in court], then they 
certainly have no right to resist good faith subpoenas duces tecum directed at a third-party’s 
business records.”   
 
The court thought that the plaintiffs’ arguments here were even bolder and less supported 
by Branzburg than the plaintiffs’ arguments in Branzburg, because in Branzburg plaintiffs 
argued for a personal right not to testify.  Here, on the other hand, “plaintiffs [argue] that the 
First Amendment entitles them to reach out and suppress the testimony of third parties whom 
they have injudiciously made witting of their secrets.”  The court concluded: 
 
It is thus clear from Branzburg and related cases that the freedom to gather 
information guaranteed by the First Amendment is the freedom to gather 
information subject to the general and incidental burdens that arise from good 
faith enforcement of otherwise valid criminal and civil laws that are not 
themselves solely directed at curtailing the free flow of information. 
 
Even after rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument, the court went on to hold that “it is clear that 
Government access to defendants’ toll-call records in no sense ‘abridges’ plaintiffs’ news-
gathering activities within the meaning of the First Amendment.”  Simply, the court did not feel 
that the government’s attempts to discover reporters’ sources actually weighed on speech in any 
event: 
 
Not every Government action that affects, has an impact on, or indeed inhibits 
First Amendment activity constitutes the kind of “abridgment” condemned by the 
First Amendment.  Historically considered, freedom of the press means primarily, 
although not exclusively, immunity from prior restraints or censorship, but the 
guarantee also affords protection from the imposition of post-publication 
sanctions and punishments.  Additionally, in recent years, the Supreme Court has 
found in a number of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the 
deterrent, or “chilling”, effect of governmental action that falls short of a direct 
prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights.  Yet not every 
Government action that has an inhibiting or constrictive impact on First 
Amendment activity is said therefore to have an impermissible “chilling effect.”  
The constrictive impact must arise from the present or future exercise, or 
threatened exercise, of coercive power. 
 
Here, the government’s investigative powers only touched incidentally on the “journalists’ 
information-gathering.”  Thus, there was no “abridgment” of speech.  
 
Second, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ argument that they had a First Amendment 
right to be free from bad faith subpoenas against telephone companies.  The court agreed that, if 
the plaintiffs’ allegations that the government had issued subpoenas to harass journalists, “there 
[would] be no doubt that . . . such bad faith action would constitute an abridgment of a 
journalist’s First Amendment rights.”  As the court explained, “[W]hile the First Amendment 




good faith law enforcement investigation, it does protect such activities from official 
harassment”  The court thought this was so, because: 
 
[u]nlike good faith investigation to which all citizens are subject, official 
harassment places a Special burden on information-gathering, for In such cases 
the ultimate, though tacit, design is to obstruct rather than to investigate, and the 
official action is proscriptive rather than observatory in character. 
 
Nonetheless, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the remedy in such cases was 
“ongoing judicial audit of future government investigations in order to screen out bad faith 
subpoenas.”  Without a showing that the government would inflict “an imminent threat of harm 






Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Privacy Act and Fourth Amendment violations. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Summary Judgment. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiffs. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
Zerilli and a co-plaintiff brought an action against several government officials, alleging 
that the officials “violated their constitutional and statutory rights by leaking to the Detroit News 
transcripts of conversations in which [they] discussed various illegal activities.”  The plaintiffs 
deposed the reporter for the Detroit News and asked him from whom he received the transcripts.  
The reporter refused to provide the names to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs filed a motion to 
compel the reporter to do so.  The district court denied the motion to compel and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the United States. 
 
In a prior criminal trial against the plaintiffs, the government confessed that it had, in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, tapped the phones of the plaintiffs.  As a result, the 
transcripts of those recording were suppressed and the district court judge “ordered that the logs 
be sealed, forbidding their dissemination to the public.” 
 
Despite this, the Detroit News would later publish several articles implicating the 
plaintiffs in Detroit’s mafia culture.  The articles themselves indicated that they were based on 
the sealed transcripts.  The government denied that any government officials gave the transcripts 
to the newspaper. 
 
The plaintiffs’ attorneys accepted the government’s denial as true, because “[t]hey 
hoped” doing so would satisfy the First Amendment requirement concerning the reporter’s 
privilege that they “show that they had exhausted any alternative sources of information.”  
Because the plaintiffs’ counsel accepted the government’s statement, they did not question 
several government employees. 
 
Thereafter, plaintiffs deposed the reporter, who refused to disclose the names of his 
sources.  Plaintiffs then sought to compel the reporter’s answer, “claiming that their rights as 
civil litigants superseded the reporter’s qualified First Amendment privilege.”  The district court 
denied the plaintiffs’ motion and granted the government’s summary judgment motion. 
At the appellate level, plaintiffs argued that the district court erred, because “the First 
Amendment reporter’s privilege should not prevail, since their interest in disclosure outweighs 
any public interest in protecting the sources.”   
 
Turning to the merits, the court first explained that “[c]ompelling a reporter to disclose 
the identity of a confidential source raises obvious First Amendment problems.”  More 




The First Amendment guarantees a free press primarily because of the important 
role it can play as “a vital source of public information.”  “The press was 
protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.”  
Without an unfettered press, citizens would be far less able to make informed 
political, social, and economic choices.  But the press’ function as a vital source 
of information is weakened whenever the ability of journalists to gather news is 
impaired.  Compelling a reporter to disclose the identity of a source may 
significantly interfere with this news gathering ability; journalists frequently 
depend on informants to gather news, and confidentiality is often essential to 
establishing a relationship with an informant. 
 
In an attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court’s holding in Branzburg v. Hayes, the 
court explained that the Court only rejected an absolute privilege, because of “the traditional 
importance of grand juries and the strong public interest in effective criminal investigation[s].”  
The court went on to characterize that case as standing for the proposition that “a qualified 
privilege would be available in some circumstances even where a reporter is called before a 
grand jury to testify.” 
 
Next, the court limited the scope of Branzburg: “Although Branzburg may limit the 
scope of the reporter’s First Amendment privilege in criminal proceedings, this circuit has 
previously held that in civil cases, where the public interest in effective criminal law 
enforcement is absent, that case is not controlling.”  Relying on its earlier case, Carey v. Hume, 
the court explained that in the case of civil actions “[w]e held that to determine whether the 
privilege applies courts should look to the facts of each case, weighing the public interest in 
protecting the reporter’s sources against the private interest in compelling disclosure.”  It 
supported its decision by explaining that “[e]very other circuit that has considered the question 
has also ruled that a privilege should be readily available in civil cases, and that a balancing 
approach should be applied.” 
 
The court began its balancing analysis by explaining that “[i]n general, when striking the 
balance between the civil litigant’s interest in compelled disclosure and the public interest in 
protecting a newspaper’s confidential sources, we will be mindful of the preferred position of the 
First Amendment and the importance of a vigorous press.”  As such, “in the ordinary case the 
civil litigant’s interest in disclosure should yield to the journalist’s privilege.” 
 
The court thought this must be the case, because “if the privilege does not prevail in all 
but the most exceptional cases, its value will be substantially diminished.  Unless potential 
sources are confident that compelled disclosure is unlikely, they will be reluctant to disclose any 
confidential information to reporters.” 
 
Next, the court explained that courts should examine several factors: first, the court 
should look to see if the “information sought goes to ‘the heart of the matter,’” and second, the 






The court also stated that whether the reporter was a party to the action or not should 
enter the calculus.  As the court said, “When the journalist is a party, and successful assertion of 
the privilege will effectively shield him from liability, the equities weigh somewhat more heavily 
in favor of disclosure.”  Despite this, the court cautioned against indiscriminate disclosure orders 
anytime the reporter was a party to the action. 
 
In this case, the court found that the plaintiffs’ suit was “not frivolous” and the names of 
the sources were “crucial to their case.”  Nonetheless, the court found that they had not “fulfilled 
their obligation to exhaust possible alternative sources of information.”  As such, at present, they 
could not overcome the reporter’s privilege. 
 
A concurring judge agreed with the court’s decision that the plaintiffs had not exhausted 
all reasonable sources of the information before going after the reporter’s testimony.  He did not, 
however, “join in the broad statements concerning the ‘reporter’s privilege’ set out in the 





Clyburn v. News World Communications, Inc., 903 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Libel. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Summary Judgment. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiffs. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
The Washington Times wrote an article suggesting that the plaintiff “waited ‘several 
critical hours’” to call an ambulance for another person who later died.  The court found that the 
plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure and, as such, had to prove actual malice. 
 
The plaintiff argued that the name of the one single source that evidently suggested that 
the plaintiff waited several hours to call an ambulance was needed to prove actual malice.  The 
court, citing Zerilli v. Smith, disagreed:  
 
We recognize that where the primary source of evidence is the reporter’s own 
(naturally self-interested) testimony of what a confidential source told him, the 
combination of the burden of proof and the reporter’s privilege to withhold the 
source’s identity confront a defamation plaintiff with unusual difficulties. But the 
reporter’s privilege is a qualified one.  If the plaintiff exhausts all reasonable 
alternative means of identifying the source, the privilege may yield.  Here the 
district court found that Clyburn ‘utterly failed’ to pursue “obvious alternative 





U.S. v. Ahn, 231 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
Stage of Proceeding:  Appeal from Motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Defendant. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  Yes. 
 
The defendant, Ahn, a police officer in the District of Columbia, pled guilty to “receiving 
illegal gratuities from massage parlors that were flagrantly violating local law.”  The defendant 
later sought to withdraw his guilty plea.  He argued, in part, that “the Government breached its 
duty of good faith and an implied promise of secrecy by leaking information to news media 
about his arrest, and submits that the district court erred in quashing a subpoena he sought in 
order to obtain the confidential sources of the reporters who broadcast the story.” 
 
After Ahn made an agreement with the government, the case was sealed.  At the same 
time, “Ahn was secretly assisting the Government in a sting operation attempting to catch then-
Mayor Marion Barry accepting a bribe.”  At that time, “two televised news reports described 
Ahn’s arrest.”  Thereafter, “Ahn filed a motion to withdraw his plea, contending that by leaking 
information about his case the Government had breached its implied promise to maintain the 
secrecy of his cooperation.”  The district court denied Ahn’s motion, however.  It held that “Ahn 
failed to establish that the Government had leaked the information.” 
 
On appeal, “Ahn contend[ed] that only one way exist[ed] for him to prove that the 
Government caused the leak and thereby breached its duty of good faith: by subpoenaing the 
reporters to reveal their sources.”  The reporters moved to quash these subpoenas.  The district 
court sided with the reporters: “The district court found that the reporters’ testimony was not 
‘essential and crucial’ to Ahn’s case and was not relevant to determining Ahn’s guilt or 
innocence.”  Despite this being a criminal proceeding, the court affirmed the district court’s 
finding of a privilege, holding that “Ahn failed to carry his burden” of showing that the 





Lee v. Department of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Civil – Privacy Act 
Stage of Proceeding:  Motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Plaintiff. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identity. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
Wen Ho Lee, a Department of Energy employee, was investigated by the government “on 
suspicion of espionage.”  He later plead guilty to one count of “mishandling . . . classified 
computer files.”  After the indictment, Lee filed a complaint against several government agencies 
that he alleged “had improperly disclosed personal information about Lee and about the 
investigation to members of the news media.” 
 
In early 1999, several news agencies reported about the investigation of Lee.  Later 
articles named Lee explicitly.  Lee “claimed that the leaked information included his and his 
wife’s employment history, their financial transactions, details of their trips to Hong Kong and 
China,” and other things.  According to the record, Lee “made at least 420 written requests to the 
government defendants, but was largely rebuffed by assertions of law enforcement privilege and 
learned nothing identifying the source of the leaks.”  Lee also deposed six Department of Energy 
employees, but those employees were “unable (or unwilling) to identify the leaker(s).” 
 
As a result of these failed attempts, Lee subpoenaed a group of journalists who had 
previously written about him.  Although the journalists attempted to quash the subpoenas, the 
district court denied the motions and ordered the journalists to “truthfully answer questions as to 
the identity of any officer or agent of defendants.”  The court did so after finding under the 
Zerilli v. Smith test that the information sought went to “the heart of the matter[,]” and Lee had 
“exhausted ‘every reasonable alternative source of information’ so that journalists are not simply 
a default source of information for plaintiffs.” 
 
On appeal, the reporters argued that “the First Amendment and federal common law 
create a privilege that protects the right of a journalist to conceal confidential sources of 
information in the face of otherwise legitimate compulsion of testimony in federal courts.” 
 
Reviewing its prior jurisprudence, the court explained that the D.C. Circuit “limited the 
applicability of the Branzburg precedent to the circumstances considered by the court in 
Branzburg-that is, the context of a criminal proceeding, or even more specifically, a grand jury 
subpoena.”  Indeed, under Carey v. Hume, the court explained that it had suggested “that some 
such privilege might survive Branzburg in the context of a civil action.”  The court recognized 
that it went even further in Zerilli v. Smith to hold that “there is a reporter’s privilege in civil 
actions, and that ‘in the ordinary case the civil litigant’s interest in disclosure should yield to the 




Nonetheless, under the standard of review, the court found that the district court “did not 
abuse its discretion in requiring the journalists to testify.”  First, the information was crucial, 
because if Lee could not discover the name of the sources for the stories, he could not prove 
essential elements of his Privacy Act case.  Indeed, even though success “might be possible” 
without the sources’ identities, it would be “very unlikely.”   
 
The court also found that Lee had exhausted alternative avenues to discovering the 
information.  As a general rule, “the number of depositions necessary for exhaustion must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.”  According to the court, “While Lee did not depose every 
individual who conceivably could have leaked the information, Carey makes clear that this is not 
necessary.”  Even though other sources existed, the court believed that requiring Lee to depose 






In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 
Type of Proceeding:  Criminal – Disclosure of classified information 
Stage of Proceeding:  Grand Jury. 
Party Requesting Subpoena: Government. 
Type of Information Sought: Source identities, among other things. 
Confidentiality:  Yes. 
State of Publication:  Unpublished. 
Type of Person Subpoenaed: Reporter. 
Subpoena quashed?  No. 
 
In 2003, President Bush told the country in his State of the Union Address that “[t]he 
British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of 
uranium from Africa.”  Shortly thereafter, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson wrote an editorial 
for the New York Times where he explained that he was sent to Africa to determine whether that 
assessment was credible.  He concluded that it was not and disclosed that information in the 
editorial. 
 
After the editorial was published, a columnist for the Chicago Sun-Times, Robert Novak, 
disclosed in a column that Wilson’s wife was a covert CIA operative.  According to the media at 
the time, “[T]wo top White House officials called at least six Washington journalists and 
disclosed the identity and occupation of Wilson’s wife.”  As such, several articles disclosed the 
identity of Wilson’s wife. 
 
As a result of the leak a grand jury was impaneled.  The grand jury later issued a 
subpoena to one reporter, Matthew Cooper, but he refused to cooperate.  He also made a motion 
to quash the subpoena, which was denied.  The grand jury also subpoenaed Cooper’s employer, 
Time, but Time also made a motion to quash that subpoena.  That motion was denied, and the 
court later held both parties in civil contempt. 
 
Thereafter, while an appeal was pending, Cooper worked out a deal with the prosecutor 
and “agreed to provide testimony and documents relevant to a specific source who had stated 
that he had no objection to their release.”  As such, the contempt order was vacated.  Later, 
however, the grand jury would issue another far-reaching subpoena asking for documents 
relating to his sources for his articles. 
 
The grand jury also issued a subpoena to Judith Miller, “seeking documents and 
testimony related to conversations between her and a specified government official.”  The district 
court also denied the motion to quash that Miller would file.  It also held her in contempt. 
 
Both Cooper and Miller appealed, arguing four separate points.  First, they claimed that 
“the First Amendment affords journalists a constitutional right to conceal their confidential 
sources even against the subpoenas of grand juries.”  Second and third, they argued that the 
common law protected them from disclosing sources.  Finally, they argued that “the Special 






As to the First Amendment claim, the reporters asserted that the lower court’s holding 
that “a reporter called to testify before a grand jury regarding confidential information enjoys no 
First Amendment protection” was erroneous.  The court disagreed. 
 
First, it refused to distinguish Branzburg v. Hayes: 
 
Each of the reporters in Branzburg claimed to have received communications 
from sources in confidence, just as the journalists before us claimed to have done.  
At least one of the petitioners in Branzburg had witnessed the commission of 
crimes.  On the record before us, there is at least sufficient allegation to warrant 
grand jury inquiry that one or both journalists received information concerning 
the identity of a covert operative of the United States from government employees 
acting in violation of the law by making the disclosure.  Each petitioner in 
Branzburg and each journalist before us claimed or claims the protection of a 
First Amendment reporter’s privilege.  The Supreme Court in no uncertain terms 
rejected the existence of such a privilege.  As we said at the outset of this 
discussion, the Supreme Court has already decided the First Amendment issue 
before us today. 
 
The court concluded, “Unquestionably, the Supreme Court decided in Branzburg that there is no 
First Amendment privilege protecting journalists from appearing before a grand jury or from 
testifying before a grand jury or otherwise providing evidence to a grand jury regardless of any 
confidence promised by the reporter to any source.” 
 
Moreover, the court refused to read a limit on the opinion in Branzburg based on Justice 
Powell’s concurring opinion, because he “joined the majority by its terms.”  The court also 
refused to give any credence to its prior case, Zerilli v. Smith, stating that that case was not 
controlling, because it was decided in the civil context.  The court went on to reject the reporters’ 
non-constitutional arguments as well. 
 
Judge Tatel wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize that he found Branzburg “more 
ambiguous than [his] colleagues [did].”  He argued that the balancing test set forth in Justice 
Powell’s concurring opinion “must have meant, at the very least, that the First Amendment 
demands a broader notion of ‘harassment’ for journalists than for other witnesses.”  
Nevertheless, he joined the majority’s view that the First Amendment did not protect the 
reporters, because “although this circuit has limited Branzburg in other contexts, with respect to 
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